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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this inquiry was to investigate the meaning of the concept
governance in order to answer the central research question “can school boards
govern?” While the importance of the governance of organizations is widely
acknowledged in the literature, the governance of local school boards has seldom
been a central focus of research. The duality of governing and being governed
experienced by school boards is not characteristic of board governance in the private
and nonprofit sectors and so made school boards an exceptional area of governance
research.
The method of inquiry was to subject the central concept of governance to a
conceptual analysis. The analysis drew from a spectrum of normative and academic
literatures, from governance in broad political and organizational contexts to board
governance in private, public, and nonprofit organizations. It then focused on the
evolution of school boards in Ontario with attention to shifts in how school board
governance was understood including conflicts over power, authority, areas of
competence, and responsibility for the public good.
Three central themes emerged. First, that governance, although described and
discussed in different contexts from a variety of critical perspectives, has a number of
consistent and essential characteristics or features. These are power, authority, and
fiduciality, and legitimacy, governance as political and oriented toward public good.
Second, governance is subject to internal and external conditions, constraints, and
circumstances. These internal and external influences are treated as contingent
features. Finally, board governance is a social practice. As such, the activities of

board members in the act of governing contribute to the outcomes of governance,
both positive and negative.
The analysis provides a point of reference for understanding and discussing
school boards as governing bodies. Essential and contingent governance features
afford a language for school boards (and other governing boards) to assess their
practice and facilitate reasoned conversation about roles, responsibilities, and ethical
issues.
The inquiry concludes that school boards in Ontario can govern and identifies
implications for the practice of school board governance.

KEYWORDS: governance, board governance, school boards, conceptual analysis,
social practice
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND, RESEARCH QUESTION,
SIGNIFICANCE AND APPROACH TO INQUIRY
It is hardly an exaggeration to note that more is known about the
operation of medieval merchant guilds than about the boards that govern
our school districts.
W. G. Howell (2005)
In my early thirties, I was appointed to a provincial board of directors. Pleased
that I might follow his example, my grandfather gave me his briefcase. Throughout his
life he had been a notable, sought after board member on numerous corporate and
nonprofit boards. I carried his briefcase with me to board meetings and learned what I
could about being a board member. Board governance was different from my other
volunteer activities. Initially it did not bring a sense of accomplishment or tangible
results, of making a difference. It was difficult to know what it was I was supposed to
be doing and what we were supposed to accomplish as a governing body.
Understanding organizational objectives was much easier than appreciating my
governance role. Board meetings were boring, endless, unfocused, and I often went
home feeling drained by the inertia. I was unsure about both the meaning and practice
of board governance but stayed with it until it became a part of my personal history and
professional practice. Over time, I have experienced many internal and external factors
that change from board to board and influence the practice of board governance. Yet,
even as I posed the central question of this thesis, can school boards govern? I was
perplexed about the concept of governance, as an abstraction, a social practice, and a
political phenomenon.
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The processes that informed my knowing and behaving in relation to
governance have been incremental (through experience and life-long learning) and
punctuated (through intense governance experiences). Gersick (1991) notes the
importance of ending old deep structures before trying to initiate new ones. For me,
this meant learning about the role and practice of board governance as my grandfather
understood it within its social and historical context, and working to uncover the
meaning and essence of board governance as it was viewed then, and now.
Sartori (1984) noted in his work on concepts that “as we are all prisoners of the
words we choose ... we had better choose them well” (p. 60). Everyday language is
often imprecise and ambiguous. This is certainly true of “governance,” used broadly by
different people to indicate different meanings and used inconsistently in different
contexts to designate various activities associated with government, the exercise of
authority, or a method or system of government or management. Indeed, as Krahmann
(2003) observes, the use of the term governance “ranges from definitions that subsume
any form of social coordination to policy-making in the absence of an overarching
political authority” (p.323).
My intent in this thesis was to analyze the concept of governance as is it used in
several diverse domains; to draw from this literature key features that are generally
accepted as essential to the concept of governance; and to review the practice of school
board governance (in Ontario) with the intent of answering the question, can school
boards govern? Although we cannot see board governance, we can observe what
people say and write about it and can look at the practice of board governance to derive
its essential features.

3

Framing the Research
Board Governance
Every corporation, regardless of sector-be it private, public or nonprofit-is a
legal entity whose affairs must be managed. That responsibility is vested in boards of
directors. Boards face a dual responsibility. They represent the stakeholders of the
organization and are warranted by law to reasonably conduct the affairs of the
organization.
According to Rosell (1992), board governance is about oversight and guiding,
the processes by which an organization is steered. All boards are expected to govern by
exercising their authority, direction, and control to discharge certain legal and oversight
obligations that ensure that organizational purposes are achieved (Chait, Holland, &
Taylor, 1996; Gill, 2005).
Board governance across all sectors has faced difficult challenges since the early
1990s, because of policy shifts, restructuring initiatives, emergent complex needs, and
possibly enhanced legal liability, requiring substantive levels of collaboration, and
fierce competition for limited resources. Boards in the private and nonprofit sectors
have seemed better situated than school boards to respond to these challenges.
Nonprofit and private-sector boards govern autonomously within broadly understood
legal and fiduciary expectations. They are situated at the apex of their organizations,
answerable to their stakeholders and various publics. Although they may be
accountable for meeting particular legislative requirements, ultimately they are fully
and completely responsible for all organizational outcomes. In contrast, public school
boards are constrained by their mandated structure and functions and may be less able
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to exercise the potential of board governance to the fullest, which gives rise to the
question at the core of this inquiry.
Differences in how governance has evolved in public school boards brought me
to the central question to this study: can school boards govern? More precisely, is it
possible for contemporary school boards to govern in accord with public expectations
and as embodied in current board governance theory? As a long-time board member
and educator with nonprofit, public, and private-sector boards, I was struck by what I
perceived as the limited authority and autonomy that school boards can bring to bear in
the exercise of their mandated governance tasks. Although school boards retain specific
responsibilities for planning, monitoring, hiring, and oversight, the concept of board
governance developed in the research literature is broad. Indeed, it encompasses such
tasks as directing the activities of the organization, securing resources, and accounting
publicly for their use, as well as developing policy and broad strategic planning (Chait,
Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Gill, 2005; Houle, 1997; Plumtre & Graham, 1999). For school
boards in Ontario, these latter governance responsibilities are subject to regulations and
approval by the provincial government.

Boards and Organizations
According to Parsons (1960), organizations are important “as they are the
principal mechanism in which, in a highly differentiated society, it is possible to get
things done, to achieve goals beyond the reach of the individual” (p.41). These “goaldirected, boundary-maintaining, and socially constructed systems of human activity”
(Aldrich, 1979, p. 4) are comprised of any number of subsystems, such as departments,

programs, teams, and boards. Each of these subsystems works toward accomplishing
the overall goals of the organization. From an organizational perspective, the role of
boards, the governing subsystem found in all incorporated organizations, is to oversee
the business of the organization (Miller-Milleson, 2003; Mintzberg, 1989; Widmer,
1993).

Background to the Inquiry
Canadians have long believed that elected school boards should govern local
public school districts. The Alberta School Board Association (2008) affirms this
belief, describing the philosophy that underpins school board governance as that of
representative government, most effective when it is close to the people being governed.
Education is believed by many to be primarily a public good in which society has a
stake and from which it will benefit when it is delivered as a public service (Sale, 1993).
As such, Canadian public education remains principally a public undertaking within
which community residents elect trustees to govern their local schools, within limits set
by provincial legislatures (Henley & Young, 2008).
It has been claimed that school boards are the oldest form of elected
representation in the country (Ministry of Education, 2006). They are certainly the
principal method of governing school districts in Canada. According to the Royal
Commission on Learning (1994), “school boards are necessary [for] translating
provincial policy into local contexts, for setting local priorities, and for providing co
ordination and support for their schools” (p. 10). School boards are accountable to the
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provincial government1 for the proper execution of their duties and powers, and to their
electorate for responding to the education needs of the local community.
The past ten years have brought marked changes to school board governance in
Canada, particularly in Ontario. In a time of intense educational reforms driven by
increased competition for public resources and demands for more rigorous
accountability, school boards have been restructured and reformed and, by necessity,
have adapted, changed, and regrouped. Mandated amalgamations, loss of taxation
authority, budget controls, and demands for improved student performance have
exposed school boards to greater public scrutiny and research attention. These reforms
have required school boards to govern in new circumstances under a more centralized
mandate. Within accountability and reporting frameworks established by governments,
elected school boards remain responsible for governing their local school districts, with
ultimate accountability to the Ministry of Education. The duality of governing and
being governed experienced by school boards is not typical of board governance in the
private and nonprofit sectors and so makes school boards an exceptional area of
governance research.

The Problem o f Governance
It is rare to read something about board governance without reference to
effective governance, and setting criteria for effective governance has been central to
many reviews (e.g. Cadbury Report, Great Britain, 1992; Toronto Stock Exchange Dey
1
Section 230.12 (1) o f the Education Act o f Ontario states: Where a board fails to comply with
any order, direction or decision o f the Minister under this Part, the Minister may, on the notice, if any,
that he or she considers appropriate, do or order done all things necessary for compliance with the order,
direction or decision, and may exercise all the powers o f the board for the purpose, under its name.
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Report, Canada, 1994; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S.A., 2002). As structures of statute and
representatives of their electorates, school boards are obliged to govern effectively.
Ultimately, effective governance is believed to support school districts in ensuring
educational programs that meet the needs of all children in their jurisdictions (Campbell
& Green, 1994; Carver, 2000; Goodman & Zimmerman, 2000; Resnick & Seamon,
1999). Yet, according to Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1996), who studied American
college and university boards over a five-year period, “effective governance by a board
of trustees is a rare and unnatural act” (p.l). Herman, Renz, and Heimovics (1997)
contend that conceptualizing board effectiveness is a difficult task, and currently there
is no agreement on measurement criteria or tools. Other than Chait et al (1996), who
worked directly with board members, most researchers have judged governance
effectiveness using survey information completed by chief executives. Fletcher (1999)
found higher attendance at board meetings and longer CEO experience were associated
with “good boards” as perceived by CEOs, but maintained that more studies were
needed to generalize this finding. A Canadian study (Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin,
1992) found that board involvement in strategic planning was important to perceptions
of board effectiveness by CEOs but noted that these were only judgements about
effectiveness, and were not borne out by empirical evidence. The research by Herman
et al (1997) concluded that different stakeholders (such as trustees, funders, senior staff,
the public) have varying views on what constitutes board effectiveness, leaving boards
open to judgments from multiple constituencies using both objective and subjective
criteria. These findings call attention to the problematic and inconsistent nature of

8

effectiveness judgements and the importance of expanding effectiveness research
beyond CEO judgements (Ostrower & Stone, 2006).
Concerns expressed by government regarding ineffective school boards suggest
that failure to govern effectively is not so much a result of systemic limitations as
inadequate skill and effort by board members. Although educational activities are
offered to trustees, Ostrower and Stone (2006) argue that “the gap between what boards
are supposed to do and what they actually do is considerable” (p. 613) and challenge the
belief that educating trustees will help them govern. Voicing a similar sentiment, Sasso
(2003) observed “that while few professionals have ever seen a truly successful board,
everyone knows what one looks like” (p.1485), reinforcing the assumption that learning
about governance does not necessarily lead to its effective practice. Ostrower and
Stone, in discussing future directions for effectiveness studies, argue that effectiveness
is a contingent concept. They contend that various internal and external environments
influence boards and that no one model of effectiveness will be suitable for all
organizations. It is likely that the question of governance effectiveness may benefit
from greater clarity about the concept of governance itself.

Working Conceptions
Even though meanings and ideas are not communicated exclusively through
language, an initial explanation of certain terms used in this thesis will help to prevent
some misconceptions. Working conceptions of the terms board, school board,
governance, board governance, trustee, and director are offered to provide clarity in
their use throughout the thesis.

9

Boards (board of directors, governors, trustees) are described similarly across
sectors as organizational bodies. They are expected to govern the affairs of a
corporation with collective authority to establish policies, set objectives, make decisions
and foster and steer the growth or mission of the corporation (Chait, Holland, & Taylor,
1996; Houle, 1997; Huse, 2007; Ontario Public School Boards’ Association, 2003).
The legal context in which boards exist is most often informed by the law of business
corporations and sometimes by the law of trusts. Their power is derived primarily
through statutes and partially through common law principles and rules. Boards operate
in three sectors in Canada, the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. It should be noted
that boards exercise their authority only when duly constituted, that is, authority is not
vested in individual board members but in the corporate board.
Ontario school boards are public-sector boards. They operate within an
extensive legislative framework established by the Education Act, the Municipal
Elections Act, the Ontario Human Rights Code, the Labour Relations Act, and other
relevant statutes. The Act does not define school boards, except to state, “board means
a district school board or school authority” (Education Act, R .S .0 ,1990, Interpretation,
1.1). The earliest recorded instance of school boards in Ontario is in 1807, when a
small group of trustees was given absolute control by the Lieutenant Governor for the
oversight of each of the eight Grammar Schools in Upper Canada (Putman, 1912).
In nonprofit and private-sector governance, “the board” generally refers to the
voting members of the governing body. When used in education, allusions to “the
board” are generally understood to mean the “head office,” including the elected
trustees and the senior school district managers (Howell, 2005). Because the focus of
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this thesis is on the board governance aspect of public school districts, the term school
board is used to refer to the body of elected trustees with decision-making authority and
overall responsibility for governing the school district. Although senior staff members
interact with and report to the board, they are not voting members of the board. This
board membership structure is generally consistent with how most public-sector and
nonprofit governing boards are constituted and is unlike private-sector boards, where
select senior staff, known as ‘inside directors’ do vote on board matters.
Differences in how membership on boards is described are attributable to both
tradition and legal conventions. In the instance of Ontario school boards, “a member of
a board may be referred to as a trustee for any purpose related to this Act” (Education
Act, R .S .0 ,1990, c.31, s.l (7)), although throughout the Education Act trustees are
consistently referred to as board members and not trustees. References in the Act are
specific to student trustees and provincial counsellors, neither of whom are voting
members of school boards. Moreover, although the term board member is used
throughout the Act, in practice school board members are commonly referred to as
trustees.
The term trustee usually refers to a person with a fiduciary duty to a charitable
trust or foundation. Trustees are charged with the responsibility for managing and
holding in trust funds, assets, or property belonging to others, such as charitable or
pension fund assets, for example. It was a long standing practice for public-sector
boards, such as libraries, museums and hospital boards to refer to board members as
trustees, although that is changing.
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The term “director” has been adopted by many public-sector boards, such as
hospital and pension plan boards, to describe their membership, and by boards of
Crown corporations. Director, the term used in the Ontario Corporations Act (1990) for
a board member of a corporation, is widely used by private and nonprofit sector boards.
In this usage, directors are trustees who act on behalf of an organization's constituents,
including service recipients, funders, members, the government, and taxpayers. Over
time the terms trustee and director have come to be used interchangeably, both in
practice and in the research literature, along with other less commonly used terms such
as governors and commissioners.
In public education in Ontario, the term director tends not to refer to a board
member but to the senior administrator of the school district. The Education Act (1990)
specifies that a director of education is the “chief education officer of the system and
the chief executive officer of the board” (1990, c. 31, s. 124). The Act further specifies
that chief executive officers shall, "within policies established by the board, develop and
maintain an effective organization and the programs required to implement such
policies" (c. E.2, s. 283 (2)). Allison (1989) observed that on larger boards in Ontario,
it is common practice to assign the duties of Board Secretary to the director's position,
thus giving directors of education responsibility for board minutes, notice of meetings,
and in some instances preparation of the board agenda. The relationship of the Director
of Education to the school board is similar to that of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
on private and nonprofit sector boards. What is different is that, on many other boards,
the term CEO represents a staff position, whereas the term director denotes board
members. In this inquiry, the terms director and board member are used
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interchangeably to denote membership on governing boards. Chief executive officer
(CEO) is the term used to describe the senior staff person for all administrative aspects
of organizations, including private and nonprofit corporations and school districts. The
term chief education officer is not used in this inquiry, although this role is understood
to be integral to the role of school board chief executive officers.

Research Question
The guiding problem in this inquiry was as follows: Can school boards govern?
Is it possible for contemporary school boards to govern in accord with current board
governance theory and established board governance expectations?
To create the focus necessary to address this central research problem this
inquiry takes up various questions, which frame the possibility that contemporary
contexts and circumstances impede or actively prevent school boards from governing,
as board governance is generally understood. Chief among them are (1) How
appropriate is the concept of governance for describing and understanding what public
school boards are expected to do? (2) Do school boards have the mandate and authority
to govern as described and theorized in the literature? (3) What are the major theories
and explanatory accounts of board governance in general and school board governance
in particular, and what expectations are conveyed in the pertinent literature? (4) Where
do the literatures on board governance and school board governance activities converge
on understanding board governance?
To answer these questions, my inquiry centred on school board governance
within a North American context and, more specifically the province of Ontario.
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Beyond North America, the range of school system governance, complexity, and
variability becomes too great. My analysis focuses on literature related to the history
and meaning of governance, the mandate of board governance, the actual practices of
board governance in the private, nonprofit and public-sectors, and the literature related
to the history of public school boards and school board governance. This literature
includes the constitutional foundations of governing boards, as well as public policies
and other influences regarding their formation and activity. Finally, board governance
literature from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors is explored in order to analyze
adequately the concept of governance.

Method of Inquiry
Using conceptual analysis as my primary method of inquiry I subject the
central concept of board governance to an ordered scrutiny from the perspective of the
historical, political, and organizational contexts within which governance is practiced. I
explore the evolution of school boards in Ontario with attention to shifts in how school
board governance is understood and to conflicts over power, authority, areas of
competence, and responsibility for the public good. While there may be apparent unity
in conversations about school board governance, an exploration of the concept may
show that understandings are divided into camps of distinct and different meanings. If
“governance” is not a good interpretive concept for understanding what school boards
can do, then school boards may be particularly vulnerable to expectations that they
cannot meet, as well as to personal and public misapprehensions about their roles and
responsibilities. Exploring the appropriateness of the concept of governance in relation
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to school boards does not pretend to suggest what boards should be doing, or what
legislatures should do to grant boards more or less power in the exercise of their duties.
Rather, it intends to provide the kind of conceptual clarity necessary to assist school
boards to be optimally effective and functional.
Coombs and Daniels (1991), in their work on conceptual analysis, contend that
concepts are embodied in language and understood in relation to other concepts.
Examining other contexts in which the concept of governance is used may contribute to
the analysis of school board governance. Thus, the concept of governance will first be
examined across a spectrum of normative and academic literature, from governance in
broad political contexts to board governance in private, public, and nonprofit
organizations, before explaining the sense in which governance is applicable to school
boards.

Functions o f Concepts
Concepts and language are used to interpret human experience, yet all too
frequently, we assume that common experiences lead to universally shared
understandings of what we seek to communicate. By reducing a complex idea to an
“understandable, relational concept” we can abstract from the “boom and buzz of
experience” (Sheffield, 2004, p.763), so a concept, often taken for granted, may be
more easily understood and debated.
A concept is an abstraction, a representation of an object, one of its properties,
or a behavioural phenomenon, for example, social status, power, or governance. Each
discipline develops its unique sets of concepts. To scientists these concepts and
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symbols often take on particular meaning in their disciplines and constitute a
professional language. For example, when a social scientist uses the word cohort, other
social scientists immediately know what that term represents - a group of people sharing
a demographic characteristic such as age (Anfara & Mertz, 2006; Nachamias &
Nachamias, 1992).
Concepts, according to Nachamias and Nachamias (1992) serve at least four
functions. They provide a common language, enabling researchers to communicate
with one another; they introduce a way of looking at a phenomenon; they allow
researchers to classify their experiences and to generalize from them; and they serve as
components of theory by framing a theory’s content and attributes.
The value of concept clarity, according to Denzin (1989), is that the perceptual
world is given an order and coherence that could not be perceived before
conceptualization. Thus concepts are a central concern for philosophers, political
theorists, sociological theorists, historians and linguists, among others (Gerring, 1999),
because we critically engage with concepts to achieve greater understanding. The use
of concepts helps us think about, guide, and control how we interpret experience,
express purpose, structure problems, and carry out inquiries (Coombs & Daniels, 1991;
Soltis, 1978).
Governments, international agencies, and boards of directors are in the business
of governing. While there may be various conceptions of governance, there is only one
concept. In spite of the different conceptions about what governance is, the concept of
governance itself can be considered a common denominator for these conceptions, as it
fulfils the same function in the different cases. Thus, it will be necessary to explicate
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the meaning of governance as it is written about and practiced, in order to answer the
central question of this inquiry.

Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis is a way of studying and discussing the concept of
governance. In everyday practice, the concept of governance is used in different ways
in a variety of contexts. Coombs and Daniels (1991) offer a definition of conceptual
analysis that clarifies its purpose and role in research.

Conceptual analysis is the mode of analysis by which we come to a sound
understanding of the ordinary meaning of a concept or set of related concepts.
Conceptual analysis attempts to provide an explicit and perspicuous account of
the meaning of a concept by clearly detailing its relationships to other concepts,
and its role in our social practices - including our judgments about the world.
(P-29)
The demanding character of a conceptual analysis is highlighted by Giarelli and
Chambliss (1988), who maintain that those who embark on a study of this nature must
create a process that involves “going around, exploring, looking within a situation,
context or field.. .questioning and searching with an intent, with some limits or with an
object in mind” (p.32).
A conceptual analysis can take a variety of forms but always has several
elements at its core. In the case of governance, for example, we can look to see if there
are contradictions in the use of the term and if the implicit and explicit understandings
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of governance are vague or ambiguous. It involves searching for strengths and
weaknesses in these understandings, how a particular person or theory interprets the
concept, how different ideas inform the concept of governance essentially and
peripherally, and if accounts/understandings of a concept have changed over time
(Toulmin, 2001).
The concept of governance requires a depth of analysis that extends beyond the
practice of board governance to a broader understanding of the term. School board
governance is a term used frequently by governments, the media, and school board
associations. Although the scholarly literature, legislation, and popular writing about
school boards reveal a similarity of ideas in many areas, they also expose a diversity of
understandings and expectations. This diversity must be taken into account if this
project is to succeed in offering an acceptably comprehensive account of board
governance that is applicable to school board governance. This is because the variety of
meanings employed in the literature are indicative of both the complexity of the process
of educational governance and the struggle to adapt our understanding to appreciate the
reality of school board governance in practice. Having an accurate interpretation of the
concept is essential in understanding whether school boards in reality, can govern.
The ultimate goal of conceptual analysis, which establishes categories and
concepts of general application, is an improved, enhanced, more complete
understanding. Although it is difficult to state precisely when understanding has been
improved, Giudice (2005) argues that in revealing confusion and disagreement about an
existing concept, the way is cleared for construction of a more adequate understanding.
Moreover, a better understanding of a social phenomenon (governance) can be achieved
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only by exploring the essential features of the phenomenon and its relations with other
related phenomena and charting and commenting on revealing distinctions and
connections between these phenomena. There is value in investigating both the
relations and features of governance that are essential, as well as those that are
contingent and variable. In this inquiry, I pursue this method.

Continuity between Essential and Contingent Features
Conceptual analysis undertaken in the following project requires identification
of necessary or essential features of governance, for example, the concept of
governance may include certain features such as legitimacy or authority. Nevertheless,
conceptual analysis cannot limit itself to an understanding of governance by considering
only its essential features. What governance ought to be and do cannot be derived
solely and exclusively from a definition of governance or a list of its essential features.
Because concepts are susceptible to empirical shifts or variations in phenomena,
identifying features and of a concept that are contingent helps to explain and make room
for such changes (Giudice, 2005). The contingent features of governance are those
which may have been thought necessary, but turn out to be accidental and variable. For
example, although governance may be construed as representative some of the time, at
other times it is not. Governance is a social practice (in time and location) and thus
does not exist in isolation but within a context of social phenomena. Identifying
contingent features of governance recognizes that concepts and conceptual theories
must leave open the possibility of contributions to their understanding from other
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perspectives. Thus, the construction of the concept of governance requires
consideration of differences, variations, and contingencies as well as essential features.
Although conceptual analysis represents only one approach to understanding
governance, it is helpful because it enables differentiation between dissimilar models of
governance and the identification of essential features of governance according to these
models. For example, treatments of governance in comparative politics may share
essential features with board governance, but contingent features may differ. The
benefit of identifying both essential features and contingent features of governance is
that it allows the construction of a more adequate way of organizing, describing, and
explaining the social practice of governance. Furthermore, because governance requires
knowledge of the social context within which it is practiced, understanding it only
through its essential features (by way of definition and determination of irreducible,
necessary components) ignores the broader context. Governance can be adequately
understood only when contextual issues surrounding the diversity of theoretical
approaches to understanding governance are recognized.
Conceptual analysis from this perspective provides an understanding of
governance that accomplishes two things. First, it transcends particular manifestations
of governance, collecting and grouping together essential features that are common to
all instances of governance. Second, conceptual analysis identifies and groups
contingent features and refers to the challenges that governance (as practice) must
satisfy that arise from within existent conditions. For example, school board
governance must satisfy the demands in contingent relationships that inhere in the
mandate and societal good that school boards are committed to promoting. Broad
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variations of context in governance theory and practice provide a distinctive meaning,
not derived from essential features but infused with contextual features and relations.
This distinction underscores the reality that governance is not so much a theory as a
social practice: it is located in the tradition of conceptualizing governance and in a
particular context.
As such, board governance that ignored the reality of the Education Act, that
school board members are creatures of that legislation or the assembly that created the
Act or can change the rules and regulations, would fail to adequately address the
question can school boards govern?
A central task of this undertaking was to analyze the variety of conceptions that
currently occupy the spectrum of understandings of board governance manifest in
current literature. This process was oriented so as to allow for recognition of points of
unity among scholars and theories, as well as to provide a basis on which to distinguish
points of divergence. Although there are any number of claims about the meaning of
governance in general, and board governance in particular, they are necessarily context
laden and subject to internal and external influences and elements (contingencies).
Hence, this inquiry focused on core theories (conceptions) of board governance that are
largely implicit in the bodies of literature that surround and inform this practice and, in
this way, I sought to establish its content and limits.
In short, I adopted conceptual analysis as an appropriate and powerful tool for
pursuing my descriptive-explanatory project of delineating and elucidating the nature of
board governance, via reference to the literature and activities that surround that social
practice. In this respect, a central aim of this inquiry was to build a clear and coherent
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conceptual understanding of board governance: something that does not currently exist
in the literature.

Epistemic Values
Research, as the disciplined search for truth, takes multiple forms (Harris, 1996).
The research undertaken in this project explored an area where knowledge is
incomplete, where questions about school board governance remain unanswered. My
goal was to seek robust answers, by engaging different theoretical perspectives in the
analysis and interpretation of meanings, expectations, and practices of board
governance found in a variety of literatures. My approach to the inquiry was guided by
recognition of the importance of epistemic values (e.g. Evers & Lakomski, 2000).
Epistemic values are concerned with knowledge, specifically the relationship between
the researcher and what is to be learned, and the social and cultural context within
which that knowledge is created. They compel one to ask, for example, does a work
warrant a judgment of clarity, coherency, usefulness, simplicity, and adequacy? Is it
trustworthy, authentic, accurate, and credible (Cresswell & Miller, 2000)? Epistemic
values can be used as criteria for theory construction and/or for assessing a systematic
inquiry. They act as moral standards for a researcher, who should self-consciously
strive for fairness in reporting and intellectual honesty. Epistemic values informed and
directed the choices I made during this inquiry and guided how I reported my findings.
My inquiry, a conceptual analysis of board governance, required me to locate
and analyze major theories in the literature in an effort to develop an in-depth
understanding of the concept. I have drawn on a broad range of information, such as
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professional literature, government publications, and newspaper accounts in seeking to
build a coherent account of emerging themes. Where possible, I have drawn on
literature from the actual field of practice in an effort to balance understandings of
board governance operative in the field with those theories dominant in the literature.
Additionally, I have engaged a variety of issues related to board governance, so as not
to be caught up in a narrow perspective. Finally, I have explicitly engaged any
anomalous or contradictory information that ran counter to the themes that emerged to
ensure that different perspectives were identified and my arguments are balanced.
Through ongoing self-reflection, I have worked continuously to be aware that how I
view the world is echoed in my work.

Inquiry Sources
This analysis is informed predominantly by North American literature
addressing nonprofit, private, and public governance sectors, literature specifically
related to school board governance, and literature influential in informing board
governance practice and policy. In selecting sources from these fields of study,
information on previous and current works on the topic of governance, board
governance, and school board governance was located, using hard copy and electronic
databases, such as ABI Inform, CBCA, JSTOR, Proquest and Scholars Portal. I also
relied on publications from school board associations across Canada and the United
States, as well as on documents from Ministries of Education, primarily in Ontario.
Three main bodies of literature contributed to my analysis of governance. The
first is the normative board literature that purports to instruct members of governing
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bodies on their roles and responsibilities, sets out norms for board governance, and
addresses the nature and functions of governing bodies. The contributors to this body
of literature are practitioners, board educators, and researchers who give specific
attention to structural and functional aspects of board governance. This body of
literature assisted in identifying theories of board governance and in deducing a
common set of expectations for board governance. It includes such stalwarts as Carver
(1997; 2000), Gill (2005), Fletcher (1999), Houle (1997), and Leblanc and Gillies
(2005).
Of this group, two particularly influential authors are Cyril Houle and John
Carver. Houle’s writing has spanned several decades and is among the most cited in
relation to what is commonly referred to as a traditional conception of board
governance. The use of the term traditional is employed by governance writers to
connote an established notion of board governance, adopted and replicated over time
(Bradshaw, Hayday, & Armstrong, 2007; Fletcher, 1999). As Macnamara (2005) notes,
traditional board governance is based on the “earliest of corporate structuring (1700s)
and passed down over the years” (p.l). Another particularly influential approach to
board governance is Carver’s Policy Governance. I include Carver’s work in this
analysis as it challenges the traditional model, promising to address the “failures of
governance” (Carver, 1997, p. xiii) associated with established practice. Carver’s claim
of offering “universal governance principles” has created adherents and critics. I
examine both perspectives.
The second main body of literature examined is the academic literature on
governance and board governance that informs and underpins much of the normative
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literature. The literature in these areas is voluminous and includes governance-related
research from public administration, political science, law, and the private, nonprofit
and public-sectors. Major entries from this literature include Chait, Holland and Taylor
(1991, 1996); Comforth, (2003); Hung (1998); Huse (2007); Kjaer (2004); MillerMilleson (2003); Ostrower and Stone (2006); Pierre and Peters (2000); and Rhodes
(1996; 1997).
The third type of literature is professional school board-related literature that
draws on the normative and the academic literatures as well as jurisdictional policies
from governments that illustrate and teach school board members how their boards
should govern. I draw on widely accepted writings in this body of literature including
works by Gidney (1999); Hodgins (1908; 1911); Manzer (1994), Prentice (1977) and
Stamp (1982; 2005)Prentice as well as publications from professional school board
associations in Canada and the United States and Ontario Ministry of Education
documents.

Significance
Academics and policy-makers alike have acknowledged the importance of the
governance of organizations. In the past twenty-five years, research on the subject has
grown from little more than rules of order to books, journal articles, and board
development programs available in print, online, and at universities across the country.
But as both Saidel (2002), and Leblanc and Gillies (2005) note, despite the impressive
studies and commentaries published in recent years, most aspects of board governance
are in need of research attention. This is certainly true for school board governance,
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where the body of research literature is small and primarily restricted to the structural
and political aspects of school boards.
In her review of school board-related research, Land (2002) found that local
school boards have seldom been a central focus of research, that in spite of their distinct
role in public education, school boards have been understudied. Of importance to this
inquiry is that questions related to school board governance have not been examined in
depth in the literature. Howell (2005) notes that “while school boards are the subject of
a chapter or two in educational administration textbooks, the coverage tends to be
descriptive and perfunctory” (p.14). In light of this gap, my research will contribute a
necessary and scholarly bridge between the theory and practice of school board
governance. It will also contribute to shaping an education forum where researchers
and practitioners will be able to find common ground for understanding the differences
that inhibit effective critiques of school board governance. Such a commons might also
offer shared meanings that facilitate the process of improving school board governance
and determine the future role of school boards (if any) in the process.

Organization
This report of my inquiry is organized into six chapters. Chapter One sought
to provide an overview of the inquiry, establish the concept of board governance, and
explicate my primary method of inquiry, conceptual analysis. Chapters Two and Three
review and analyze extant governance models and frameworks found, first, in the
political science and management literatures and, second, in the private, public, and
nonprofit sector governance literatures. Central themes, functions, and features of
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governance are identified and grouped into conceptual categories. Chapter Four creates
a context for the central question of the inquiry, can school boards govern?, by
situating and analyzing school boards in the social, historical, and political spheres
within which they operate. Chapter Four then argues the appropriateness of the concept
of governance for describing and understanding what public school boards do and can
be necessarily be expected to do, given the circumstances, constraints, and
contingencies within which they operate. Chapter Five analyzes and synthesizes
discussions related to these conceptual categories to develop an enhanced understanding
of these concepts in relation to school board governance. Chapter Five moves to an
examination of what it means to exercise board governance in the context of public
education. Chapter Six revisits the research questions and provides a retrospective
analysis of the knowledge transformation that took place. It then discusses implications
arising from the inquiry.

Summary
Throughout the thesis, the reader will see three central themes emerge. First,
governance, although described and discussed in different contexts from a variety of
critical perspectives, has a number of consistent and necessary characteristics or
features. These are power, authority, fiduciality, legitimacy, and governance as political
and oriented toward public good. The second theme to emerge is that governance is
subject to internal and external shifts and responds to multiple influences. Boards are
influenced by the conditions, constraints, and circumstances in which they operate, and
are part of both the organization and its environment. These internal and external
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influences are treated as contingent features. The inquiry identifies and analyzes both
the essential and contingent of features of governance. Finally, references to
governance as a social practice are found throughout the inquiry, especially in the
literatures related to board governance (see, for example, Alderfer, 2001; Bird, 2001;
Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1991; 1996; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Robinson, 2001;
Sonnenfeld, 2002). MacIntyre (1984) defines social practice as

any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity, through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods
involved, are systematically extended, (p.187)

Thus, governance as a social practice has internal goods (excellence in governing itself)
made possible only by the human activity of governing. The notion of governance as a
social practice is engaged in Chapter Five using Paquet’s (1999) burden o f office
perspective, and developed more thoroughly in the closing chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
NATURE OF GOVERNANCE
Even in the old world of governance, the boundaries between the
economic, political, and civic spheres were never well-defined either
conceptually or statistically; they did not correspond to a rigid frontier,
but rather to a wavering and evolving fracture zone between subsets of
organizations and institutions integrated by various mechanisms. This
has become even more true in the new world of governance.
Gilles Paquet (1999)
Libraries and bookstores are awash with publications on the practice of board
governance. While many of these publications are practical and helpful, they often take
the concept of governance itself for granted, leaving it unexamined and uncriticized.
The degree to which the concept of governance appears to have a patently clear
meaning is perhaps more reflective of general usage than conceptual agreement among
scholars. The frameworks in which governance is discussed, such as political science or
management theory, further complicate understanding of the concept. As regards the
question of school boards, much of the pertinent literature references features such as
legitimacy, fiduciality, and authority, with opposing sides of a discussion often
assuming a high level of clarity surrounding these terms. This confluence of
terminology contributes to an assumption that there is agreement on the foundational
and fundamental beliefs about board governance. This is not the case.
Thus, to prepare the groundwork for engaging the question can school boards
govern? it is desirable to explore the meaning of governance from a broad perspective.
Toward that end, I examine in this chapter the understanding of governance from two
critical areas of study: political science and organizational theory.
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While such a review may seem, at first glance, clear-cut, there are problems that
must be acknowledged before embarking on such an undertaking. The first is that the
concept of governance has a protean character. Like Proteus of Greek mythology,
“governance” takes on different shapes and meanings, responsive to changing
circumstances and constraints. While this may be a positive phenomenon exhibiting
organizational resilience, “a quest for authenticity and meaning,” as Litton (1993, p.9)
says, it raises certain difficulties for research, because like Proteus who takes on many
shapes, the basal concept of governance has a variety of manifestations. This suggests a
second difficulty. The changing nature of governance reflects the shift, in recent times,
in social and political contexts, as the stability of nation states and institutions—public
and private—abruptly gave place to a period of volatility and insecurity. All of this
underscores the symbiotic relationship among governance, the organizations, and
groupings that are governed, and the context in which governance is accomplished.
Governance is embedded, and thus defined and confined by its generic and contingent
nature. Because governance is rarely described in the abstract, it is essential to
acknowledge problems that arise in coming to a satisfactory analysis of the concept.

Governance: A Protean Concept
The extent to which governance appears to enjoy a common meaning in current
usage is the result of a combination of factors including governance scandals, media
attention on the “crisis in governance” in politics, international relations, and business,
and emerging patterns of interaction between governments and their constituencies
(Kooiman, 1993). Rhodes (2007) observed that governance often functions as an
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“umbrella word” (p. 1243). It is assumed to cover any number of meanings, without the
necessary nuances, in a broad range of contexts, from international relations to the
boards of local agencies. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000) attribute the assumption that
governance has a common sense meaning to its strong intuitive appeal and the reality
that those who employ the term rarely consider exact definitions necessary. Because, as
already noted, governance is a context-bound term, researchers must contend with a
range of meanings reflective of the level of analysis adopted, the goals to be achieved,
and the approach taken. This is further complicated by the focus of concern, for
example, political activity, organizational structures, managerial theories, administrative
philosophies, or some combination of these. Finally, governance reforms in the public
and nonprofit sectors and the drive for these sectors to adopt corporate management
practices have, according to Comforth (2003), blurred long-standing boundaries
between private, public, and nonprofit sectors and added to the vagueness and
ambiguity of the concept of governance.
An etymological search suggests that governance has both a substantive
meaning (a governing body or structure) and an active meaning (a process or activity).
Kjaer (2004) notes that the Greek word kybernan means, to steer, and was used by Plato
in regard to how to design a system of rule. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary (2006) the Latin word gubernare connotes a similar sense of piloting,
guiding, and ruling, and implies a helmsman or pilot. The term governance brings
together both the active and the substantive usage of “to govern” and “the one (or body)
who governs.” Historically, government and governance have been used
interchangeably to describe the role of the state, directing society from the centre.
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Perhaps because of its simplicity this definition has been claimed as the basis or
justification for at times diverse purposes. Thus, efforts to understand the concept and to
establish the elements that constitute governance continue to concern researchers, with
the result that no clear agreements on the concept have been reached.
In political theory the word government is typically used to denote formal
institutional structures and process of state and the control of political power
(Kymlicka, 1995). According to Rawls (1971), government is a way “to assign basic
rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.. .to regulate claims
and [establish] the foundation charter of their society” (p.l 1). Hierarchical political
power, administrative authority, and recognition of legitimacy characterize this view of
government, often described as the rule of law. Government implies the authority to
make and enforce decisions that uphold civil order, preserve and protect social values,
and facilitate collective action, what Pierre and Peters (2000) call the “processes and
capacity.. .to make and implement policy, in other words, to steer society” (p.l).
Governance, in this sense, maintains its connection with its classical meaning as
concerned with the interaction of politics and society, the relationship between those
who govern and those who are governed. Accordingly, governance embodies basal
values such as authority, public good, and legitimacy.
Today, governance is often used in a way that distances itself from the
centralized, authoritarian top-down hierarchical model, in which state authorities exert
sovereign control over those governed (Mayntz, 2003). Even within the Roman
Catholic Church, a monarchical, hierarchically organized institution, theologians are
calling for a revised, more original understanding of hierarchy. Moran (2009), for
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example, argues that hierarchy “describes an authority pattern of an institution,” but not
necessarily “a pyramid of power” (p.69). Governance, as a concept, continues to evolve
and theories of governance evolve with it. Both Jessop (2003) and Rhodes (2007) view
governance, and the theories explaining it, as moving along a continuum toward more
cooperative processes in which state and non-state participants work together toward
shared goals. This perspective supports Stoker’s (1998) view of governance as the
processes that coordinate basic forms of social order, primarily through networks.
According to Pierre and Peters (2000), these newer processes are more responsive to
complexity, dynamics, and diversity than traditional administrative models, which are
characterized by a top-down uniform application of rules. Rhodes (1997) had already
argued that governance is achieved through different processes, even though the outputs
of governance and government may be similar. In his view, governance reflects the
inherent propensity of social systems to select processes and approaches that enhance
their ability to be self-regulating. The term governance is also frequently employed as a
synonym for the efficient management of a broad range of organizations and activities,
such as modem corporations, community agencies and public institutions (Stoker,
1998).
These shifts in meaning are reflected in the academic study of governance,
which is wide ranging and mediated by political and sector-based interests, such as
international relations, organizational studies, and public administration. Theoretical
positions based on post-modernism have attempted to introduce to the debate Foucault’s
analysis of governance as the structures of power by which conduct is organized and
“forms of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some persons”
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(Gordon, 1991, p.2). Despite the differences, there is general agreement with Hewitt de
Alacantara’s (1998) claim that governance is concerned with basic problems of
political order and “although the concept of governance is applied to many situations in
which no political system can be found, it still implies the existence of a political
process” (p.105).

Governance as a Research Challenge

.

Organizations require governance that may take on different forms, dependent
on external and internal conditions. Thus, the term is reflective of both its generic and
contingent meaning. In recent times, research has shifted towards the possibility of
governance and the conditions of governance. Seismic shifts in information
technologies, globalization of the economy, as well as political instability in many parts
of the world have raised questions about what or who can be governed and who or what
bodies have the authority and power to govern. What is the impact, for example, of
political instability or the blurring of jurisdictional borders on the conditions necessary
to govern? Loughlin (2004) contends that as society became more complex and
differentiated, inherited methods of governing have been rendered more difficult and
new understandings are required. Although, in my view, it remains questionable to
what degree increasing complexity has invalidated established processes and brought
about the levelling of their influence, the introduction of the issue of govemability adds
to the difficulty of arriving at a universally agreed upon definition of governance.
In summary, the protean nature of the concept of governance and the diversity of
approaches to its study contribute to two trends that raise significant challenges to the

34

analysis of governance. One is the inclination to confuse the notion of governance with
normative theories of how it should operate and be understood. This is evident in the
adoption of governance indicators by both the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. These and similar efforts are aimed at achieving “good governance”
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2008). Efforts by the United Nations and other
development organizations to achieve specific governance reforms set out expectations
for “effective governance” in terms of their relationships with other organizations and
countries. In addition, good governance and effective governance are terms broadly
used to spell out the governance outcomes desired by different groups and
organizations. In this usage, the elements of effective and good governance are judged
by prescriptive lists and tend to be conflated with stakeholder subjectivity. Effective
governance is a central focus of that genre of board governance literature which
prescribes guidelines and rules believed to lead to effective governance (Leblanc &
Gillies, 2005; Saidel, 2002), although this literature is sometimes criticised for its
inattention to the complex and dynamic nature of governance. This first challenge
requires the researcher to de-couple the concept of governance from the normative
prescriptions thought to effect good governance, an approach commonly found in
school board governance literature with its dual preoccupation with effectiveness and
what board members should do (Canadian School Board Association (CBSA) 2006;
Resnick, 1999; Smoley, 1999).
A second problem arises from the tendency to view the concept of governance
from a single perspective. As perspectives shift, the concept of governance also shifts.
Thus, according to Kjaer (2004), the concept of governance as a top-down, authoritarian
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capacity to rule has ceded place to new thinking about governance that began to emerge
in the 1980s, producing a different paradigm of how governments interact with society.
What were previously exclusive government-centered activities are now carried out
through collaborative arrangements with less clear boundaries between public and
private-sectors. Salamon (2002) sees this as a shift from command and control to a
process of negotiation and persuasion.
The result of both of these trends is that the concept of governance is often
implied or assumed in discourse, rather than explicitly reflected upon. Rather than
assembling and comparing a set of definitions, one must first work out the
understandings of governance that lie hidden or implied in the discussions. The
challenge for a reliable conceptual analysis of governance is to distinguish between the
concept and the context in which it is being used, while recognizing the correlation
between concept and context and not unrealistically attempting to separate the two.

Analysis of Governance
Distinguishing different approaches to conceptualizing governance is
methodologically important, since failure to identify the perspective from which one
approaches the discussion has been an underlying source of many controversies. To
acknowledge differences, identity interests, and explore their implications is critical to
understanding the concept of governance. Recognizing these differences, in fact, will
provide some theoretical clarity to the plurality of meanings that otherwise might risk
obscuring the question of school board governance. To make the meanings of
governance, as used across different social, political, and economic spectra, more
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accessible, I have organized the following discussion into two broad streams:
governance in (a) the political sciences, and (b) the management sciences.

Political Science Perspectives
While efforts to articulate the concept of board governance have largely relied
on organizational and management theories, the concept of governance has an
inherently political connotation. Governance has historically been associated with
institutional interactions related to public policy, driven by the engine of common
societal goals, selected and pursued through political process. From this perspective,
governance links the objectives of diverse stakeholders with the activities that occur at
operational levels of government, commerce, and community. According to Lynn,
Heinrich, and Hill (2000), governance is inevitably political. In order to build a
conceptual framework for understanding school board governance, it is important to
acknowledge the political nature of school boards. With this in mind, it seems useful to
turn first to the political sciences in order to provide a conceptual context for the
question of school board governance.
Different perspectives refer to different debates. Ideas of governance seem to be
especially prevalent in three distinct fields in political sciences: comparative politics,
international relations, and public administration and policy (Hyden, 1999; Kjaer, 2004;
Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Roseneau, 1995; Stoker, 1998). I will briefly
summarize key areas of each in the following sections, with special attention to
governance in public administration, since board governance, especially as seen in
Ontario’s education system, is theoretically most closely associated with this field.
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Governance in Comparative Politics
I begin the analysis of governance with literature from the field of comparative
politics, relying on the research of a number of known scholars in the field.
Comparative politics focuses on political systems, seeks ways to explain similarities and
differences between countries, and considers optimal modules for development. As
Hyden (1999) observes, governance in this field reflects an interest in institutional
models and processes related to economic development, regime changes, and statesociety interactions. Governance has been defined here as “the stewardship of formal
and informal political rules of the game,” referring “to those measures that involve
setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling disputes over such rules” (Hyden,
1999, p.185).
When focused on economic development, governance typically refers to how
institutions focused on economic policy-making and implementation are structured, and
how legitimacy is generated. Nevertheless, when the focus shifts to democratization
issues, governance refers to setting, applying, and enforcing regime rules. According to
Kjaer (2004), this includes how rules govern access to power and how they change. For
nations in transition, the setting of rules is the most critical activity of governance when
political institutions are believed to be moving toward a more democratic form. Kjaer
argues that whether or not these institutions actually become more democratic is not the
point. The operative assumption in this view of governance is that democracy, of one
form or another is a potential outcome of the change. The concern, therefore, is for
rules and form, rather than actual outcomes. This can be seen in recent policy work
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commissioned by the World Bank, whose idealized notion of governance is reported in
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, (2008):

Governance is the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected,
monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate
and implement sound polices; and the respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them, (p.7)

In this instance, governance is viewed as state management and control, with a view
toward legitimization of the “public realm” (Hyden, 1992 p.7) through reception of
what Hewitt de Alcántara (1998, p.108) calls the “rules of the game” or the way that
power is exercised. Hyden (1999) goes so far as to claim that governance involves
setting the rules that guide rule making.
Comparative politics’ concerns with governance surfaced in the World
Governance Survey (WGS) developed by Hyden and Court (2000). With the aim of
assessing the quality of governance in developing and transitional societies, the survey
identifies general governance issues, including dispute resolution (especially within the
judiciary), relationships between the state and the market, the extent of civic
participation in the political process, and government stewardship of the system.
During periods of political transition, previously outsider groups and individuals
have potentially significant influence on the institutions of government. Hence,
governance can be understood as extending beyond government agencies.
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Nevertheless, as Kjaer (2004) argues, “governance focuses on the nature of the public
realm in all political systems, democratic or not,” (p.163). In Kjaer’s view, governance
in the public realm includes aspects of authority, which refers to legitimate power;
reciprocity as a form of social interaction to generate new and ongoing forms of
consensus about basic rules of politics; trust within families, kinship groups and public
authorities; and accountability for the responsiveness of public authorities towards
citizens and the extent to which citizens can hold public authorities accountable (p.164).
Implicit in these aspects of governance in the public realm is yet a fifth: effective or
good governance enhances and advances the public good.

Governance in International Relations
In turning to governance in international relations, I explore theories of
governance set within the emergence of worldwide problems requiring global answers.
Governance in this context inquires into the ways to establish rules and procedures in
response to these problems. Roseneau (1995) envisions governance as “systems of rule
at all levels of human activity.. .in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of
control has trans-national repercussions” (p. 13). A central question in international
relations relates to globalization and how the newly emergent networks of trade and
commerce can be governed or even whether this is possible (Keohane & Nye, 2000).
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) include in their understanding of a
globalized world not only patently political concerns, but the expanding reach of
organized violence, international markets, global economics, the globalization of
corporate power and production, migration, culture and the environment. A key issue in
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global governance is rules, and how they can be made and enforced, as the following
examples illustrate.
The notion of governance in international relations can be found in the United
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol
(1997). Such international agreements reflect the perception that there is a need for
environmental governance at an international level. Similarly, the World Trade
Organization sees itself as an international regime aimed at establishing global
standards to lower trade barriers and secure free trade. Such initiatives reflect the
conviction that complex global interactions generate expectations for an international
model of governance. In the words of the Commission for Global Governance (1995),
“there is no alternative to working together and using collective power to create a better
world” (p.2).
Central issues in conceptualizations of global governance are compliance with
and enforcement of international rules, as well as accountability for violations of such
rules. Nevertheless, as Kjaer (2004) rightly observes, until sovereign nation states cede
power to a single global authority or commit to a networked form of cooperative
governance, such governance models remain simply an ideal. Indeed, to call such
agencies or organizations governing bodies leaves critical questions of authority and
legitimacy unanswered. As Weick (1969, p.3) points out, “whether a decision has
authority depends on the person to whom the order is addressed, not on the ‘persons of
authority’ who give orders.” At present international governance depends on the
willingness of member states, signatories, and non-members to acknowledge the
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legitimacy and authority of those who would govern. Issues such as the locus of
governance are unresolved.
Christiano (1996) notes that the concept of international governance raises the
question of how to define the demos, that is how to identify the people, generally
understood as all those affected by a decision. Without a clear answer to this question,
democratic theory—that all members of the demos have the opportunity to influence a
decision that affects them—is compromised (Kjaer, 2004). While certain key features
of governance can be found in these theories (for example, fiduciality, orientation
toward a public good), others are contested to the point that it must be questioned
whether governance is an apt term to describe the activities of these groups. Perhaps it
would be more appropriate to speak of their coordinating function (modes of joint
decision-making) and attempt to facilitate international dialogue toward shared values
(driven by both ideological principles and pragmatic necessity). While such iterations
of global governance remain unfulfilled possibilities, they offer a useful perspective that
highlights the purposes and modes of governance, without embedding them into any
particular manifestation of the concept.

Governance in Public Administration
The final area of political science in which I examine how governance is
understood is public administration. In an ideal representative democracy, the basis for
political authority is the assent of the people, whose power is exercised indirectly
through elected representatives and implemented by the administrative arm of
government (Christiano, 1996). Governance in public administration has been
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generally understood as those federal, provincial, and local government agencies that
administer, oversee, and manage public interests. Public administrators work at all
levels of government and perform a wide range of tasks. The bureaucracy is conceived
as an impartial implementer of laws decided by legislatures and of policy decisions
made on behalf of the citizens by the government. Ideally, according to Frederickson
(1999), there is a symmetrical relationship between the governed and those who govern.
The last quarter century has seen a broadening of the understanding of the term
“public administration” to include not only government, but also those organizations
that contract with government to provide public services (Kettl, 2002). This includes
many nonprofits (such as hospitals) and quasi-govemmental agencies (such as privately
held utilities). Moreover, a series of public-sector reforms in the 1980s led to the
privatization of many government tasks previously undertaken by the centre of
government. Partly as a result of this shift, authority was decentralized to regional and
local institutions and private-sector management principles were transferred to the
public-sector.
A decline in the public’s trust in government, together with a drive to modernize
and streamline public service management, in tandem with demands for increased
flexibility, enhanced responsiveness, and greater effectiveness in the management of
resources and programs, fuelled the demand for a new form of governance. To what
extent these new forms of governance have evolved, or the service objectives have been
achieved, is not clear. Nevertheless, the re-visioning of responsibility for structures of
public services has led to a more “nuanced conception” (Frederickson, 1999, p.702) of
public administration that includes government, nonprofit and private-sector
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organizations that are “public serving.” Bozeman (1987) even argues that the distinction
between institutions that are primarily public in character and those that are private and
exist for profit has become fuzzy. Boundaries that in the past clearly delineated the
sectors are now blurred, a phenomenon reflected in the growing popularity of
governance literature written from a primarily private-sector perspective.
Such a change of perspective brings private-sector and nonprofit governance
into the discussion of public-sector governing boards and necessitates a more nuanced
understanding of how public administration theory bears on this analysis of governance.
This is significant for the understanding of school boards and how they are governed.
Several authors (Comforth, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Steane, 2001) contend that in order
to paint an adequate picture of organizational governance within a “public serving”
context, additional perspectives are needed to capture its complexity.
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000), who identify two ways of conceptualizing
governance in public administration, suggest possible frameworks for such a rethinking.
The first views institutions as layered, structural, rule directed, and overseen. This
framework reflects many of the governmental systems in Canada. The second approach
conceives of governance as networks and emphasizes the roles of multiple social actors
in systems of negotiation and implementation involving partnerships and the capacity to
bring about productive action.
Generally accepted perspectives of the governance of organizations and
agencies by boards have been modelled on the first way of thinking. But much in
contemporary scholarship on governance in public administration offers an alternative
to the traditional top-down approach. Frederickson (1999), for example, stresses
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coordination and collaboration as necessary for democratic participation. The newer
approach sees governance as involving a wider set of actors in governance, not only
elected politicians and public officials, but a variety of nonelected citizens and interest
groups, characterized by interdependence between organizations. Rhodes (1996)
describes this as less government and more governance, indicating that governance is a
broader, more inclusive concept than government.
This iteration of governance accords with the trend in international relations that
characterizes governance by a multiplicity of actors and, in Kjaer’s (2004) reading of
the trend, “rejects the centrality of nation-state as the sole locus of governance” (p.97).
Pierre and Peters (2000) believe that in the public-sector, these partnerships “move
government away from its role as the central course of the authoritative allocation of
values for the society” (p.222). The notion of an authoritative allocation of the values
of a society is of critical importance in reference to the distribution of social goods such
as health, education, and welfare. This makes an inquiry into board governance and
public administration of special relevance to the current study.
Governance viewed through the prism of public administration offers a
paradigm for understanding governance and public-sector boards. In this perspective,
governance consists essentially of policy development by government and policy
implementation by public agencies. This approach deals with political systems that
have a clear identity, unambiguous authority, definite boundaries, and a defined
membership, which, as Mayntz (2003) notes, implies specific rights and duties. While
governance is necessarily about rules and is inescapably structured, new models of
governance require that we be aware of influences that may affect them. When greater
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attention is given to citizen participation, openness, transparency, and accountability
(especially in relation to demands for efficiency and effectiveness), the focus of the
study of board governance must be wide enough to actually see how these factors
influence governance of public service-agencies. Legal requirements prescribe
accountabilities that guide boards. This is evident in the Acts that mandate and regulate
board governance, articles of incorporation, regulatory mechanisms such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) in the United States, as well as bylaws and policies
that all public boards are required to have. New models of governance have not
replaced the established structures and processes of governance. What they have
succeeded in doing is to introduce into the discussion of board governance a heightened
awareness that the focus and functions of governance are occurring in an arena that is
less easily defined and limited than in the past. In the future, it may not be sufficient to
follow Wainberg’s, Roberts or other rules of order currently guiding the process
followed by many boards. The kinds of rules and structures necessary for effective
governance thus need to be adjusted to accurately reflect the actual development of
community interests and the presence of interest groups.

Features of Governance: Political Sciences
No single concept of governance dominates the discussion in the political
sciences. Indeed, researchers typically contend that governance remains an obscure
concept, particularistic, and accounted for in different ways (Kooiman, 1993; Pierre &
Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 2007). Still, certain features of governance recur in discussions
found in all three areas of political science examined thus far. These are power,
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authority, legitimacy, fiduciality, and governance as political and oriented toward the
public good. These features, it would seem, are essential components of what we mean
by governance and are necessary for understanding governance. As such they are
accepted here as constitutive of the concept itself.
In the review of the political sciences literature, other features emerged which
do not enjoy the same level of universality. The challenge is in determining how these
other features, reflective of the changing circumstances and concrete situations in which
governance is manifest should be incorporated in a useful understanding of governance.
I use the term “contingent”, not in the sense of optional, but in order to respect the
reality that essential features, such as authority or legitimacy, are exerted or acquired in
specific settings, for particular ends, and in relation to certain players. Governance is
contextual and, in real time, does not exhibit only essential features. Contingent
features are those features present in concrete embodiments of governance, for example,
power, authority, fiduciality, but not present in all iterations of governance. Contingent
features are always, at least as possibilities, constitutive of governance as practiced and
are, therefore, indispensable to an adequate analysis of the concept of governance.
This can be seen when, for example, comparative politics studies describe
governance as the interaction of public and private groups and reflects, what in Kjaer’s
(2004) view, is an important condition for effective governance in modem market
economies, where a plurality of organizational forms reflects competing interests.
Another example can be found in the claim advanced by many theorists in international
relations that governance is collective. This claim suggests an attempt to conceptualize
governance as the exercise of collective power and the practice of joint decision-making
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as a necessary condition for governance when the locus of control is dispersed and not
situated in a single place. Public administration researchers Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill
(2000) recognize governance as layered, process oriented and rule bound, indicating
that governance in public administration cannot be imagined, except in relation to legal
frameworks and legislative structures established by central governments.
The analysis developed here sought to indicate a range of interpretations from
the centralized, top-down, hierarchical structures to more decentralized, levelled, and
collaborative models of governance. As noted earlier, a group of influential
contemporary authors (Kettl, 2002; Kooiman, 1993; Pagden, 1998; Rhodes, 1997;
Salamon, 2002) promote the collaborative network view and, in doing so, seem to
disparage what they represent as the classical, hierarchical, or top-down understanding
of governance inherited from the established literature.
Most Canadian public-serving organizations are governed in a way that more
closely resembles the hierarchical, top-down model, making it, as Manytz (2003) states,
debatable just how much “the new notion of governance” is actually new or whether it
is just a new way of talking about old problems. The point of the present analysis is not
to referee the debate or to suggest which definition of governance is most appropriate
for any particular agency. It is an attempt to map out divergences in the concept of
governance, identify common features, and to distinguish between those features that
may be best described as essential and those best explained as contingent.
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Summary
A review of how governance is conceptualized in the political sciences indicates
that governance is not a simple term. Governance, like most words, can and will be
stretched beyond its etymological moorings, and used effectively and variously across a
continuum of situations and circumstances. The root of the word, in Greek and Latin
antiquity, connotes steering or directing. When that activity is brought to bear on any
concrete situation involving a group of people who come together for a purpose, it
inevitably takes on structure and is ordered by rules, either express or tacit. Governance
is not simply a concern of those who exercise this responsibility; it is of vital interest to
the enterprise or persons being governed. This interplay between who governs and
what or who is governed creates a multiplicity of situations in which the word
“governance” has to make sense.
Toward this end, an outline of the central themes related to governance
identified in the comparative politics, international relations, and public administration
literatures is provided in Table 2:1. It is intended to provide a practical overview of
otherwise very complex fields of study. The column “focus of governance” illustrates
the points of convergence that define and hold the attention of governance in each field.
The column “function of governance” outlines the obligations and performance
expected and required in the course of governing. “Essential features” shown in the
final column, depict those characteristics necessary for understanding the concept of
governance in each of these three fields. Although the characteristics in the focus and
functions columns differ across the three fields, the essential features remain constant.
These differences, the contingent features of governance, create the context within
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which the concept of governance is realized. Because governance is a dynamic social
practice, the boundaries separating the categories have a porous character and elements
of one category may also be found in other categories.

Table 2:1 C e n tra l G o v e rn a n c e T hem es in P o litic a l S cien ce

Governance in
political science
research
Comparative
Politics
(Hewitt de
Alâcantara, 1998;
Hyden, 1999;
Hyden & Court,
2000; Kaufman,
Kraay &
Mastruzzi, 2008;
Keohane and Nye,
2000; Kjaer, 2004;
World Bank, 2008)

International
Relations
(Commission for
Global
Governance, 1995;
Held, McGrew,
Goldblatt, &
Perraton, 1999;
Keohane & Nye,
2000; McGrew,
1997; Roseneau,
1995)

Public
Administration
(Bozeman, 1987;
Frederickson,
1999; Kettl, 2002;
Lynn, Heinrich, &
Hill, 2000; Pierre
& Peters, 2000;
Rhodes, 1996;
1997)

Focus of governance

Functions of
governance

Essential
features

• Political systems
• Stable rules that promote
legitimacy and enhance
efficiency
• Exercise o f power
• Nature o f state/society
relations
• State regulation in economy
and social development
• Interactions between
private/public groups

• Accountability
• Formulate and
implement sound
policies
• Stewardship o f rules of
control
• Leadership in capacity
building and promoting
development
• Co-opt external
influences, develop trust
• Collective (individuals,
groups, nations)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Power
Authority
Political
Fiducial
Legitimacy
Oriented toward
public good

• World-wide political
problems requiring global
answers
• Establishment o f rules at a
global level to ensure
compliance from nationstates
• Local - global tensions
• Dominated by power
politics, self-interest and
anarchy
• Coordinating-joint
decision-making

• Accountability
• Compliance
• Establish principles,
norms, decision-making
procedures to increase
relative capacities
• Values based - driven by
ideological principles
and pragmatic necessity
• Collective (individuals,
groups, nations)

•
•
•
•
•

Power
Political
Fiducial
Legitimacy
Oriented toward
public good

• Political authority and its
administrative apparatus
(bureaucracy)
• Service, rights, societal
values
• Increase flexibility, enhance
responsiveness, manage
resources,
revitalize/modemize public
service
• Public-service efficiency
• Public -private partnerships
• Hierarchical and emerging
networks

• Accountability
• Compliance
• Improvements to the
public service
• Knowledge o f how to
concert actions among
social partners
• Coordinating/
collaborating necessary
to democratic
governance but
ultimately political
• Layered, process
oriented, rule-bound

•
•
•
•
•
•

Power
Authority
Political
Fiducial
Legitimacy
Oriented toward
public good
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Management Sciences Perspectives
Efforts to articulate the concept of governance in reference to board governance
have largely relied on management theory. Governance of organizations is seen as an
integral part of organizational life. Although no single management sciences approach
adequately explains all aspects of governance, organizational theories provide heuristics
for interpreting the concept by explaining how it is enacted by boards of directors
governing constituent organizational subsystems. As such, organizational theories are
not theories of board governance. They do not deal directly with boards, but treat them
from the perspective of where they fit structurally in an organization and how they
might influence its overall life. While management sciences does not attempt to fully
explain board governance, boards are a necessary element of most organizations in the
private, nonprofit, and public-sectors, and no conceptual analysis can ignore attempts in
the management sciences literature to explain and situate governance.
Hall (1996) suggests that organizational theory essentially focuses on how
managers should manage and how organizations should be organized. Organizational
theory can be useful in describing and explaining factors and influences that affect
different aspects of social organizations from a variety of perspectives. Although
organizational theories tend to concentrate on private-sector corporations, the public
and nonprofit sectors are by no means excluded.
Organizational theory is a generic term that comprises many different theoretical
perspectives, including principal-agent theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory,
resource dependency theory, and institutional theory. While each theory has its
supporters and detractors (Comforth, 2003), each one promises to advance and enhance
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our understanding of different aspects of board governance. Some theorists take an
executive organizational approach (auditing, financing, strategic management), others a
more legalistic (company law) approach, still others may combine both. A key
assumption, which Hung (1998) identified throughout these different theories, is that
organizations are influenced by an external or open system perspective, as well as by an
intrinsic or closed system perspective. Mintzberg (1983) underscores the significance
of these influences, arguing that organizational actors must recognize and be adept at
responding to both perspectives because they affect every aspect of organizational life.
External environmental pressures and influences include such contingencies as
resource/funding and institutional regulatory environments. Internal factors, which
Eisenhardt (1989) described as ensuring conformance to institutional expectations, can
be combined into structural attributes with which organizations function (for example,
traditions, values, and institutional history); systems of control; levels of authority; and
the decision-making, action-taking process. According to Mintzberg (1983), the board
of directors represents the external coalition of influences, while the CEO represents the
internal coalition. Internal and external influences nonetheless affect all aspects of
organizations, including governance.
In the following sections, I examine five major organizational theories
(principal-agent, stewardship, resource dependency, stakeholder and institutional) in an
attempt to shed light on their meanings and their implications for governance. Each of
these theories is concerned with a central, defining concept around which observations
about governance are organized. Each offers a unique perspective believed to be
comprehensive enough to serve as a basis for critiquing and explaining governance.
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The theories reviewed do not deal explicitly with governance as such, but unlike many
other discussions of organizations, they identify and discuss several themes, functions,
relations, and features that touch directly on the roles and responsibilities of boards
governing organizations. As such, these theories shed light on what governance,
particularly board governance, means. Because theories privilege a particular vantage
point for viewing organizations and accept one model over others in describing
organizations, what any single theory says about governance must remain partial, both
in the sense of completeness and perspective. In the following survey, no attempt has
been made to create a composite description of governance or to reconcile differences.
The purpose in this section, as in the chapter as a whole, is to identify recurring themes
in the discussion of the relation between boards and the organizations they govern, to
identify the organizational models that condition how governance is explained, and to
point out limitations in each explanation. In order not to close the discussion
prematurely, several different theories have been examined.

Principal-Agent Theory
Eisenhardt (1989) describes principal-agent theory as an attempt to explain how
best to organize relationships in which one party (the principal) determines the work
that another party (the agent) undertakes. Huse (2007) traces the roots of this theory
back to financial economics - as a model for addressing conflicting relationships
between owners and managers in large corporations.
In regard to board governance, this theory raises awareness of what Eisenhardt
(1989) considers a set of problems that typically arises around issues of agency,

54

especially under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty. The theory
argues that under such conditions, which characterize most organizational settings, two
agency problems arise: the differing desires and goals of the principal and agent; and
the difficulty the principal faces in confirming what the agent is actually doing
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Principal-agent theory identifies a tension that may exist between
boards and their chief executive, portrayed as differing organizational goals: the board’s
to maximize shareholder value, and the chief executive’s to maximize personal power,
position, status or organizational operations. Activities which might maximize personal
power, status and so on are described by Eisenhardt as “agent opportunism” (p. 71).
The central focus in principal-agent theory is one of control, viewed as a key
responsibility of the board, whose function is, for example, to control organizational
costs in the interests of shareholders and to ensure management operates in ways
consistent with the interests of the board (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen,
1983). What has captured the attention of board governance researchers in agency
theory is its commitment to hold management to account and to see that the resources of
the organization are used as the board requires. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) go so far as
to claim that “boards that are totally independent of management are better able to do
this than those that are in some way beholden to it” (p. 111).
Principal-agent theory may be more suited to private-sector boards, being less
helpful when applied to public and nonprofit boards where there is less clarity about
who are the principals and owners of the organization. As Allison (1983) asks, in the
case of school boards, for example, is it the public, the taxpayers, the government, or
the children who go to the school, and their parents who are the principals? In any case,
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the goals of the public and the government may be at risk if mangers in any sector
attempt to act independently of their boards. Monitoring and ensuring compliance with
board strategies and objectives are important governance activities, but in my judgment,
principal-agent theory ignores the important governance function of relating the
organization to its external institutional and social environment. I concur with
Cornforth’s (2003) view that the role of governance includes “ensuring a degree of
accountability and compliance with external regulations and standards” (p.238).

Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theorists propose a model in which the manager works to
effectively guide and direct development of corporate assets for the benefit of the
organization. The board’s role is to be a supportive partner. Davis, Schoorman, and
Donaldson (1997) envision the manager as being trustworthy and collectivistic, whose
performance is motivated by a desire to achieve, be responsible, recognized and
fulfilled by the job.
An assumption in this model seems to be that management and stakeholder
interests coincide. It is not surprising that within such a model, the role of the board is
primarily strategic and its implications for governance focus on improving planning and
adding value to executive decisions, rather than ensuring managerial compliance.
Mintzberg (1983) sees the board’s role within a stewardship model to include
supporting and mentoring the chief executive, co-opting external influences,
establishing contracts and raising funds for the organization, enhancing the
organization’s reputation and giving advice to the organization. Donaldson and Davis
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(1991) describe the relationship of the board to the chief executive as trusting and
supportive, giving high authority and discretion in order to realize principal, collective
organizational ends. Pastoriza and Armo (2008) concur, noting that the role of
governance in stewardship theory is to create the “mechanisms and structures that
facilitate the most effective coordination between the two parties” (p.5). Whereas
boards in principal-agent theory monitor and control, in stewardship theory they
facilitate and empower.
In my view, the model espoused by stewardship theory creates the possibility of
conflicting roles for boards. It blurs the distinction between governance and
management roles, potentially compromising the board’s oversight role. A board is
legally responsible to a variety of stakeholders and to regulatory bodies for certain
aspects of organizational life, and it holds the power to hire, supervise, and dismiss the
chief executive. To construe the board primarily in terms of partnership would appear
to undervalue the fiducial responsibility of governance.

Resource Dependency Theory
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) resource dependency theory views
organizations as interdependent with their environments. A key tenet of resource
dependency theory is that organizations that lack essential resources will seek ways to
obtain these resources. Essentially, organizations are assumed to work toward two
related objectives: acquiring control over resources to minimize their dependence on
other organizations, as well as controlling resources that maximize the dependence of
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other organizations on themselves. Attaining either objective affects the exchange
relationship between organizations and thereby an organization’s power (Scott, 2001).
Originally developed to analyze relationships between organizations, resource
dependency theory is also applicable to units within organizations. The board can be
viewed as a unit. Its role is understood in terms of strategic support for securing
resources for the organization and attending to the external relations that ensure the
flow of such resources, what Hung (1998) describes as “linking” (p.101). Huse (2007)
argues that, in order for a board to fulfill this linking role, its members must include
several well-networked individuals, creating implications for both the size and the
membership of boards.
Resource dependency theory raises awareness of the board’s need to be
responsive to the boundary span between an organization and its external environment
and the joint problem of maintaining and spanning this boundary. From this
perspective, to legitimize, connect, and co-opt resources become a major governance
functions. Boards legitimize by ensuring that their members’ reputations and positions
add prestige and standing to the organization. They connect by ensuring information
about the organization is communicated in a timely fashion to appropriate nodes in its
environment. They co-opt by putting stakeholder representatives on the board. When
minimizing resource dependency is the strategic focus of an organization and its
governance body, then as Comforth (2003) points out, selection of board members and
ensuring board effectiveness is an important governance function. But this poses the
risk of assigning governance a role that requires expertise, experience, and networks
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that many potential board members, especially in the nonprofit and public-sectors
typically will not possess.

Stakeholder Theory
First described by Freedman (1984), stakeholder theory is based on the premise
that organizations are to be responsible to a range of groups in society and not
exclusively to the organization’s owners. According to Donaldson and Preston (1995),
this givers inherent value to the interests of all stakeholders, which warrant
consideration for their own sake, not simply because they are able to further the
interests of the organization. In this context, Freeman (1984) identifies stakeholders as
“any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
organization’s objectives” (p.46). Thus, management, employees, customers, and the
general public appear as stakeholders in this organizational model. For public-sector
and nonprofit organizations, this list could be extended to include funders and
regulators.
Within stakeholder theory, a vital governance task is to advocate and ensure
corporate social responsibility (Huse, 2007). Board governance, therefore, requires
attitudes, structures, and practices that ensure coincident attention is given to the
interests of legitimate stakeholders, mediate a multiplicity of stakeholder demands, and
balance and manage conflicts between organizational and stakeholder interests. Boards
may even develop codes of practice and policies that aim at safeguarding the interests of
stakeholders. Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1996) offer as examples of such practices
holding open board meetings in some sectors, inviting designated groups of
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stakeholders to appoint board members, or recruiting board members from key
stakeholder groups. These practices are thought to assist the board in responding to
broader social interests, although they may actually fuel conflict-of-interest problems in
some instances. In this context, Phillips (2004) believes that prioritizing stakeholder
interests and managing the costs that may arise from stakeholder involvements must be
viewed as an important concern for organizations and the boards that govern them.

Institutional Theory
In proposing institutional theory, Selznick (1957) suggested, “as an organization
acquires a self, a distinctive identity, it becomes an institution” (p.21). According to
Aldrich and Ruef (2006), Selznick “developed the theme of institutionalization as a
process of instilling values” (p.39), or as Meier and O’Toole (2006) maintain,
“institutions, broadly construed, represent systematic efforts to shape the actions of
individuals on an on-going basis” (p.125).
Institutional theory construes organizations as social constructs, with rules,
norms, and expectations that constrain individual and group choice and behaviour.
Lynn (1996) claims that in its attempt to account for how organizations perform,
institutional theory focuses on such core concepts as results, performance, outcomes,
and purposefulness and favours systems that constrain individual group choice and
action. Insofar as institutional theory seeks to rationalize institutional functioning, it
may be seen to assume that organizations of a similar nature tend toward uniformity
over time. In contrast, Meier and O’Toole (2006) point out that because they “interact
with the people who operate within them.. .institutions [are] modified as people’s values
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come into play in ways that may generate tensions, creative or destructive, with the
values regnant among the earlier designers of the institution” (p.130).
How governance is conceptualized in institutional theory is implied in the high
value it places on the stability of the institution. Miller-Milleson (2003) suggests that
this expectation may place pressure on boards to embrace values and expectations that
reward conformity, even when this may impede organizational effectiveness. The role
of the board, then, is itself institutionalized. Even so, the duty of maintaining
equilibrium does not privilege consensus and conformity entirely at the cost of conflict
and change.
From the perspective of institutional theory, the board’s role is central, while the
role of management is “ignored in most institutional discussion,” because incumbents
tend to be viewed as interchangeable (Meier & O’Toole, 2006, p.130). This may
explain some actions of boards, such as the repetitive, accustomed (institutionalized)
ways of recruiting board members, even in the face of evidence of more effective
recruitment strategies. Miller-Milleson (2003) suggests the legitimacy of board
governance may be linked to conformity to institutional values and norms. This
expectation of continuity and conformity as part of the recognition of legitimacy not
only comes from within the organization, but, in the view of DiMaggio and Powell
(1991), may be a condition of external factors, such as funding bodies.

Features o f Governance: Management Sciences
Organizational theories do not speak directly to the question of governance, but
their concerns over how organizations should be steered or directed imply an operative
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perception of the nature and process of governance. The preceding analysis of five
selected organizational theories has yielded several themes, functions, and features of
governance, reflective of the perspectives of each approach to understanding and
modelling organizations. The themes and functions, although different in each theory,
consistently assume and require certain elements be present for governance to be
effective. Table 2:2 (see p.62) offers an overview of the central assumptions of these
theories.
Governance themes represent differences in the interests and emphases inherent
in the organizational models put forward by each theory and capture the differences in
understanding purpose and structure of organizations. The unique perspective of each
approach is evident in the diversity of functions assigned to an organization’s governing
body. The themes and functions indicate how governance and the concrete
circumstances of governance are intertwined. At the same time, for governance to be
effective, certain characteristics must be present; these characteristics are identified in
the last column as essential governance features. These features are called essential,
because while the manner in which different authors and theories assume they are
manifest varies in practice, they are fundamental to the concept of governance and
pertain to understanding what governance means.

Table 2:2 C e n tra l A ssu m p tio n s o f F ive O rg a n iza tio n a l T h eories & B o a rd G overn an ce

Governance
themes

Governance in
organizational
theory
Principal-agent
(Comforth, 2003;
Eisenhardt, 1985;
1989; Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Hung,
1998; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976)
Stewardship
(Davis, Schoorman
& Donaldson, 1997;
Donaldson & Davis,
1991; Mintzberg,
1983; Pastoriza and
Armo, 2008)
Resourcedependency
(Hung, 1998; Huse,
2007; MillerMilleson, 2003;
Pfeffer& Salancik,
1978; Scott, 2001)
Stakeholder
(Chait, Holland, &
Taylor, 1996;
Donaldson &
Preston, 1995;
Freeman, 1984;
Huse, 2007)
Institutional
(Aldrich & Ruef,
2006; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1991; Lynn,
2001; Meier &
O’Toole, 2006;
Selznik, 1957)

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

Governance
functions

Principals and
managers interests
diverge
Assumes information
asymmetry and goal
conflict
Aligning interest of
agent with principal

•
•
•
•
•
•

Principals and
managers have shared
interests
Facilitative authority
structures

•

Pluralistic organization
Intemal/extemal
coalitions emerge from
social exchanges
Ongoing
reinterpretation and
negotiation with
environments
Stakeholders have
legitimate interests
considered intrinsically
valuable
Relationships between
stakeholders and
organization are
negotiated
Organizations
constrained by rules/
conventions that shape
form and practice
Organizations are
effective consequence
of conformity

Essential
governance
features

Conformance
Accountability
Monitoring
Compliance
Control
Separating
ownership and
control
Organizational
performance
Accountability
Linking
Support/mentor
Co-opt external
influences

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Accountability
Linking
Supporting
Secure resources
thereby minimize
dependence on
others

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Organizational
performance
Coordinating
Representing
Accountability
Conformance
Linking

•
•
•
•
•
•

Organizational
performance
Conformance
Maintenance
Accountability
Strategic
Coordinating
Linking

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Political
Fiducial
Oriented
toward
public good
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Political
Fiducial
Oriented
toward public
good
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Political
Fiducial
Oriented
toward public
good
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Political
Fiducial
Oriented
toward public
good
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Political
Fiducial
Oriented
toward public
good
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Summary
Chapter Two began with an analysis of three governance perspectives reflective
of political science. From these perspectives, governance can be construed structurally
along a continuum from centralized and authoritative to networked and collaborative.
An analysis of the positions adopted toward governance in comparative politics,
international relations, and public administration showed that although each perspective
reflected a unique point of view, their conceptions of governance have certain features
in common. Power, legitimacy, authority, fiduciality, governance as political and
oriented toward the public good appear to be essential to the concept of governance. A
similar review of five management theories identified central assumptions about
governance from an organizational perspective that coincide with the previously named
essential features.
Governance is not simply a concept or an abstract idea. The focus and functions
of governance are responsive to contingent relations particular to the social systems
being governed and so define, limit, and give form to any particular iteration of
governance. While structures and processes present no single example of governance,
some features help us articulate what we mean when we use the term governance.
Thus, those who govern, as I have shown, require power, authority, and legitimacy, and
are fiducial, political, and oriented to public good; and the process by which they
govern must exhibit those same features. They create an image and capture particular
features by which we recognize governance. These features do not pretend to create an
ideal type for understanding governance. Identifying distinctive features of governance,
nonetheless, is useful in attempting, as Allison (1983) puts it, “to force the development
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of more accurate definitions” (p. 18) and “to capture the particular character” (p.21) of
the object of inquiry.
In thus preparing the groundwork leading up to answering the question, can
school boards govern? it seems apparent that an adequate treatment will have to ask
whether or to what extent schools boards possess all of these essential features.
However, before I proceed to the discussion of school board governance, I examine the
concept of governance specifically in the context of board governance. Toward that
end, the following chapter examines the concept of governance as it is represented in
board governance literature. The history, legal context, governance expectations,
practice, and characteristics of boards are explored in order to reach a more nuanced
understanding of governance and one that is suited for an inquiry into school board
governance.
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CHAPER THREE
BOARDS AND BOARD GOVERNANCE
Although few practices are more ancient than communities delegating
authority to small groups of elders, deacons, proprietors, selectmen,
counselors, directors, or trustees, the formal responsibilities and informal
expectations defining who they are, what they do, and how they do it,
have varied from time to time and from place to place.
Peter Dobkin Hall (1990)
Chapter Two examined the concept of governance as it appeared from selected
perspectives in the literatures of political and management science. This chapter probes
deeper into the concept of governance by examining literature that addresses the
processes and structures of board governance. The discussion involves identifying and
grouping significant themes associated with board governance, indicating areas of
theoretical and practical convergence, and distinguishing between essential and
contingent features of governance as they apply to governing boards.
I have divided this task into three parts with the aim of creating a framework
that can be of assistance in determining the essential content and limits of the concept of
governance in the context of governing boards. The first part intends to provide a
description of the historical and legal context within which boards operate, and to
briefly distinguish the sectors or environments in which boards govern. These
environments include private, nonprofit, and public-sector boards, all of which govern
within distinctive contexts and are influenced by different contingencies. This will aid
in more clearly identifying a context for understanding public-sector boards, which is
where school boards are situated, and the expectations surrounding them. I then turn to
what I have termed the normative literature and those authors who purport to set out
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norms for boards, address the nature and function of governing bodies, and instruct
boards on their roles and responsibilities. Macnamara (2004) characterizes this
literature as providing rules, guidelines, and prescriptions for how to govern and
explanatory accounts of board governance from which a common set of expectations
can be deduced. Finally, a review of the academic literature attends to the findings of
studies on private, public, and nonprofit-sector boards.

Board Governance in Context
The Evolution o f Boards
Social systems require order and effective processes (Parsons, 1960). Toward
this end, society is organized through institutions that provide structure, continuity, and
dependability to social interactions. Some form of order and regulation is essential to a
well-organized society—a social system of multiple social subsystems—which in turn
requires an ordering agent, individual or collective, that is capable of directing the
system to its desired ends. Dobkin Hall (2003) observed, “if we once lived in a society
of communities, today we live in a society of formal organizations, public and private,
almost all of which are governed by citizen boards” (p.29).
Collective decision-making systems and bodies of various kinds extend back
into pre-history as tribal councils and hunting parties. The discussion of governance
and governing bodies in Western civilization can be traced back to ancient Greece and
Rome. In the Laws (1961), Plato spoke of the necessity of a “nocturnal council” (X,
908-909), a body which could oversee “the style of a magistrate,” and understand “the
mark of statesmanship.. .and the methods by which it can be attained and the
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counsels.. .which make for or against it” (XII, 962). Its governing role is superordinate
to the laws and structures of a society, as is clear from Plato’s claim: “If a state leave no
room for such a body, we should not be surprised that a society.. .finds itself drifting at
the mercy of circumstances in its various undertakings” (XII, 962). Plato’s student
Aristotle, in encouraging trade and the pursuit of commercial interests, emphasized “the
need for regulation from a higher and trusted authority” (Kakabadse & Kakabadse,
2008, p.8).

Guilds and corporate bodies. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, guilds
were organized to regulate trade and crafts in urban areas. They functioned as self
governing, corporate bodies, and were regulated with bylaws and internal elected
governing bodies. “[T]hose who were members of the corporation were directly
responsible for its activities” (Bell, 1971, p.29). The corporation or “corporate form of
organization has been traced,” according to Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan (2003), “to
the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, at which time the ‘body corporate’ was established”
(p. 151). However, “the first recorded charter for the sole purpose of business was
issued [some years earlier] by England’s Henry VII” (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008,
P-9).
The term “board” goes back to at least the seventeenth century, its origin
recounted by Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2008) as follows:

.. .those tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the company regularly
met.. .At the place of meeting, a long board was laid across two sawhorses and
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the group that assembled around this crude table to discuss their affairs later
became known as the board. The leader of the group became known as the
chairman simply because the individual sat on a chair, while the others had only
stools available to them, (p.10)

Weber (1947) noted that in older, pre-industrialized societies governance was
based on tradition that is “on the basis of the sanctity of the order and attendant powers
of control as they have been handed down from the past” (p.341). As secularity
eclipsed religion and democratic ideals undermined absolute monarchy, society required
other forms of governance. Traces of the transition to what Weber (1947) calls
bureaucratic authority are visible in the origins of the corporation noted above, sacred or
traditional notions of order being replaced by a more rational and legalistic approach,
reflected in “a system of rules that is applied.. .in accord with ascertainable principles”
(p.333).
This brief account of the early history of board governance reflects somewhat
the struggle involved in the transition from older, more communal approaches to
governance to newer ones based on rationalism. Nevertheless, regardless of the
paradigm or the historical period, governance has been and continues to be
indispensable for social living and boards are major social institutions, critical to
organizational wellbeing.

The Body Corporate
The notion of board governance is related to the concept of the corporation and
spans private, public, and nonprofit sectors. Like Kramer (2004), I recognize that sector
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boundaries converge and blur, and use the term sector as an artificial construct to help
distinguish between environments and perspectives. Federal law in Canada generally
requires that a corporation be managed by a board of at least three directors (Canada
Business Corporations Act, 1985). Many organizations may also be incorporated under
provincial legislation. In most circumstances, private, public, and nonprofit
corporations and agencies are incorporated and required to have a board of directors.
Thus, boards of directors govern in all three sectors: the private-sector, also known as
the corporate, market or for profit sector; the public-sector, related in some way to
government and including such diverse organizations as Crown Corporations, public
schools, and libraries; and the nonprofit sector, which is understood as having a formal
structure that is not part of government, and reinvests all profits in the organization, is
self governing through a board of directors, and pursues some public good (Salamon &
Anheier, 1997). Community health and social service agencies, advocacy groups,
foundations, and religious organizations are typical of the nonprofit sector.

Board Governance Sectors
Governance is not a univocal term. Although it has historically been associated
with institutional interactions related to public policy, narrowing the focus of inquiry to
the phenomenon “board governance” does not result in a single image that is identical
to every instance of board governance. An inquiry into board governance must be
cognizant of the context and conditions in which governance is discussed. This concern
requires attention to the differences in organizational sectors in which boards operate
and to understand how governance is interpreted.
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Much of the scholarship on board governance is concerned with the privatesector, leading some to assume the private-sector provides the paradigm for board
governance in general. Although boards in all three sectors are charged with
governance responsibilities, and employ similar processes, the driving force of the
private-sector is financial/profit oriented, whereas public and nonprofit boards
characteristically discharge social mandates (Lewis, 2005). It is not only necessary to
distinguish between different types of organizational sectors, one must also be attentive
to the way in which perspective influences one’s understanding of what governance is
and does. For example, several authors (Dart, 2004; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004;
Steane & Christie, 2002) argue that private-sector approaches to board governance
place little importance on ideals such as fairness and justice and, if applied uncritically
to the public or nonprofit sector, could limit the capacity of those boards to create and
maintain strong community. This is because the differences between mission
achievement and financial achievement may lead to different governance behaviours.

Private-Sector Boards
There are two main kinds of private-sector boards: (a) boards whose members
are elected or otherwise selected to represent shareholders/stakeholders, and (b) boards
whose members are selected by the owners to provide the benefits of group decision
making or to satisfy legal requirements. In the private-sector, boards act on behalf of
shareholders or owners, with the prime purpose of maximizing financial performance.
Stone and Ostrower (2007) view governance in this sector as a necessary part of an
organization, grounded in a corporate obligation to ensure shareholder assets. It would
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be a mistake to take profit as their exclusive focus and new attitudes at private-sector
board tables, as well as reformulated goals for some corporations, suggest greater
attention to values-based decision-making, corporate social responsibility, and the
common good. This movement further suggests that the boundaries between economic
and community/social values are not as clear-cut as it was once thought underscoring
the point that the concept of governance, even in the private-sector, includes regard for
the public good.
In Canada, although private-sector corporations can be traced back to the
seventeenth century, the requirement for corporate financial records did not exist prior
to 1902. Therefore, most data about Canadian corporations and shared capital
enterprises before the twentieth century are derived from Canadian business history
books. Even so, Morck, Perch, Tian, and Yeung (2004) argue that these data are
sometimes contradictory and difficult to resolve due to the lack of formal financial and
business records.
Most early Canadian businesses were privately held individual or family
ventures and included such corporations as The Northwest Company (1779), Molson’s
Brewery (1786), Cunard Steamships Limited (1840), and the Bank of Toronto (1857).
Early railroads, such as the 1834 Champlain and St. Lawrence line, were privately held
but eventually became joint-stock corporations. Boards of directors, if they existed at
all, met minimal governance requirements that differed greatly from what is expected
today.
Political upheaval in the nineteenth century, which affected the establishment
and growth of corporations across Canada, was matched by complaints about gross
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corruption, abuse of office, and inept governance. According to Armstrong (1997), a
contributing factor to these accusations was Canada’s particularly weak corporate
governance laws. Morck, Perch, Tian, and Yeung (2004) offer the following insights
into the problems of corporate governance in Canada, during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century:

Corporate governance was essentially a matter of private reputation, constrained
loosely by vague and often contradictory provincial statutes and common law
precedents. No federal corporation law existed until 1910, and that law required
no annual general meetings. Until 1917, they needed only hold meetings every
two years and then only to elect the board...the law mandated neither minority
shareholder rights nor fiduciary duties by officers and directors to shareholders.
Directors and officers had a “duty to the corporation” under common law, which
was interpreted as trumping any duty to shareholders. Conflicts of interest were
of no concern to the courts. Shareholders had no rights in common law to
inspect books or records unless they could persuade a judge of a definite legal
objective and could identify the specific records that would certainly contain the
information. Auditors had no duty to inform shareholders of potential or actual
misconduct; their duty was purely arithmetical. One key precedent held that
auditors were justified in believing tried servants in whom confidence is placed
by the company. Another warned that an auditor who opines on governance
does so at his peril and runs a very serious risk of being held judicially to have
failed to discharge his duty, (p.38)
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In the 1930s provincial securities commissions were established and with them
came greater attention to the fiduciary duties of private-sector boards. Nonetheless,
even in the 1960s when the Ontario Securities Commission mandated standardized
disclosure to shareholders, and insider trading was curtailed, corporate governance
attracted little serious attention. In the 1990s, a number of provincial exchange and
securities commission reforms further expanded shareholders’ legal rights. At the same
time concerns about board governance received international attention because of
scandals in boardrooms such as occurred at Enron and WorldCom.

Public-Sector Boards
Public-sector organizations include government agencies, public school boards,
and variously privately organized and incorporated entities, including some universities
and health care providers that receive a substantial share of their revenue from the
public treasury (Brock & Keith, 2003; Tuohy, 2003). The boards of these organizations
are characterized as existing apart from the market, having a close relationship to the
state, and being expected to act on behalf of constituents. Stone and Ostrower (2007)
point out that public-sector governance is often equated with government because of
constitutional and statutory requirements and the right of government to oversee the
implementation of most public policy.
There are myriad configurations of public-sector boards. The boards governing
national and provincial Crown corporations (for example, Canada Post and the Royal
Ontario Museum) reflect a variety of different structures and reporting responsibilities.
Hospital boards are considered public-sector by virtue of their statutory regulation, but
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they differ in many ways from other public-sector boards, for example, in how board
members are selected. Members to public-sector hospital boards are appointed and
elected through the membership. Generally, school board trustees are elected during
municipal elections, and municipal councils appoint library board members. Hospital
boards are required to have at the board table certain staff members, who have voting
privileges, whereas the only voting members on school boards are the elected trustees.
School board members receive compensation; their counterparts on library boards and
hospital boards do not.
The importance of public-sector organizations, according to Watson (2004), is
that they “arguably have a more direct and significant impact on economic, social, and
cultural life” through the Crown Corporations, health, education and worker protection
programs that they administer (p. 1). Many public-sector organizations are required by
government to achieve financial self-sufficiency while meeting public-policy
objectives, such as delivering needed services that are not commercially viable (Auditor
General of Canada, 2000). Public-sector-organizations, when incorporated, tend to be
regarded as non-share capital organizations, the same designation given to nonprofits.2
Public-sector bodies, such as certain boards, agencies, commissions and Crown
corporations, were created by government to provide objective public oversight that
ideally would not be influenced by partisan politics and to serve as regulatory
mechanisms for hospitals, railroads, electric utilities and marketing boards, and as
implementation devices for government policy.

o

School boards in Ontario are not incorporated under these Acts, but public hospitals are. Instead,
school boards are bound by the Education Act and Regulations that specify their practice.
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Early public-sector governance in Canada is manifest in the first school boards
across the country, which as public serving institutions, were mandated to oversee and
guide the affairs of their local school districts. The first provincial operating grant to a
hospital in Upper Canada was given to York General in 1830, and was followed by a
capital grant in 1832 for the building of a hospital in Kingston. These grants paved the
way for the chartering of countless charitable and human-service organizations seeking
some funds from government to aid their public-serving missions. As government
entered into funding relationships with public-service organizations, it faced serious
questions, such as, “if governments supplied public funds, did they not likewise assume
responsibility for the service? Should private citizens have the power to dispense public
money? How could these individuals be held accountable” (Martin, 1985, p.66)1
These concerns remained largely unchecked until after the second world war, when
government formalized the linkages between resources and control through a series of
statutes and regulations and unparalled public-sector intervention changed the way that
health, welfare, and the arts were administered, delivered, financed and monitored
(Martin, 1985). Houle (1997) explains the growth of public-sector organizations as a
response to development experienced across the continent and the unwieldy task for
citizens to be directly involved in controlling all aspects of society. Consequently two
societal needs emerged: (a) to adjust to the institutionalization of important social
activities such as education, health care, museums, universities, and libraries; and (b) to
provide for representative participation in governing the activities of the community.
According to Houle, social activities originated with the efforts of small groups and
grew to become institutionalized in large, complex systems. Authority to govern these
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institutions was arrogated by groups of people who came to be called trustees, directors,
board members or governors. Thus, public-sector boards represented a principled effort
and a civic commitment to citizen oversight and social responsibility, and a practical
apparatus for fiduciality.

Nonprofit- Sector Boards
In Canada today there are an estimated 161,000 incorporated nonprofit
organizations (Roberts, 2001). Approximately half of these have registered charitable
status. All incorporated nonprofits are required to have a board of directors.
Governance in the nonprofit sector is complex. Rather than being driven by an
economic bottom line, or fulfilling a public-policy mandate, Young (2002) argues that it
is the nonprofit mission, the notion of public representation, and the corresponding
responsibility for holding the organization in trust for the benefit of society that
characterize nonprofits. Nonprofits can be said to have many masters, in the sense that
they may depend on donors to provide gifts and grants, government for contract
revenues, tax benefits, and legal oversight, and markets to sell their services. In
addition, some nonprofits operate as national federated systems and must coordinate
their efforts with all members of the federation, as in the case, for example, of the
United Way, the YMCA, or the Alzheimer Society.
Some nonprofit foundations and charities are well funded, but for the vast
majority of nonprofit boards, resource development and financial pressures are common
concerns. Historically, nonprofit organizations have survived on fundraising,
donations, and grants, but in recent decades many have become more reliant on
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government for substantial portions of their operating budgets. In Canada at the present
time, forty-nine percent of all revenues reported by nonprofit organizations come from
governments, forty percent of which come from provincial sources (Statistics Canada,
2005).
In their reliance on government for some part of their funding, nonprofits share
some similarity with public-sectors boards, which can blur the analysis. The shift of
funding sources from the grassroots to foundations and government has also made the
fiduciary requirements of governance more complex and multi-dimensional.
Where many public-sector organizations evolved as a result of government
mandate, early nonprofits were run by religious orders and charities dedicated to the
wellbeing of the population. At the end of the nineteenth century, organizations such as
Children’s Aid Societies, the Red Cross, and the Victorian Order of Nurses were
chartered. Shortly thereafter, public grants were allocated to them to provide services to
vulnerable populations that governments could not reach. The board members of these
organizations most often came from the wealthy and socially prominent who could give
time and money to the cause (Martin, 1985). Businessmen, civic leaders, and
intellectuals rounded out the board membership (Taylor & Baskerville, 1994), along
with professionals such as doctors and academics, who were often recmited to serve on
the boards of organizations such as hospitals or universities as it was believed by some
that knowledge of the enterprise being governed was essential to fiducial effectiveness
(Veblen, 1904). The connotation of board members as elite, philanthropic, and
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influential may well derive from this time where local board members were benefactors
contributing to the achievement of community goals.

•y

In tandem with what was happening in the public-sector, the 1950s and 1960s
saw the advent of greater regulatory scrutiny of nonprofits, especially tax-exempt
charities and foundations handling large bequests and trusts. As government relied on
and invested in the services provided by the nonprofit sector, statutes setting out
accountabilities, reporting responsibilities, and rules about tax-exempt status set the
stage for greater answerability from boards. According to Dobkin Hall (2003), with
larger amounts of public funds comprising the revenues of nonprofits, the need grew for
board members who understood and could network across the boundaries of
entrepreneurial organizations and influential constituencies that included government
agencies, foundations, corporations, and client groups. The shift in nonprofit board
governance from a primarily benevolent and prestigious form of volunteerism to a more
legally regulated and publicly accountable responsibility contributed to a heightened
awareness of responsibilities and liabilities as well as a rapid increase in the number of
governing boards. Houle (1997) argues that board membership became less the domain
of the privileged and well-positioned and more an area of public responsibility. No
longer were the elites, mostly businessmen and often insiders, the only sought after
board members. They were joined by a cross-section of interested citizens,
professionals, and consumers.
Halpin (2001) lists several consequences of the changed regulatory environment
on boards, including an intentional focus on active oversight of their organizations, a3
3
These contributions can be seen in such structures as Massey Hall, McMaster University, and
Molson Memorial Stadium.
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heightened awareness of personal accountabilities, and greater attention to how to
properly carry out roles and responsibilities. Attention to governance, moreover,
transcended the realm of boards, themselves, and extended to an amplified interest, on
the part of both funders and stakeholders, in who governed and how well they did so.
With this interest came even greater demands on boards to be accountable, transparent,
and duly diligent.
The Accountability Imperative of Boards
The concept and practice of governance by every duly constituted board,
including school boards, have legal implications that include accountability, fiduciality,
and diligence. Accountability as an enduring feature of governance certainly did not
emerge as a result of the increased public attention to boards. It has always been central
to board governance, particularly in situations involving the public trust. Understood as
the duty to explain and accept responsibility for carrying out an assigned mandate in
accord with applicable laws and agreed-upon expectations, accountability generally
requires several things from boards. These include (a) considering the public trust in the
exercise of their responsibilities; (b) providing detailed information that demonstrates
how responsibilities are met and outcomes achieved; and (c) accepting responsibility for
outcomes, including problems created or not corrected by an organization or its officials
or staff (Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector [PAGVS],
1999). According to the PAGVS:
It is the duty of the board to oversee the conduct of the organization’s affairs,
ensure that an effective team is in place to carry out day-to-day activities,
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account for its financial and other resources, and ensure that no issue falls
between the cracks in steering the organization toward the fulfillment of its
mission, (p.23)
In Canada, provincial and federal Corporations Acts set out rules for the operation of
boards. Thus, the powers and responsibilities of boards are defined and limited by
statutes, such as the Income Tax Act and the Charitable Gifts Act.
In law, a corporation is an artificial person or a legal entity and has an
independent existence that is separate and apart from its members. Because the
corporation is a separate entity, it affords limited liability for its members. While
individual members are not personally liable in certain instances for a corporation’s
debts and obligations, board members do remain responsible for their decisions and are
responsible to all shareholders (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005).
The responsibility of boards is structured by legislation and legally constituted
boards must conduct their affairs in accord with applicable statutes, which typically
require observance of the constitution or bylaws of the corporation, the election of
directors, and the calling of meetings as governed by applicable provisions of the
relevant Corporations Act. Failure to comply with reporting and disclosure
requirements could render both the corporation and its directors liable to certain
penalties (Companies Branch and Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, 2004).
Boards have certain legal duties which specify and give substance to what is
expected under the notion of accountability. Among these are fiduciary duties.
Because they are legally charged with responsibility for the overall direction and well
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being of a corporation, boards have the power and authority to hire, supervise, and
dismiss management and to oversee the affairs of the organization. This implied
obligation for each director to act honestly and in good faith, in the best interests of the
corporation, rather than in their own interests is known as fiduciary duty. Boards must
also do what is necessary for the effective operation of the corporation, that is, exercise
the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar
circumstances. This is known as the duty of care. These duties are complex and far
ranging, holding boards accountable, at a minimum, for such things as filing tax returns
and paying applicable taxes, maintaining complete and adequate corporate records,
ensuring that articles of incorporation, bylaws, and minutes of board meetings are
adequately detailed and that employee credentials are appropriate and available for
review (McIntyre Hall & Seuss Kennedy, 2008).
As demands for openness and transparency have become stronger and decision
making more complex, accountability requirements have risen. Progressively
complicated operational environments, shifts in social policy together with an erosion of
public trust have contributed to a climate of enhanced accountability to diverse
audiences, for a variety of activities and outcomes, and through different means.
Changing expectations of boards and liabilities relating to their actions and
inactions are manifest in a series of 1960s malpractice suits which highlighted boards’
legal responsibilities for the services provided by their organizations. The most notable
of these was a ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v. Charleston (1961)
which found that hospital entities could be held liable for the care provided to their
patients:
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The Darling court responded as follows: the standards for hospital accreditation,
the State licensing regulations, and the defendant’s bylaws demonstrate that the
medical profession and other responsible authorities [e.g. boards] regard it as
both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the
care of its patients. (Weit, 2005, p.401)

The implication of this case for boards of directors was the personal liability exposure
of their institutions, the abolition of charitable immunity for hospitals, the abolition of
the “hotel” defence (i.e., hospitals, as entities, are not responsible for what goes on in
them), ultimately locating corporate responsibility for the services of the hospital in the
hands of the boards of directors. Governments reacted by increasing regulations on
hospitals. Legal advice to hospital boards stressed an obligation for boards of directors
to be knowledgeable about the organization they were governing and the legislation that
regulated them (Weit, 2005). Responsibility for organizational knowledge and
outcomes has grown to be a standard expectation for most public-sector and nonprofit
boards, an expectation that can be found in funding agreements between funders and
boards.
The Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector (PAGVS)
(1999), a national initiative of the Canadian government and the voluntary sector to
examine nonprofit governance, affirmed governing boards’ responsibility for
organizational outcomes, including problems created or not corrected by an
organization or its officials and staff. Daniels and Morck (1996) identify 106 different
federal and provincial statutes that impose personal liability on board members in
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Ontario, as well as an increase in tort-based4 liabilities relating to duty of care
responsibilities.
Increased demands for accountability did not occur in a vacuum but over time
and place, sometimes punctuated by events such as public governance scandals and
failures, sometimes in response to legal judgements, and often because of public
expectations, which informed political will.

Accountable to Whom?
The idea of accountability has a two-fold connotation: accountability to and
accountability for. Much of what corporations are accountable for is, as already noted,
regulated by law. Yet the issue of to whom boards are accountable is less clear,
including a variety of designated and non-designated groups. Even private-sector
boards, which are generally understood as being accountable to shareholders, are also
accountable to government for compliance with legal expectations in their regulated
environment. Public-sector and nonprofit accountability expectations are more complex
because of a typically more complex legal environment and multifaceted arrangements
of various stakeholder groups. Gulati-Partee (2001) lists twenty stakeholder groups to
which boards of directors may be accountable, or be perceived as being accountable to,
including funders (such as government, foundations, and donors), those with a financial
interest in the corporation (investors, suppliers, distributors), service recipients,
employees, and the general public.

4
Tort is a legal term meaning a wrongful act, resulting in injury or damage, on which a civil
action may be based (Coleman, 1994)
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The earlier era of minimal public interest in and understanding of the activities
of some public and nonprofit boards contrasts with contemporary scrutiny by
government, funding sources, the media, and the general public. At one time self
regulation and voluntary coordination among agencies were sufficient to ensure
acceptable measures of accountability. Today in education, for example, province-wide
curricula, standardized tests, and performance measurement systems factor into school
boards’ accountability requirements. Moreover, school boards must not only be fiscally
healthy, but must account for their for their decisions and operations through Ministry
mandated reviews (scheduled for all public schools in the province) which focus on
governance and school board administration; human resource management and school
staffing allocation; financial management; and schools operations and facilities
management. As public-sector boards, school boards are also accountable to the courts
when their decisions are disputed, as has been seen in challenges related to school
closures. Nonprofit and other public-sector boards reliant on public funds must now
provide data for aggregate assessments of institutional performance, which may be
linked to resource allocation decisions (performance based funding). There seems to be
a consensus among several authors (Gardon, 2001; Houle, 1997; PAGVS, 1999;
Schmidt, 2003) that these developments were inevitable, given the significant changes
in the public and legal environments within which boards operate.
The following excerpt from a letter written in 1933 by George Apley, a Harvard
Board member, to his forty-two year-old son, provides a contrast to our current
environment of governance concerns and heightened expectations:
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I have heard from a very good authority that there may be a vacancy on the
Harvard Corporation. Certain of us are looking for a younger man and one of the
right sort. There is altogether too much sentiment here for getting outsiders and
so-called ‘new blood’ into Harvard. The traditions of the place must not be
spoiled.. ..I think you might be fitted to take your place on the Board. It is true
you have never been a scholar but now that you are actually going to live in
Boston, this does not really make much difference. (Houle, 1997, p.24)

In summary, the governance of corporations, especially public-serving
organizations, does not occur in a vacuum. Boards are legally constituted entities
whose identities are not identical with the names of the individuals who serve as their
members. The actions for which they are responsible and held accountable are actions
of a corporate body, not of isolated individuals. Such actions transpire in formal
sessions of the board, for which a quorum is usually required. Yet, as a member of the
board, each individual shares in and is accountable not only for those acts taken in
formal session, but for omissions and failures to act, which by law and according to
public responsibility the member is expected to carry out. Ultimately, it is the formally
constituted board that is accountable for discharging all legal requirements incumbent
on them. They are accountable to a variety or stakeholders for their decisions, actions,
and/or inactions. Not only are there legal consequences to a board’s failure to
adequately fulfill fiduciary duties, boards may suffer a loss of public trust, and
sometimes cause irreparable harm to their corporate and public image and that of the
organizations they govern and perhaps the very services they provide.
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Cross-Sectoral Comparisons
Multiple stakeholders and competing interests characterize both the nonprofit
and public-sectors. Steane (2001) argues that while private-sector boards build support
and legitimacy through maximizing profits, nonprofit and public-sector boards build
support and legitimacy by earning the trust and respect of the public and their sectoral
actors. Recent trends, however, underscore that issues of trust, legitimacy, and public
good are elements of governance across all three sectors. Yet, despite differences in
how public and nonprofit boards are constituted, regulated, and monitored, typically
public and nonprofit boards rely on private-sector organizational and governance
research to guide their actions.
Comforth (2003) argues that although in an earlier time the traditions of
governance in each sector remained quite distinct, government reforms in the publicsector and the adoption of private-sector management practices by both public and
nonprofit organizations have blurred previously more distinct boundaries between
sectors. As a result, key differences between board governance in different sectors have
become less distinct. Nevertheless, the public, nonprofit, and private-sectors differ
sharply in two characteristics of governance. The first is the belief held by many
nonprofit and public-sector boards of the importance of appropriate stakeholder
representation. For example, library and hospital boards hold specific places for
citizens at large. McFarlan (1999) sees this as based on a conviction that representation
at the board table by users of the service generates a greater commitment from board
members, a stronger sense of legitimacy and credibility in the community, and provides
a broader base of necessary skills for board members, such as lobbying for funding or
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monitoring management. Yet, some board members come to the table as a result of
political pressure or legal mandate and concerns about their commitment and potential
for bias (Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1996; Herman and Renz, 2000).
The second characteristic is the explicit link between agency structure and
commitment to the public good. This characteristic is rooted in the missions of public
serving organizations, which typically include in their organizational statements a
pledge to social and community values, such as equal access to education, health care,
and employment. This characteristic is further reinforced by the expectation that many
nonprofit and public-board members serve with limited or no financial compensation,
being motivated by the opportunity to shape community initiatives, assume civic
leadership, or gain personal gratification or political advancement (Judge & Zeithaml,
1992; Kang & Cnaan, 1995). According to McFarlan (1999), the governance practices
of nonprofit and public-sector boards can differ considerably from those of privatesector boards because traditional business experience, the usual defining requirement of
board membership in that sector, only partially meets the requirements of nonprofit and
public-board governance.
From the discussion thus far, it should be clear that while sectoral dissimilarities
affect the processes, focus, and beneficiaries of governance, board governance itself
exhibits several core features or characteristics across the sectors, and many areas where
governance activities converge (Houle, 1997). Similarities among private, nonprofit,
and public-sector boards occur across a number of dimensions. For example, it appears
that the chief function of any board is to make corporate decisions, as a formally
assembled and properly constituted assembly. Acting as a corporate body, within a
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legal framework to regulate an organization’s operations, boards play a key role in
providing services and in the exchange of financial and other resources (Rathgeb Smith
& Gronbjerg, 2006).
Table 3:1 summarizes key meta-characteristics of boards across sectoral lines.
The table shows central organizational factors relevant to boards and their governance
responsibilities and provides a means to compare and contrast the features of
governance that characterize boards regardless of the sector in which they govern.
Because the public-sector is complex and difficult to generalize, I specifically depict
school boards as an example of public-sector boards. The first column contains central
organizational factors that inform and influence the structures and processes of
governance. These include the terms of a board’s mandate; reporting relationships and
answerability for decisions; the working and human resource relationship with the chief
executive; board membership, including specific criteria/credentials of members and
member selection; decision-making authority; compensation of board members; and
governance responsibilities. The next three columns depict differences in board
governance by sector. Sectoral differentiation is significant in that it indicates how
external and internal influences (e.g., market forces, cultural values, philanthropic and
charitable motivations, and/or political will) create dissimilarity in the structural aspects
of governance. Despite such differences, from a governance perspective, functional
responsibilities remain similar.

Table 3:1 M e ta -c h a ra c te ristic s o f B o a rd s

Organizational
factors

Public-sector:
Ontario school
boards
Top level of decision
making for local
school district in
designated areas as
per Education Act
and Regulations

Top level of decision
making for
organization.

Appreciate respective
roles; mutual respect

Appreciate respective
roles; mutual respect

Appreciate respective
roles; mutual respect

CEO reports to and is
supervised by board

CEO reports to and is
supervised by board

CEO reports to and is
supervised by board

Board hires CEO

Board hires CEO
subsequent to
Ministry approval.
CEO has secondaiy
accountability to
Ministry
Municipal Elections

Board hires CEO

Private-sector boards

Organizational
Position
(position of
boards in relation
to their
organizational
environment)

Top level of decision
making for organization

Board Mandate
(terms of board
authority;
legitimacy)

Oversee the management
of the business - build
successful corporation
and enhance shareholder
value

Mode of
Accountability
(reporting
relationships /
answerability for
decisions)
Relationship to
CEO
(direction of power
and authority; need
for collaborative
relationship to
foster information
flow; ultimately
HR power resides
with board)

To owners/shareholders

Process of Board
Membership
(how members are
selected)

Recruitment/
appointment/election by
membership

Qualifications
(criteria, credentials
and limits to who
are chosen to
govern)

Relevant experience and
business networks,
previous private-sector
board experience

Must account for their
decisions annually to
owners/shareholders

Nonprofit-sector
boards

Nonprofits with
memberships must
account for their
decisions annually
Oversee the
Oversee the
management of the
management of
school district; ensure organization for
delivery of education mission attainment
as per Education Act;
represent constituents
To government
To members
To electorate
To community
To funders/donors

Resident, taxpayer,
non-employee of
school district being
represented;
Canadian citizen

Election by
membership;
recruitment/
appointment where
there is no
membership
Previous board/
relevant experience;
mission commitment;
representative of
community

Table 3:1 Continued

Organizational
Factors
Board
Membership
(Who is at the
table?)

Private-Sector Boards
Inside directors (work for
corporation) and outside
directors
CEO may or may not be
Chair

Voting
(Who makes the
decisions?)

CEO voting; governance
decisions legitimated by
majority vote

Compensation
(financial
compensation for
work as board
member)

Yes
(can be significant with
money paid for meeting
attendance; differentials
for Board chair and
committee chairs)
a) Explicit fiduciary
responsibility for all
aspects of the
stewardship of the
corporation
b) Strategic planning
c) Identify risks and
ensure risk
management
processes
d) Succession planning
and monitoring of
CEO performance
e) Ensure the integrity
of internal controls
and management
information systems
f) Corporate social
responsibility
emerging as a new
governance
responsibility

Governance
Responsibilities

Public-Sector:
Ontario School
Boards
Elected trustees

Nonprofit-Sector
Boards
Directors

CEO membership is exofficio
CEO membership is
ex-officio
CEO nonvoting;
governance decisions
legitimated by majority
vote
Yes
(nominal with
differential for at least
Board Chair)

CEO nonvoting;
governance decisions
legitimated by
majority vote
No

a) Explicit fiduciary
responsibility for
all aspects of the
stewardship of the
corporation and
compliance with
legislative
regulations
b) Strategic planning
c) Identify risks and
ensure risk
management
processes
d) Succession
planning and
monitoring of CEO
performance
e) Ensure the integrity
of internal controls
and management
information
systems
f) Ensure
representative role
in community

a) Explicit fiduciary
responsibility for
all aspects of the
stewardship of
the corporation
b) Strategic
planning
c) Identify risks and
ensure risk
management
processes
d) Succession
planning and
monitoring of
CEO
performance
e) Ensure the
integrity of
internal controls
and management
information
systems
f) Ensure external
linkages and
networks are
developed and
nurtured
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Board Governance Literature
In this section, I review literature from board governance commentators and
scholars in order to identify what, if any, changes in the generic understanding of
governance, as developed previously in Chapter Two, emerge in the case of board
governance. Specific aims are to (a) identify theories of board governance and (b)
deduce a common set of expectations for board governance. In exploring the available
materials, it should be noted that some authors’ views fall more on the side of the
theoretical, some are more empirically oriented, while others are normative or practice
oriented.
Today board governance is studied and discussed from several different and
often divergent perspectives, each attempting in its own way to find a rationally tenable
model for understanding social organization, decision-making, policy-making, authority
and power- in a word, governance in the modem world. Much of the literature on
board governance that has emerged in the past quarter century is oriented primarily
toward private-sector organizations. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) suggest that board
governance literature prior to the 1980s conveyed the impression “that boards did not
do much and were treated as something that the law required of incorporated
organizations - something not of any real consequence and about which very little is
known” (p.14). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a general trend toward public
accountability along with a series of public governance failures led to a change in
thinking about the role of boards.
In 1992, in the United Kingdom, the Cadbury Report, commissioned by the
London Stock Exchange, identified serious problems in private-sector governance and
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made recommendations for improving board governance practice. The Dey Report
(1994), commissioned by the Toronto Stock Exchange to study corporate governance in
Canada identified similar problems, and recommended changes in governance practices.
Corporate failures and mismanagement in the private-sector, such as Enron and
WorldCom, were mirrored by scandals in nonprofit organizations, such as the United
Way (1992); March of Dimes (1996); American Parkinson Disease Association (1996);
and Good Will Industries (1998) (Gibelman & Gelman, 2000).
Demands for accountability for boards across all sectors increased as a direct
result of instances of neglect and inattention by governing boards. In 2002, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) introduced substantial governance and accountability
reforms in the United States. Although this legislation was specific to private-sector
governance, DiConsiglio (2002) contends it has implications for all sectors. The
mounting concerns for greater accountability and transparency in financial transactions,
addressed in these reports and legislation, were reflected in an expanding body of
literature dealing with a variety of questions relating to the power, legitimacy,
effectiveness, roles, and responsibilities of boards (Bird, 2001; Chait, Ryan & Taylor,
2005; Lorsch & Maclvar, 1989; Sonnenfield, 2002).

Normative Literature
By normative literature I am referring to those books, articles, handbooks and
manuals that purport to instruct governing bodies on their roles and responsibilities and
how to address their tasks and functions and, generally speaking, to set out norms for
board governance. These authors, primarily practitioners and board educators, are
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centrally interested in structures and processes of board governance, to improve the
practice of governance or, in Carver’s (1997) words they attempt, “to prescribe a better
way” (p.22). Many focus on board governance from a structural perspective.
Macnamara (2004) construes this approach as rules based: defining board rules and
responsibilities; providing guidelines, recommendations/rules for governing; offering
explanatory accounts of, and purporting to help discover a common set of expectations
for board governance. Because the concept of governance typically is not directly
discussed, the following paragraphs seek to extract the ideas that appear to be
characteristic of this approach to board governance.
The term “normative literature” should not suggest that the works that I will
examine represent a single perspective. Indeed, besides a broad-cross section of what
has appeared in the past fifteen years, I include in this review a series of handbooks
published by BoardSource (2004), a highly regarded American organization whose
mission is to support the work of governing boards. This series of handbooks has sold
over 175,000 copies across North America (BoardSource, personal communication,
February 2009). Normative board governance literature presents multiple images of
what boards should be doing and offers various models for boards, along with
frameworks to be used for understanding board governance.
For the purposes of comparison, I have divided the literature into two groups: (a)
sources that discuss governance within the framework of a traditional or conventional
model of board governance practice; and (b) others that build on the Policy Governance
model proposed by Carver (1997). Contributions in both groups tend to be atheoretical,
based on notions of how boards should be structured, and salted with prescriptions for
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how they should practice. Much of this literature, replete with models and frameworks,
attempts to explain governance from various practical perspectives, but pays scant
attention to developing any logical framework or theoretical foundation for the
suggestions advanced. To some extent, these normative publications represent what
Allison (1983) referred to as “folk knowledge” (p. 10). While such accounts of
governance are based on personal experience and individual interpretations, they “may
not be valid beyond the settings in which they were formed and tested” (Allison, p.l 1).
Many of their claims may indeed hold true, but are nonetheless based on disputed or
unsubstantiated assumptions about the nature of organizations, their operations, and
their governance.

Conventional/traditional governance approaches. The so-called traditional
view of board governance is the oldest model of private-sector governance. Over time,
it has been passed down and adopted by nonprofits and public-sector boards. Most
Canadian law firms still use this model as a template when establishing articles of
incorporation. In this approach the board is the legal ownership entity. The central
focus of the board is on oversight, and the board is, beyond doubt, in charge of the
organization (Fletcher, 1999). The literature in this approach represents the board as
primarily responsible for the organization, but having the ability to delegate
responsibilities to the chief executive and board committees. It defines board structure,
decision-making, and governance processes. According to Houle (1997), understanding
and navigating a clear separation between the roles of management and governance,
although never frilly achievable, is essential to this model of governance. From this it
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follows that a strong chairperson is needed “to guide, develop, and coordinate the work
of the board” (p. 13), and an able chief executive is required to carry out the decisions of
the board and administer the organization.
Houle (1997) identifies four characteristics of a “traditional” model of board
governance that establishes the board as the central and accountable decision-maker of
the organization. These include: (a) authority, or the established and formal right of a
board to exercise power; (b) control, as related to creating policy, choosing a CEO,
approving major expenditures, directing and delegating staff action, and sometimes
exercising a judicial role as a last internal court of appeal; (c) a fiducial requirement for
oversight, mission attainment, interpreting the institution to the public, representing
constituents, using influence for the benefit of the organization and managing emergent
problems to avoid crisis; and (d) prestige or legitimacy, the standing of the directors and
the benefits they bring to the organization, such as influence, public credibility, and
fundraising. Prestige, Houle states, provides the board with an opportunity for shared
wisdom and collective judgement from “unusually able people who have widespread
spheres of influence” (p. 13). As discussed by Houle, boards typically organize their
work through standing committees, where much of a board’s work is accomplished and
then brought to the board for review and approval. There is usually an executive
committee, where significant governance activity occurs.
There are several problematic aspects of this model. The expectation that the
board to maintain an adequate separation and balance between its role in policy creation
and the chief executive’s role in policy implementation can create a process brimming
with difficulties, as many critics have pointed out (e.g. Carver, 1997; Chait, Ryan, &
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Taylor, 2005; Fletcher, 1999; Gill, 2005; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Moreover, this
model requires strong board members, but does not deal with the inherent challenges of
attracting such individuals. The board committee structure has also come under strong
criticism, on the basis that governance should take place at the board table. Delegating
work to standing committees, it is argued, moves governance away from the board as a
whole and risks relegating to the board the role of ceremonial rubber stamp rather than
that of a governing body (Carver, 1997; Dambach, 2003; Gill, 2005).
A further problem, generally restricted to private-sector governance, arises from
board composition, where the board Chair and the CEO are the same person, or where
boards include inside directors (employed by the company) and outside directors
(independent of the corporation). This threatens the norm of board independence and
separation as articulated in the traditional board literature (Kakabadse & Kakabadse,
2008) and may threaten or be seen as threatening board members’ fiducial duties.
The functions and structures of boards, as depicted in this approach, require of
the board—as a duly constituted corporate body—attention to accountability, oversight,
outcomes, role clarity, the external environment, and the need for adequate resources.
As a result, boards operating inside this model often focus more on compliance with
legislative requirements than on governance roles related to strategy and planning, and
typically rely on the CEO to support and coordinate board activities.
In an attempt to respond to the difficulties indicated, some authors have
proposed hybrid models, derived from the established model, but modified by
enhancing, altering or introducing new governance practices, such as those advanced by
Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1996), Eadie (1993), Gill (2005), Pointer and Orlikiff
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(2002), and Robinson (2001). Gill (2005) believes that governance effectiveness is
influenced by structure, how the board makes decisions, and board culture. A key value
here is fiduciality or responsibility to stakeholders. He proposes a results-based,
audit/oversight model of governance as a way to enhance a board’s effectiveness. In
Gill’s model, the focus of governance is on organizational direction and results, and the
chief executive is a full (though non-voting) participant in the board’s activities.
Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1996) have compiled a list of competencies for
governing boards based on their multi-year study of 22 American university boards,
interviews with 110 board members, and survey responses from over 400 board
members. The critical aim of this study was to analyze board behaviours and attitudes
in order to assist boards to govern more purposefully and become more engaged in
issues of consequence, for example, strategic priorities, and in doing so develop
stronger governance practices. Ultimately, they advocated that boards must understand
the culture and norms of the organization they govern, attend to board learning and
development, foster board cohesiveness, govern analytically by appreciating the
complexities of issues and approaching them critically, understand their political
responsibilities, and govern strategically. These competencies require of board
members cognitive skills, such as, “the capacity to learn, analyze, decide, and act” and
affective skills “oriented more towards process than substance” (Chait, Holland, &
Taylor, p.8). Yet the authors reasonably argue that even with these skills, board
governance has only “marginal utility unless these assets engender decisions and
actions that add value to the institution.. .the ultimate goal of any governing body”
(P-9).
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Robinson (2001) emphasizes the social, cultural, and contextual aspects of
governance. She advances a board structure that is context based and individualized to
a particular organization and, thus, involves a need for ongoing board learning. This
model also underscores the value of an effective working partnership between the chief
executive and the board.
Yet another variation on how to improve governance aims at board capacity and
the process of governance. Eadie (2002) believes boards should approach their
governance responsibilities through the lens of teams, whose commitment to and
ownership of the governance process can be developed. Eadie identifies the chief
executive as the point person in developing the board as a team. Both Robinson (2001)
and Eadie, while remaining close to the established model, stress the importance of
board involvement and development.
It might be well to repeat that the literature reviewed herein typically assumes a
notion of governance and then proceeds to explore how to make it more effective.
Many of the practices critiqued and revisions offered by these authors constitute a meta
narrative that is uncritically accepted and acted upon by many boards.

Policy governance. It is debateable whether the policy governance model
describes a totally new type of board governance, or whether it should be considered as
a variation on the conventional model sketched above. The aim of policy governance is
to change ineffective habits and practices of boards by organizing the role of boards
around policy development and oversight (Brudney & Nobbie, 2002a). The reason for
treating it separately is the popularity attained by John Carver’s prolific publications
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and the readiness of many boards, in the public, nonprofit, and private-sectors, to adopt
the structure, and operate according to the prescriptions of the Carver model.
Carver’s first published work on policy governance appeared in 1980, but it was
his 1990 book, Boards That Make a Difference, that brought policy governance to the
centre of board governance discussions. According to Carver, the primary role of the
board is to create policy to guide management in its operational work, and to guide the
board in its work of governing. In his view, board policy should relate to four specific
areas. The governing process entails how the board represents ownership and provides
strategic leadership. Board ends determine the needs to be met, for whom and at what
cost. The board-executive relationship defines how power is to be passed on to the
executive and how to assess the use of that power, and the final policy area is, executive
limitations, which are principles of prudence and ethics to be used to limit the choice of
staff actions. By attempting to provide clear limits on the notions of chief executive,
Carver recognizes the difference between the competence and fulltime focus of a CEO
in comparison to the part-time focus of board members. As long as the limits are not
transgressed, the CEO has significant freedom to decide on the means necessary to
maximize the ends established by the board.
Many of the functions ascribed to boards in what has been termed the traditional
approach are applicable as well to policy governance: determining mission and purpose
(Axelrod, 1994), recruiting, hiring, evaluating, and, if necessary, terminating the chief
executive (Block, 1998), managing resources effectively (Houle, 1997), and overseeing
the outputs of the organization to assure objectives are being met (Gill, 2005). The
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difference lies more in the manner in which these functions are enacted than in the
functions themselves.
Carver’s (1997) model of board governance aims at moving boards from being
compliance driven to vision driven, replacing a command and control approach with
one of empowerment, and improving board decision-making by focusing on clear
criteria set out in established policy. A board modelled on Carver’s norms concentrates
on policy as a means to frame an organization’s actions. Policy governance highlights
the importance of “define and delegate” over the less effective practice of “react and
ratify” (Carver & Carver, 1996, p.9). Carver’s suggestions aim at reversing what he
views as unacceptable board practices: on the one hand, over-involvement of many
boards in the work of management practices; on the other, rubber-stamp boards.
In policy governance, the chief executive is accountable for “no less than the
entire product and behaviour of the organization” (Carver, 1997, p.107). Chief
executives have no responsibility for the board, only to the board (Fletcher, 1999). The
board works as a whole (ideally with no standing committees) with all board business
enacted at the board table, ensuring greater accountability by preventing the practice of
receive and review, which remains the norm for many boards.
While policy governance has been embraced by many boards for focusing
members’ attention on improving board practices, over time criticisms have emerged
about its practical utility. Although Carver (1997) insists that policy governance must
be fully implemented and that boards may not pick and choose which aspects of the
model they wish to employ, Hough (2002) observed that its implementation requires
substantial discipline on the part of both board members and the chief executive, and is

101

difficult to maintain. In practice many boards follow the policy governance model
selectively as the effort to sustain it can be too demanding. Brudney and Nobbie
(2002b) point out that it requires all participants to be committed to the model and to
understand its principles, which are quite different from the more conventional
approach to governance Houle (1997) espouses. Another hurdle to the successful
operation of policy governance lies in the nature of board membership. Member
turnover may lead to a loss of policy champions, and new members must be newly
oriented and commit to the principles of the Carver model.
Fletcher (1999) and Upshaw (2006) argue that the policy governance model
does not adequately address a board’s responsibilities for dealing with political
responsibilities in its external environment and relations with constituents such as
regulators, citizens, key stakeholders, and other officials. External linking and
stakeholder relations are recognized as important, political aspects of governance.
There are also concerns that because of its structural rigidity, little room exists for the
“subtleties of human interaction” (Fletcher, 1999, p.437). Policy governance has been
described as a “two-dimensional model” that can, nevertheless, offer some insights to
practitioners “working within messy multi-dimensional realities” (Armstrong, 1998,
p.l). A sa two-dimensional model, it lacks the range and depth required by the complex
multi-dimensional phenomenon of governance. Among the multi-dimensional aspects
of governance are the behaviour, skills, motivations, commitment of board members,
the social processes believed to contribute to effective governance (Leblanc & Gillies,
2005; Sonnenfeld, 2002) and the influences (internal and external) that may affect board
governance.
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An important yet unvoiced criticism of the policy governance approach is that it
substitutes one roughly defined concept (policy) for another (governance), thus
avoiding serious practical engagement with either. It risks feeding into a naïve belief
that organizing all governance roles around policy-making becomes a sort of invisible
mechanism that frees the board from the mess of an organization’s operations. This
model fails to recognize the complexities of governance, such as those arising from the
influence of social processes, the context, contingencies, and conditions in which
governance must be carried out. Nonetheless, Carver’s perspective, although not
universally accepted and certainly no panacea for the ills of board governance, can
serve as a heuristic for helping board members understand what they do and for
improving board practice.
Figure 3:1 attempts to show graphically how boards are understood in the
normative literature. Typically, the board sits at the apex of the organization, ultimately
responsible for stewardship, oversight, and mission/mandate attainment. The CEO is
depicted as accountable to the board, but also, to varying degrees and dependant on
context, as situated within the board’s sphere of power and authority in a way that can
influence governance decisions. The CEO has loyalties to the board as well as to the
organization, and represents the organization to the board. The normative literature
stresses the importance of the separation of the roles of the Board and the CEO, and too,
the importance of mutual communication and collaboration.
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Figure 3:1 Graphic representation of the traditional model of board governance

The traditional model of governance locates boards at the pinnacle of the
organization, working with and directing the CEO. Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1996)
describe this way of thinking about boards as oligarchic, with power and authority
reserved to the inner circle, where the chief executive proposes and the board decides.
What can be distilled from these authors is, nevertheless, a common-sense
conceptualization of governance as the power and authority to direct an organization.
Fiduciality and legitimacy are implicit in the expectations of duty of care, strategic
planning, and accountability. Governance as political activity can be seen in the
board’s role in consulting and communicating with key constituencies, including the
CEO, in ways that attempt to minimize conflict and win/lose situations (Chait, Holland,
& Taylor). The hybrid models reinforce this image, but their attentiveness to
circumstances also raise issues of public good, flexibility, and responsiveness.
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Academic Literature
Although the academic literature focuses less on models and frameworks,
relevant questions arise in relation to inquiries about board behaviour, such as, why
boards behave as they do, and how board behaviour affects organizational performance.
This section begins with a review of analyses of board behaviour and its influences.
Selected authors attempt to provide an explanatory account of board behaviour and to
make inferences for governance practice. There are three sections to this review,
dealing respectively with governance as contextual, as a social practice, and as
influenced by individuals. I then move on to effective governance studies, probing
deeper into what I have identified as essential governance features, in an attempt to
further realize an emerging conceptualization of governance.
Governance as contextual. A small yet important body of writing discusses how
board governance is situated and influenced by its environment. From this perspective
governance effectiveness is assumed to occur when boards attend not only to
relationships and the internal processes at the board table, but also to external influences
on the board’s governance (Miller-Milleson, 2003; Ostower & Stone, 2006). This
perspective echoes that of Mintzberg (1983) and Hung (1998), who described the
intrinsic and extrinsic influences that may affect boards. This contextual research takes
a contingency approach to governance effectiveness, mediated by the organizational,
external, and internal board culture.
According to Sonnenfeld (2002), a board works together as a group and in so
doing creates shared meanings. This is an internal process. These shared meanings
help develop the culture of the board through discussion, interpretation, action,
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reflection, and negotiation, and serve as a strong source of governance effectiveness or
ineffectiveness (Li, 2005). Thus, as boards, ideally, develop into “robust effective
social systems” (Sonnenfeld, p.8) and effective board members act as “members of
groups or subgroups, not mere individuals” (Alderfer, 2001, p.38), boards become
better able to manage both the organizational and external factors that influence
governance.
Murray (2005) offers an example of resource dependency to show how
governance behaviour is contextually conditioned. He contends that one of the most
important contextual variables affecting governance is the organization’s pattern of
resource dependency and, as noted in Chapter Two, tasks that resource dependency
theory assigns to governance require expertise, experience and networks that many
board members, especially in the nonprofit and public-sectors, do not always possess.
The more an organization depends on external funding sources, and the more complex
and rapidly changing its environment, the more the board needs to focus on its external
political role, that of enhancing the organization’s reputation among stakeholders. One
can appreciate the implications for school boards in the context of the resource
dependency perspective, their political nature, and the requisite need for skills and
expertise to meet the complex demands they face.
Another example of the impact of context is the role of dominant societal values
as they relate to the sector in which an organization is situated. Miller-Milleson (2003)
holds that acknowledging this relationship is integral to understanding the influences
that bear on board governance. Thus, the importance of ethno-racial diversity held by
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influential groups in an organization’s external environment can have an effect on the
nature and extent of diversity to be found on the board.
A governance as contextual perspective holds that board policy decisions need
to relate to both their immediate constituents and to the broader community, and
includes in the notion of governance not only the good of the organization but the
public good as well. The trend among private-sector boards in recent years to adopt
corporate social responsibility policies (CSR) illustrates the sensitivity of boards to
societal values, especially when they are promoted with vigour and political intent.
Thus, CSR is a form of corporate self-regulation and monitoring to ensure compliance
with law and ethical standards. It also represents a concerted effort by boards to take
greater responsibility for the impact of their corporation’s activities on the environment,
consumers, employees, communities, stakeholders, and the public in general.

Governance influenced by individuals. Huse (2007) depicts organizations as
multiple coalitions of actions, and decisions as the outcomes of political bargaining
between actors. Although boards may appear to act as collective assemblies speaking
with a common voice, Huse maintains they are more often a diverse group of
individuals with different ideas, biases, and motivations. Hendry (2005) finds evidence
of the importance and power of individuals in any board governance situation in various
configurations and alliances, whose influence is dependent on the context and
underlying political dynamics associated with a board. Although the impact of
individuals on the organization is wider than simply that of board members, and may
run the gamut from senior managers to customers, the role of the board is central in
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these studies. Huse (2007) lists some of the individual traits that have a bearing on and
influence board behaviour including age, seniority, tenure, gender, race, individual
integrity, shareholding, esteem, influence, professional standards, formal background,
and awareness of legal responsibilities.
While a good part of normative board literature gives attention to the
relationship between the board and the CEO, (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008;
Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995) and to the CEO’s influence on policy (Comforth, 2001),
there has been less attention given to the informal interactions among board members
and among board members, CEOs and other members of administrative staff. This is an
important area for research to examine more deeply because, as several authors
comment, these interactions are important to organizational operations and board
autonomy (Herman & Renz, 2000; Middleton, 1987; Salipante, Morrison, & Zielstra,
2003). While the literature on the influence of individuals on board practice raises
issues that are of importance in the functioning of any corporate group, it does not
explore the concept of governance as such, nor does it provide compelling comparative
cause-effect discussions of outcomes.

Governance as social practice. MacIntyre’s (1984) definition of social practice
cited in Chapter One refers to social practice as a reasoned, multifaceted form of
socially recognized, mutual human activity whose internal goods (in this case, effective
governing) are realized by attaining those qualities that are “appropriate to and
definitive of that activity” (p.187). Participants in a social practice master its
knowledge and technology and acquire the skills needed for goal accomplishment.
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Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1991; 1996) offer a multilayered view of governance as
involving numerous actors, relationships, and complex knowledge, in which
interpersonal dynamics and attention to group behaviour is pivotal to effective
governance. Because they see “the board as a group,” [emphasis added] they infer that
“[effective boards.. .create a sense of inclusiveness, set goals for themselves, and
groom members for leadership” (1991, p. 42). Zander (1993, 1994) reasons that
essential for board effectiveness is the practice of certain group processes, such as
articulating shared norms, values and beliefs, and recognizing mutual influence and
interdependence of board members.
Authors who view board governance as a social practice tend to see themselves
as shifting the emphasis of governance from a number of single-dimensional tasks to a
focus on its interpersonal dimension. They argue that prescriptive board models ignore
the continuous interactions of boards and board members with their internal and
external environments. Bird (2001) contends that the exercise of authority and good
judgment is less task oriented than is portrayed in structural approaches and is more
cognitive and conceptual. These claims seem to overlook the common experience that
human beings do not always act in a rational manner or work unselfishly to maximize
results. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) do not deny that social practices need the support of
structures, but they place more importance on the human factors, such as the fit among
individual directors and how they relate to one another. In a similar inference (from an
explanatory account of boards as groups to a conclusion regarding effective
governance), Nadler (2004) claims that the social dynamics of board interaction is a key
to effective governance.
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Perspectives that consider the social and relational aspects of governance may
offer some insight into the practice of governance, because, as Sonnenfeld (2002)
suggests, they underscore the importance of developing “strong and high functioning
work groups whose members trust and challenge each other” (p. 106). These authors
speak to the kinds of board practices that transcend procedural responsibilities and
highlight the importance of relational aspects of governing, particularly shared
processes supportive of participation, interaction, and critical discussion, or what Chait,
Ryan, and Taylor (2005) have described as generative behaviours. More needs to be
said, however, that relates these important social connections to those aspects of
governance that, in his definition of social practice, MacIntyre referred to as “those
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity,” (MacIntyre, 1984, p.187) which in this case is governance.

Analysis
The normative governance literature addresses important elements such as board
composition, structures, processes, and culture as they are thought to relate to effective
board governance. It seeks to describe how boards can govern effectively and
prescribes tools, methods, processes, and activities to that end. The academic literature
also focuses on effective board governance and identifies a number of factors, which
intervene and impact on the practice of governance, such as internal board culture, the
influence of individuals, and the environment. Both bodies of literature seek to identify
elements that are essential for boards to know and to put into practice, if they wish to
function well and govern effectively. Much of this writing concerns itself with the
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partial details of governance, such as policies, meeting practices, decision-making
processes and other elements that are constitutive of board structure and process. Some
of the literature focuses on relational models of interaction in social groups as well as
boards as social constructs of rules, norms, and expectations.
Any of these aspects of governing may be described and practiced differently,
and are reflective of the conditions and circumstances of governance, the models that
frame one’s thinking about governance, the culture of the organization, and the
historical practices of a board. While they are not necessary to the concept of
governance in itself, they are inseparably present in the discussion of any particular
iteration of governance as carried out by governing bodies and in relation to particular
ends, circumstances, and conditions. Although they do not contribute directly to an
elaboration of the concept of governance, they must be acknowledged in a conceptual
analysis of governance that hopes to resonate with the governing bodies of actual
organizations, corporations, agencies, or societies. However they are configured, these
elements influence what I have already named as essential features of the concept of
governance and will have a decided impact on the organization as a whole (Comforth,
2001; Murray, 2005).
The question that remains implicit in much of the abundant literature on boards
is: what are we to understand by governance? How do these organizational models,
sectoral descriptions, or prescriptions for effective communication and cooperative
action clarify our understanding of governance, and how might they contribute to good
governance? In a limited and modest attempt to contribute toward an answer to these
questions, I have attempted to organize the findings of the normative and academic
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literatures in a way that distinguishes essential features of governance from those that
are contingent and to do this in a way that differentiates but does not separate them from
each other.
Table 3:2 presents a summary of key ideas that have emerged in the literature
reviewed in this chapter. These ideas are organized in three columns. The first two
columns are “general themes” and “governance functions” and reflect the conditions,
contexts, limits, opportunities, and purposes that constitute what are referred to in
column three as contingent features.
In order to help in make the world of governing intelligible, any study of
governance must recognize and attend to both the concept of governance and the
contingencies of governance. If the concrete circumstances and contexts tell us why the
contingent features are there, the essential features tell us what governance is about.
Essential features, as conceptualizations, remain abstract and do not describe the
experience of any particular practice of governance. Contingent features represent
conditions of governance that make governance possible. They help explain how the
essential features of governance are shaped and cohere in particular situations.
Essential features serve a primarily cognitive purpose, articulating ideas that belong to
the notion of governance, giving it content and substance. Contingent features refer to
conditions that make governance possible and relations that contextualize, give form to,
and concretize governance. They are conditions that must be met not so much to make
governance intelligible, as to make it operative. Recognizing contingent features of
governance, whether internal or external, provides insight into why essential features
are practiced in a certain way. They interact with and inform how the essential features
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of governance are shaped, which features seem more prominent, and how governance
becomes operative.

Table 3:2 B o a r d G o v e rn a n c e L itera tu res: Them es, F u nctions, a n d F ea tu res

Board
Governance
Literature
Normative
literature
(e.g. Carver,
1997; Conger,
Finegold &
Lawler 2000;
Fletcher, 1999;
Gill 2005;
Houle, 1997;
Ingram, 2003;
Leblanc &
Gillies, 2005)

•

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Academic
literature

•
•

(e.g. Chait,
Holland &
Taylor, 1991,
1996;
Comforth,
2003; Herman
& Renz, 2000;
Huse, 2007;
MillerMilleson,2003
¡Murray,
2005;
Ostrower &
Stone, 2006;
Sonnenfeld,
2002)

Governance
Functions

General Themes

•
•
•

Board structures and
processes: size,
composition, meeting
management, job
descriptions, policies
Legal/Ethical compliance
Primacy of organizational
interests (safeguard
mission; maintain
/increase shareholder
wealth)
Effectiveness
Risk Management
Community
representation, education
and advocacy
Management of critical
events and transitional
phases
Board development
Financial stewardship
Board/CEO role
separation
Clarity of board roles

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Govemance/organization •
effectiveness
Influences on
performance
•
Group dynamics as
•
contributing
Governance as generative •
•
Relationships between
CEO and Board; CEO
and Chair
•
•
•

Strategic
planning and
decision
making
Policy
Compliance
Conformance
Oversight
Hire/evaluate
CEO
Board
Maintenance
Accountability
Represent
organization to
external
environment

Strategic
planning and
decision
making
Policy
Compliance
Conformance
Oversight
Hire/evaluate
CEO
Board
maintenance
Accountability
Represent
organization to
external
environment

Essential / Contingent
Features of
Governance
Essential Features
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Fiduciality
Political
Oriented toward a
public good
Contingent Features
Social, historical
and cultural
contexts of board
• Board learning
• Board member
selection
• Financial
independence/
dependence

•

Essential Features
Power
Authority
Legitimacy
Fiduciality
Political
Oriented toward a
public good
Contingent Features
• Social, historical
and cultural
contexts of
board/organization
• Role of internal
board culture
• Role of various
environments
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Essential and Contingent Features of Governance
The term governance is rooted in the Greek word kybernan, meaning to steer
and was used by Plato with regard to how to design a system of rule (Kjaer, 2004).
Themes relating to oversight and fiduciality, direction, the exercise of power, the
enactment of policies and decisions concerning public life, authoritative direction and
control as well as accountability have all surfaced in discussions of governance.
Although conceptions of governance vary across the literatures, consistent, recurring
features can be identified. Each type of governance, whether in reference to sectors (for
example, nonprofit) or in reference to themes (for example, international relations) is
appropriate to a particular context. To interchange these types without reference to for
example, what is to be governed, why or what values are at stake, would be to risk
losing sight of the essential features that belong to the concept of governance itself.
Before proceeding to the question of school board governance, it is thus necessary to
recap and describe those core components of governance, features that are essential if
we are going to be able to apply accurately the term “governance” to what is happening
in any particular case.
These essential features are not so much in the forefront in the normative and
scholarly literatures dealing with the effectiveness of boards, which often pay more
attention to the behaviours of board members, the structures within which they practice
and the functions they carry out, but rather they underpin the issues at stake when
boards are dysfunctional or are ineffective. They represent conditions that must be
satisfied for a particular social practice to be understood as governance and thus are
intrinsic to the concept of governance. These essential features of governance have
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been distilled from the literatures by considering the behaviours of board members, the
structures within which they practice and the functions they carry out. The features that
I identify as essential to understanding the concept of governance are power, authority,
legitimacy, fiduciality, governance as political, and governance oriented toward a public
good. An account of each feature follows.

Power. Broadly defined, power is the capacity of an individual or group to
produce intended effects on others, sometimes despite opposition (Wrong, 2002). This
capacity may result in action, where the intended effects are achieved, or inaction,
where the intent may have been to prevent something. Often, authority is used
interchangeably with the term power, but their meanings differ: whereas power refers to
the ability to achieve certain ends, sometimes despite resistance, authority requires a
claim of legitimacy, the justification and right to exercise that power. Power as an
attribute of governance was identified in the political science, management sciences,
and board governance literatures. The concept of power runs deep and offering a
simple explanation is difficult, but Dahl’s (1957) definition can be used as a starting
point: A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B might
not otherwise do. The use of power in Dahl’s proposition suggests that A can influence
B towards a certain outcome. Depret and Fiske (1993) describe power as asymmetrical
control over another person’s outcomes, focusing on the source of power rather than its
ultimate actions. Its exercise may result in action or inaction.
In the context of board governance, while power is seen in voting rights, the
hiring the chief executive, and the setting of the direction of the organization, its
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distinctive quality is collective action and decision-making, with access to what Ingram
(2003) describes as “limitless organizational powers” (p.21). Among governance
actors, power is also manifest as influence. Both power and influence are exercised
through politics and strategizing inside and outside the boardroom (Huse, 2007). It can
be seen in many forms and includes alliances and control through interactions. Lorsch
(2000) points out that although legal frameworks provide boards with the legitimacy
and authority to govern, their power also depends on other sources including the
knowledge that directors have and their cohesion as a group.

Authority. Authority is the justification and right to exercise power, the
mechanism by which power is legitimately exercised, a form or instrument of power
exercised by legitimate means. It implies voluntary acceptance on the part of
subordinates who recognize the legitimate right of those in a superior position to decide
and delegate. The exercise of authority, seen in the right to decide and control over
decisions may be conferred by the ownership of the organization, or result from “an
explicit or implicit contract allocating the right to decide on specified matters to a
member or group of members of the organization” (Aghion & Tirole, 1997, p. 2).
The democratic processes through which school boards are elected serve as a
source of legitimate authority. Weber (1947) identified three kinds of authority:
traditional, charismatic, and rational/legal. Rational/legal authority is associated with
bureaucratic organizations and is vested in the holder of an office. Authority is
undermined if those in power are considered ineffective, lack expertise, or are for some
reason undeserving of it.
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Sonnenfeld (2002) locates boards’ authority in the important decisions they are
authorized to make. Various governance theorists including Gill (2005) have described
authority as “the exercise of direction and control” (p.14). Boards exercise authority
over an organization in meeting their legal responsibilities for promoting organizational
outcomes (Houle, 1997; Muttart Foundation, 1995). Carver (1997) describes boards
decision-making authority as the “the highest leverage element in an organization”
(p.21). Authority is embedded in the descriptions offered by Leblanc and Gillies (2005)
of the board as the “decision-making body of the corporation” (p.6) and by Huse (2007)
as “the allocation of decision rights” (p.27). The board has the authority to lead the
organization to envision a direction and shape a strategy (Chait, Holland & Taylor,
1996); it sets parameters for the management team, monitoring and assessing
performance and taking remedial action when indicated (Joint Committee on Corporate
Governance, 2001); Mintzberg (1983) argues that there are three areas of authority that
governing boards cannot delegate. These are selecting the CEO, exercising direct
control during periods of crisis and reviewing organizational and managerial decisions
and performance.

Legitimacy. Legitimacy is the properly conferred or justified right to act. It is
defined in terms of institutional arrangements such as the separation of powers,
transparency, and rule of law principles intended to combat abuses of power and to
yield trust (Coglianese, 2005). Legitimacy can be understood in relation to power and
authority. According to Friedman (1990), authority is power established by legitimacy.
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With legitimacy, “power ceases to be the brute exercise of will and becomes the rightful
exercise of will” (Klein, 2004, p.2).
Board governance is an institutional arrangement and boards have a defined
mandate to operate and exercise power. They are legitimized by their legal status, set
out in the various statutes and regulations that govern them, and grounded in their
public accountability to members and clients for resources held in trust and for the
effective delivery of their purposes (Comforth, 2001). Boards exert significant power
that may affect people’s lives in important ways. The decisions they are authorized to
make may have major ramifications, economic and other, for customers, clients, and
numerous other possible stakeholders. Without recognition of a board’s legitimacy by
its publics, that board would be unable to exercise its authority. Legitimacy is
understood as undisputed credibility to govern and leads broad organizational
constituencies to recognize the validity of the governing group.

Fiduciality. When one acts as an individual and a board member, regardless of
the board, there is a fiduciary responsibility owed to the principal party. On a privatesector board, the principal parties are the owners/shareholders; on public and nonprofit
boards there may be a number of principals who have a stake in the organization.
Responsibility for each company or organization is legally entrusted to a board of
directors (the fiduciaries) who are required to act always with a view to the best
interests of the company, not their own interests (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Directors
must comply with applicable federal, provincial, and local laws, adhere to the
organizations bylaws, and seek to maximize share value or succeed in organizational
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mission (Ingram, 2003). This translates into attention to financial discipline, informed
oversight, mission fidelity, and primacy of organizational interests (Chait, Ryan &
Taylor, 2005). Boards make important decisions, steer an organization in a way that its
health is safeguarded, and render an accounting for performance (Plumtre & Graham,
1999; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Boards have the final authority and legal responsibility for the
outcomes of the organization (Houle, 1997), must practice financial discipline, respect
informed oversight, and respect the mission fidelity, and the primacy of organizational
interests (Chait, Ryan & Taylor, 2005).
Additionally, board members must take due care in discharging their
responsibilities, that is, they must be reasonable, diligent, prudent, and demonstrate
sound judgment equal to that of an ordinarily prudent person, especially in regard to
processes of deciding and acting (Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002). The concept of
stewardship is often found in the governance literature. Its base meaning is the same as
fiduciality, although its focus also includes a moral/ethical dimension of fiduciality as
well as its legal content. A recent Supreme Court of Canada ruling, People’s
Department Store vs. Wise (2004) describes fiduciary duty for trustees in this way:

... fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith
vis-à-vis the corporation. They must respect the trust and confidence that have
been reposed in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the
realization of the objects of the corporation. They must avoid conflicts of
interest with the corporation. They must avoid abusing their position to gain
personal benefit. They must maintain the confidentiality of information they
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acquire by virtue of their position. Directors and officers must serve the
corporation selflessly, honestly and loyally, (p.21)
Political. At the risk of circularity, politics can be narrowly defined as all that
relates to the way a social system is governed. Politics is the process by which the
community makes decisions and establishes values that are binding upon its members.
This definition comes from the original Greek meaning of “politics” the government of
the city state (polis). In a broader sense, politics refers to processes that involve the
exercise of power, status, or influence in making decisions or establishing and
modifying social relationships. This is consistent with Heywood’s (2002) perspective
of politics as “the activities through which people make, preserve, and amend the
general rules under which they live” (p.410).
The term political is sometimes used in a derogatory way to give a picture of the
use of public (governmental) power for illegitimate, usually secret, private advantage.
All forms of government (and governance) are susceptible to political corruption.
Forms of corruption vary, but the most common are patronage, bribery, extortion,
influence peddling, fraud, embezzlement, and nepotism. Hall, Hochwarter, Ferris and
Bowen (2004) describe political behaviour that obstructs or impedes what should
otherwise be rational decision processes as the “dark side perspective” (p.240) of the
concept politics.
All organizations, according to Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005), are political
systems in which attempts to acquire and retain control over various resources allow
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them to meet their aspirations. Effective boards accept as a primary responsibility the
need to develop and maintain robust relationships among major constituencies.
Boards develop policies, the instruments of governance at the local level that
take on the full force of law and become the guidelines under which organizations
function (Downey, 1988). The influence that boards can leverage and deploy to frame
problems and promote solutions is evidence of politics as a core governance feature.
Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) imply that a board is political in the way it interacts,
makes decisions, and lobbies for particular views. It expends its political capital when
it acts in a collective and cohesive way, and when the board asserts its influence through
mainstream processes rather than back channels. They describe board governance as
the “fulcrum of organizational politics, the counterbalance to the parochial interests of
other constituencies” (p.154).

Oriented toward a public good. Board governance is a principal element of
organizational performance. Boards may be from the private, public, or nonprofit
sector but they are expected to operate for public benefit. Board governance is required
to ensure that resources are well managed, objectives are reached, policies are
formulated and implemented, and the interests of shareholders / stakeholders are
preserved and reflected in key decisions (Institute on Governance, 1990). Board
governance is ultimately about the public good. Houle (1997) describes board
governance as a social invention meant to ensure a representative voice in issues related
to the public good and to support the institutionalization of what historically began as
individual effort. Boards founded on accountability and responsibility work toward
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economic, social and community enhancements (Canadian School Board Association,
2006). They are required by a duty of care to enact governance diligently and
prudently, and have a duty of loyalty to practice governance in good faith (Overton &
Frey, 2002). Governance is demonstrated as good stewardship, responsibility for
maintaining accountability and safeguarding trust (Robinson, 2001). It is the practice of
openness, integrity, and accountability (Cadbury Report, 1992), harnessing the
collective efforts of accomplished individuals to advance the organization’s mission and
long-term welfare (International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)(2001). According
to Carver (1997), boards should always ask how their existence will affect the world.
He stresses that a “governing board’s highest calling is to ensure that the organization
produces economically justifiable, properly chosen, well-targeted results” (p.35).
Figure 3:2 seeks to make this discussion of governance more meaningful by
indicating some of those concretizing, influencing, and shaping factors, which I identify
as the essential and contingent features of the concept of governance. The innermost
elements in the diagram are presented as the essential features of governance.
Surrounding these essential features are those that appear contingent and as modifying
how governance is enacted. The outer elements in the diagram are normative elements.
These too are contingent features, without which the concept of governance in context
cannot be understood.
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Summary
No single approach to board governance has been established as suitable for
every organization (Abzug, 1999; Robinson, 2001). General insights can be derived
from an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of specific models, but governance, if
it is to be effective, must be adapted to the specific circumstances of the organization
because people, the environment, and socio-historic context all influence governance
behaviour (Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1996; Ostrower & Stone, 2001; Ryan, 1999).
Moreover, while there are many elements of board governance that are within the
control of the board, some internal and external influences affect the practice and
outcomes of governance, giving authority a particular structure or making legitimacy
depend on certain processes. The essential features identified in Figure 3:2 and
discussed above are seen as providing the central attributes of the concept of board
governance and have been found to be consistent across several bodies of governance
related literature. Governance is realized within a web of contingent relations, from its
need for structure to the internal and external influences that affect its exercise.
Together with the essential features discussed in this chapter, these contingent relations
shape and form how governance is manifested and exercised.
In experiencing and thinking about social phenomena and institutions, we use
concepts such as systems, community, and governance. Throughout each chapter, I
have reviewed how organizations and their governance Eire discussed in a variety of
literatures, representative of a broad range of theories, settings, and purposes. In each
case I have sought to identify and explain significant features of the concept of
governance, recognizing and acknowledging how these essential features are defined
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and limited by contingent relations. A central part of conceptual analysis is to identify
the subject matter or the thing “we need knowledge about” (Allison, 1983, p.8), with an
eye to formulating and refining useful descriptions of vital social phenomena, such as
governance.
In the following chapter, I attempt to develop further the context for the central
question of the inquiry, can school boards govern?, by situating and analyzing school
boards in the social, historical, and political spheres within which they operate. The
chapter traces the development of Ontario school boards from the first related
legislation in 1807 to Ontario school boards today in an attempt to ascertain what, if
any, governance roles and responsibilities school boards hold.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE QUESTION OF SCHOOL BOARDS AND GOVERNANCE
Nobody of sound mind would have deliberately created the collection of
laws, regulations, court orders, intergovernmental relationships, and
contracts that goes by the name of educational governance.
Paul T. Hill (2004)
The central question addressed in this study, can school boards govern? is a
practical one, and cannot be answered in the abstract. The inquiry moves from a purely
conceptual approach to one that considers whether the concept of governance examined
in earlier chapters can be realized. This chapter seeks to show that the expectation for
public school boards to govern is grounded not only grounded in the literature
pertaining to school board governance, but is also foundational to the history and policy
of Ontario’s education system. As a way of providing a necessary context to the
question, I explore the historical and political influences on the development of school
boards in Ontario through an analysis of the legislative and historical aspects of school
board governance. The chapter begins with a review of the legal foundations of
education and school board governance in Ontario, situating school boards as the local
elements of a largely centralized system. It then moves to a historical-political review
of the development/evolution of school boards.
By necessity, and for the sake of clarity and precision, I focus on one
geographical location and political situation: public school boards in the Canadian
province of Ontario. This narrowing of the question is necessary because school boards
are regulated by provincial legislatures and administrations, even when public education
is treated as a right of citizenship and, in some jurisdictions, a universal human right.
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Although there are many comprehensive analyses and commentaries available
about the emergence, growth, and consolidation of the education system in Ontario,
school board governance as a distinct topic has received less attention. Generally,
historical accounts of Ontario’s educational system often imply or make assumptions
about the roles and activities of school boards, but do not explicitly discuss them.
Therefore, an exploration of the origins and character of school board governance and
the changes it has undergone since its inception will provide the reader with points of
reference for understanding school board governance today. While the historical data
introduced in this chapter has a strong grounding in the history of school boards in
Ontario, a review of the public and political interest in schools and education shows that
contested issues of school board governance are not isolated to Ontario. However,
focusing on the school boards of a single province provides a level of concreteness that
makes possible comparisons between theory and the actual practice of school board
governance, and allows a context for meaningful discussion of the question of school
( board governance. Finally, the specific choice of Ontario school boards for this analysis
can serve, mutatis mutandis, as a model for similar research in other geographical areas
and political jurisdiction.

Legal Framework o f Education Governance
Of interest to the discussion of school board governance is the observation made
by Curtis (1988) that locally controlled schools predated Ontario’s educational project,
implying lay trustees had participated in the early schools in the province prior to state
involvement. According to Curtis, control over local schooling was “wrested away

128

from the local school supporters.. .and the construction of our current educational state
was accomplished only through the destruction of a prior educational organization”
(P-15).
Since the early nineteenth century, Canadians have held common ideals about
the value of education, believing that some kind of formal instruction was important for
the proper development of the individual and society. Across the country, the political
debates on education were many. Some believed that a centrally coordinated system of
education was best; others wanted more local control. When the British North America
Act (1867) was proclaimed, Section 93 specifically assigned responsibility to the
provinces for making laws with respect to educational matters. An implicit assumption
in the legislation was that only a strong central authority could provide the vision and
control necessary to establish a provincial school system (Fleming, 1989). The right to
denominational schools that was established in the British North America Act was
reaffirmed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. Section 23 of the
Charter added a similar guarantee for official language minorities.
While education is thus primarily a provincial responsibility, the federal
government has maintained influence in certain areas (Zucker, 1988). We can find
examples of federal involvement in the education of for example, status Indians and
Inuit children, inmates of federal penal institutions, and the children of members of the
armed forces (Hurlbert & Hurlbert, 1992).
Aside from the right to English or French first language instruction in the
Constitution, provinces have the constitutional authority to determine their own
educational structures and the power to enact laws governing their education systems.
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This includes, among other things, maintaining central control over such areas as
teacher certification, curriculum, budget allocations, and textbooks. As Zuker (1988)
observed, “ultimate responsibility for most public education continues to be that of
provincial government” (p.5).
In Ontario today, for example, there are 72 public school boards, including 31
English public district school boards, 29 English Catholic district school boards, 4
French public district school boards, and 8 French Catholic district school boards. In
addition, school authorities operate a small number of schools in hospitals and treatment
facilities, and in remote and sparsely populated areas. At this writing, three northern
Ontario boards, in the districts of Gogama, Foleyet, and Ontario Northeast are
reportedly planning to amalgamate in an effort to provide greater support to staff and
students in isolated regions of the province (Boards Merging, 2009).
While provincial governments are not obligated in the Constitution to delegate
functions and powers to school boards, most have done so5, although not without
ensuring the regulatory and legal mechanisms necessary for maintaining centralized
control. School boards are required to act in accordance with established statutes and
regulations (Dickinson & Mackay, 1989; Herapath, Mitches, & Sutton, 1978; Hurlbert
& Hurlbert, 1992).
Their powers and duties are contingent and have changed markedly over time,
as has been shown. Education systems across the country share many common features
5
Nine Canadian provinces and two territories govern local school districts through district school
boards. New Brunswick schools are governed by locally elected District Education Councils. The
Councils are responsible for some development and monitoring o f an education plan and supervising the
Superintendent o f the school district but do not have the authority and responsibilities o f the other
provincial and territorial boards, for example, teachers are employed directly by the province. Similarly,
while there is one French school board in the Yukon, all other public schools are governed through school
councils, who do not have human resource and other governance responsibilities.
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(Lawr & Gidney, 1973). One such similarity is the delegation by most Canadian
provinces of responsibility for the operation of school districts to locally elected boards
of trustees, something that has been done since the first legislation related to education
was enacted. Indeed, most school systems across Canada have “partly centralized and
partly decentralized functions” (Enns, 1963, p.l) of educational governance.
Centralized administrative functions reside in departments of education, while the
decentralized functions are delegated to local school boards. Thus, school boards have
a legislated status whereby they asymmetrically share by delegation, educational
responsibility and power with the provincial government. This relationship appears in
practice as the division of authority between the local and the central and between core
factors in education and its surrounding elements.

Division o f Responsibilities between School Boards and the Legislature
Powers and duties delegated to school boards are set out in provincial
legislation. Zuker (1988) describes the relationship between the legislature and school
boards as one in which “boards act as agents of the province, and, within the limits of
authority provided by the statutes, are the local legislatures in educational matters”
(p.6). What is not apparent in this statement is the asymmetrical character of the
relationship and the tensions that arise as a result. These tensions become apparent in
the legislation related to education and the political and ideological struggles they
reflect, highlighting the complexity of the governance question.
The tension that exists between the “need to govern education at the local level,
where elected representatives who are familiar with local conditions can ensure that
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local needs are met, and the need to spend both local and provincial funds in an
equitable and efficient manner” (Ontario School Board Reduction Task Force, 1996,
p. 15) underscores the complexity of the governance question. This relationship need
not lead to stalemate but can be the source of creativity.
Several perspectives exist on the character of the relationship between the
legislature and its bureaucratic arm, and school boards. These include policy tutelage,
intema/extema, and pragmatic delegation of authority.

Policy tutelage. Manzer (1994) describes the assumptions that underlie such
delegation of powers to school boards as a “policy tutelage” (p.27) or guardianship
model of educational governance. Policy tutelage is based on a vertical division of
authority as is found, for example, between the Ontario legislature and local school
boards. In the policy tutelage model the legislature concerns itself primarily with the
principles of policy, and school boards on the details of their implementation.
Decision-making related to educational beliefs and values, funding, policy goals, and
standards for policy implementation belong, to the Legislature. Oversight of the
administration and implementation of these policies is delegated to local school boards
within the centralized policy framework (Manzer, 1994). Guarding the principles and
policies of a centralized education administration requires a strong, central leadership to
oversee and support local compliance. This model of educational governance allows
for the informed interpretation of local needs within the framework of uniform
provincial policy and the local participation of citizens in the project of education.
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Interna/externa. Education administration scholars have used Kandel’s (1933)
theory of interna and externa to conceptualize the divisions in educational
administration between provincial education authorities and local school boards, and the
distinct powers of both. Interna are considered the higher-order elements at the centre
of the project of education, such as curriculum, textbooks, examinations, and teacher
training: “the actual content and conduct of instruction” (Kandel, p.238). Externa are,
in Kandel’s view, those elements that surround and support the provision of education,
such as the schools themselves, human resource policies, and collective agreements.
They are important to supporting and sustaining the project of education. Among the
externa elements described by Kandel are “those factors that make an efficient
educative process possible” (p.58) including aspects that may have little or no impact on
pedagogy.
Allison (1991) utilized Kandel’s concepts to describe the Canadian pattern of
school administration, situating interna aspects of education under the control of
provincial authorities, who delegate specific responsibilities for particular externa to
local school boards. Allison described interna as “the strategic factors at the heart of
the schooling process, particularly curriculum, textbooks, examinations, and teacher
training, certification, and supervision” (p.223). Externa are “the surrounding elements
which condition and support the provision of schooling, such as buildings and personnel
policies” (p.223).
The report of the Royal Commission on Education in Ontario (1950) commonly
known as the Hope Report, also employed the interna-externa distinction, locating the
interna of school administration under the direct control of provincial authorities and
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defining responsibilities for specific externa delegated to local school boards. In
general, boards were required to build, maintain, and operate schools; employ, pay and
if necessary dismiss teachers; raise or requisition local school taxes; and manage the
financial accounts. School boards were understood to provide the local management of
the system, but, according to the Royal Commission Report on Education (1950) (Hope
Report), they were ultimately controlled by the provincial educational authorities
through standardized management processes and operating regulations, thereby making
board power and authority contingent on the province. It must be noted here that there
is nothing in the concepts of interna and externa that warrants the assignment of
strategic factors at the heart of school administration (interna) to central educational
authority. Indeed, there is evidence in Kandel’s theory and in educational practice that
responsibility for what is essential to the purpose of education (interna) “cannot be
legislated and prescribed from above if genuine progress, adaptation to the pupils and
their environment, and professional initiative on the part of the teachers is to be
encouraged” (Kandel, 1933, p.216). Centralizing responsibility for the interna, placing
them directly under the control of provincial authorities, as is the case in Ontario, does
not flow necessarily from the concepts (intema/externa) themselves. Past practice
elsewhere, such as in England, favoured local control of the interna (Van Pelt, 2009).

Pragmatic delegation of authority. According to Macauley (1988),
governments delegate authority to crown corporations, regulatory boards, and others,
such as school boards, for several pragmatic reasons. When certain governmental
responsibilities (such as education) become massive in scope and complexity,
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delegation permits simultaneous activities by multiple players, relieving the volume of
work for the central administration and creating opportunities to implement creative
government strategies through innovation, rather than the cumbersome legislative
process. In addition, local decision-making bodies may be more attuned to the needs of
their local communities and can therefore enhance the delivery of services to their
communities, as well as facilitate the implementation of sensitive political decisions.
Moreover, tradition is recognized by Macauley as a factor in the delegation of such
authority. From this pragmatic perspective, the question of school board governance
shifts from the older paradigm of local representation versus central authority, or
externa versus interna, to one of levels of administration of organizations and services
that are unquestionably the primary responsibility of central government.

School Boards
Since the early days of education in the province, the management and
coordination of the public system of education has become increasingly more complex.
The associated legislative Acts reveal this increasing complexity. Changes over time to
the power, authority, structures, and roles of school boards, have not altered their
representative responsibilities or the requirement that they fulfill the duties and
obligations set out in the Education Act.6

6
There is a brief period o f time in the history o f school boards, between 1841 and 1843, when
school board trustees had their powers rescinded.
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Ontario School Boards: A Historical-Political Context
Much of the historical-political literature related to education in Ontario tends to
concentrate on the evolution of educational administration and the system of education
itself. School boards tend to be viewed as part of the administrative structure of school
districts, and thus are apt to be subsumed by literature relating to educational
administration. Their position as stewards of the local school district is frequently case
as a supportive role. In order to capture the political context in which school boards
currently operate, it is useful to review the role of school boards in relation to the
formation of the system of education, as it evolved in legislation. I do not provide an
exhaustive account of the history of education in Ontario, but draw on selected works to
trace the origins, characteristics, and roles played by school boards in the province that
are embedded in these accounts.
The following timeline, Figure 4.1 situates school board governance at its
beginning and seeks to demonstrate how, with few exceptions, various statutes shifted
the balance of control away from local school boards to a central government
department. This shift is discussed in the following section.

Provincial Government
Acts directed at
further
coordinating
public
education and
its governance
under central
authority, e.g.
prescribed
courses of
study

Central
focus on
educational
matters;
view that
school
boards were
aligned with
provincial
goals and
largely
compliant

1850-1900

1950

Administrative re
organization driven
by rising costs,
equity concerns for
rural areas with
smaller tax base,
greater
coordination,
culminated in
amalgamations in
1969 to 126 school
boards

Tensions between
government and
boards re: rising
education costs;
labour conflicts;
concern about
educational quality
and attainment
^Fewer School
Boards Act (Bill
104) and Education
Quality
Improvement Act
____(Bill 160)____

Appointment of
government
Supervisors and
suspension of
powers to govern in
several school
districts; creation of
Governance Review
Committee and
passing of Student
Achievement and
School Board
Governance Act
____ (Bill 177)____

First
Acts

1807 & 1816

Autonomous
local school
governance

F ig u re 4.1

1846-1850

Legal status
legitimated;
power to raise
taxes granted,
some limits
placed on power
and authority

School board
governance
autonomy and
leadership
wanes as
central control
increased

Secondary
school trustees
now elected
not appointed;
overall period
of stability for
school boards

Shifts in locus o f education governance control

1960-1970s

Increased board
autonomy with
move away from
regulatory role of
Dept, of Ed.;
mergers lead to
larger school boards
considered powerful
public institutions

1980-1990S

Loss of power and
authority through loss
of local taxation;
creation of EIC; cap
on trustees and
honoraria

Government
proposes further
legislation about
trustee behaviour
and responsibilities

Ontario School Districts
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From Autonomous Local School Governance to Centralization
The beginnings. Clerics, missionaries, and local townspeople ran the earliest
schools in Upper Canada, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. School
founders and parent-subscribers controlled when the schools would open and close, who
would teach, and what was to be taught (Allison & Wells, 1989). Each community
governed its own school. The geographical distances and physical limitations of the
time kept each school a local venture.
The mainstream of American public schooling during the nineteenth century
was similar, chiefly “rural in nature, unbureaucratic in structure, and dependent on
hundreds of thousands of lay promoters and school trustees” (Tyack & Hansot, 1982,
P-17).
Early legislation: background. The beginnings of education in Ontario were
very much a local venture. The Report of the Royal Commission on Education points
out that although Ontario’s current educational system was initiated by the legislature,
the establishment of a school in any particular area was the result of local action and the
demands of the residents for schools were usually far in advance of legislation (Royal
Commission on Education, 1950).
By the early nineteenth century, there was general agreement in Upper Canada
that the state should play a major role in the provision of education (Gidney & Lawr,
1979). Yet, there was little agreement on the role that government ought to play or the
extent of supervision it should provide (Levin & Young, 1994). A number of central
debates related to the history of Ontario’s emerging education system and the role of
school boards are evidenced in the various Education Acts enacted since the early
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1800s. Some of these issues revolved around questions about the most desirable way in
which to organize the education system; the merits of elected versus appointed officials;
the location of authority over curriculum, textbooks, and taxation powers; and the
responsibility for training, certifying, and inspecting teachers (Levin &Young, 1994).
The debates reflected a political struggle focused on centralizing control over
aspects of education. This contest was situated in two differing ideals of responsible
government: the American model of republican democracy, which placed a high value
on electoral responsibility and local control, and the British model of colonial
administration, which viewed local democracy “as being far from responsible” and
favoured a more centralized system of education (Levin & Young, p.27). Ultimately,
the Act of 1850 would create a provincial system of schools with centralized control
that foreshadowed in many ways the structure of school boards as they are known today
in Ontario and in most other provinces and territories.
The move toward centralization of public education in Ontario reflected what
was already happening in European education systems, particularly the Prussian model.7
This was in contrast to the United States, where, according to Tyack and Hansot (1982),
educational reform was based on belief in republican ideals and led mostly by
prominent community citizens who both shaped and represented that ideology. The
idea of centralizing the control of education was unthinkable according to Allison
(1991), because in the United States the values of popular democracy informed the
efforts to develop a decentralized system of common public schools. Civic values were
7
On a European trip to inspect other education systems, Ryerson was particularly impressed by
the organization and operation o f the Prussian Schools. Education was compulsory, free, and centrally
regulated. It had standardized curriculum, graduation exams, well-trained teachers and a group o f
superintendents and inspectors (Allison, 1991).
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stressed, local control was the most conspicuous feature of schooling, and resistance to
central supervision was strong, as was a belief in the American character of “voluntary
and decentralized institution-building” (Tyack & Hansot, 1982, p.19).

First Acts Related to Education in Ontario (1807-1850)
(a) Public school Act (1807) and Common School Act (1816)
On March 10,1807, members of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada
passed the Public School Act for grammar schools (a rough equivalence to secondary
today). The Act included a provision for the Lieutenant Governor to appoint school
trustees who “shall have full power and authority to make such Rules and Regulations
for the good government and management of the said schools...” (Provincial Statutes of
Upper Canada, 47 George III, Chapter VI, s.5 ,1807). Nine years later, the Common
Schools Act (1816) was passed for elementary schools, making the same provisions
regarding the local governance of schools by school trustees (Hodgins, 1908, vl).
The 1807 Public School Act, and, the 1816 Common Schools Act made the first
government aid available for the establishment and operation of schools. This aid came
in the form of land and conditional government grants to subsidize teachers’ salaries.
Schools that qualified for these grants were required to use textbooks approved by the
District Board of Education (appointed by the Governor to “superintend”8 the Common
Schools in their District). With the grants provided by government came prescribed
8
Common School Act, April 1, 1816, s. 9. “And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
that it shall and may be lawful for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Person administering the
Government to appoint not more than five fit and discreet persons to compose a Board o f Education in
each and every District o f this province, three o f whom shall be a quorum; who shall have full power to
superintend such Common Schools in the Districts for which they are appointed and shall annually report
to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Person administering the Government the state of the said
Common Schools, to be laid before the Legislature at their meeting.”
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duties and obligations for school trustees, as well as the power and authority to establish
the rules and regulations necessary to run the local schools successfully. These
included the effective management and governance of the schools, the submission of
annual reports to the Lieutenant Governor regarding school activities, and an accounting
of monies spent. Trustees were vested with the power to remove a teacher for any
misdemeanour or impropriety and to nominate a successor (assent for the successor
came from the District Superintendent). The earliest accountability relationship of
school boards to the legislature for the local governance of public schools can be traced
to these Acts. Trustees for both public and common schools shared similar powers and
responsibilities (Coleman, 1907).

(b) School Act of 1823
As Coleman (1907) observed, these early school boards remained mostly a law
unto themselves and, aside from District School Board appointments by the Governor
and annual reporting obligations, local boards were essentially autonomous. In an
attempt to gain more control and extend government influence over education, the
School Act of 1823 created a colony-wide General Board of Education under which the
District School Boards were placed. The General Board was given control over large
tracts of land set aside for education and the opportunity to create a more coordinated
system of education was presented, for example, by identifying and recommending
preferred textbooks.
At the end of 1830, there were 400 common (elementary) schools with a total
enrolment of 10,000 students, and 11 grammar (secondary) schools with a total
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enrolment of 280 students. According to Curtis (1988), each school had a board
composed of three trustees who continued to be responsible for raising money to
support their schools, but with little awareness of educational developments occurring
beyond their local jurisdictions. Curtis describes their association to education as local,
that is, they viewed themselves primarily as responsible to the local townsfolk who
helped to pay for the school.
At this time, the fundamental structures and processes necessary to order the
relationship between local schools and their owners, the local electorate, and
government, were very much in their infancy. Concerns about the quality of teachers,
the curriculum, and the lack of adequate resources were widespread. On the state of
education in Ontario at the time, a British government official reportedly observed,
“.. .Even in the most thickly peopled districts there are but few schools, and those of a
very inferior character; while the more remote settlements are almost entirely without
any” (Johnson, 1968, p.27). The General Board of Education was unsuccessful at
influencing or limiting the powers of trustees, who were inclined to support local
politics and viewed outsiders with suspicion. It was disbanded in 1833. Following this,
another period of autonomy ensued for the local governance of schools. Nevertheless,
the move toward centralization was far from over.

(c) District Councils Act of 1841 and School Act of 1843
The period of local school autonomy did not last long and interest in how to
administer a system of education became a front burner issue for government. During
the 1840s Egerton Ryerson, an influential educational reformer with close ties to
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government and a strong belief that a central authority should govern education, led a
concerted effort to centralize the administration of education. The move toward
centralization of educational authority was heavily politicized and concerns were raised
in the Legislature about inept local school board governance. A deep mistrust of
trustees and their purported wrongdoings surfaced. This interest in trustees appears to
have been driven primarily by political forces keen on centralizing the control of
education, but these views were also shared by many “respectable” educational
observers and administrators (Curtis, 1988). Trustees “occupied a pivotal position
between their communities and the provincial administrative machine” and “if
superintendents found anything wanting in the local schools, it was usually the trustees
they blamed” (Houston & Prentice, 1988, p.147). In a government-commissioned
review of the educational system, Arthur Buller (1840) was critical of the broad powers
of trustees, depicting them as cheap, refusing to pay teachers fair wages, inadequately
furnishing their schools, and using their authority ineffectually and dishonestly.
Although Buller acknowledged the political importance of local representation, he
opposed any real power being in the hands of trustees and advocated a central system of
educational governance (Hodgins, 1908, v.7).
Whether school trustees did not understand the responsibilities of governance,
lacked clarity about their roles, or chose not to honour their fiducial responsibilities is
unclear from the historical reports. It is equally unclear what the early builders of the
education system in Ontario actually expected of local trustees. For example, did they
want them to govern or did they simply tolerate them as a way of appeasing local
electorates? In the end, the approach was to leave the routine administration of local
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school districts with trustees and the oversight of education to individuals who were
considered more qualified.
In the cities, trustees tended to focus their attention on the financial aspects of
school governance, with which, as businessmen, they had some familiarity, often at the
expense of issues about which they possessed less acumen, such as curriculum and
education quality (Prentice, 1977). In the rural school districts, which comprised most
of the geography of the province, trustees worked in relative isolation, were mostly self
sufficient and tended to view outsiders as interfering (Stamp, 1982). As a result,
“education change advanced through rural Ontario on a broken front, depending on the
wealth and inclination of local trustees and taxpayers” (Stamp, p.21). This urban-rural
divide is a recurring theme in the evolution of Ontario’s education system and school
board governance, as will be shown in a discussion of legislation enacted in 1846.
The struggle for control over education between local interests and the
government took a sharp turn in the District Councils Act of 1841, which abolished the
office of local school trustee and replaced it with school commissioners. The control of
schools given to commissioners was short-lived. There were widespread concerns that
these commissioners did not bring local voice to school governance and were incapable
of managing the developing system. Correspondence to R. S. Jameson, the
Superintendent of Education for Upper Canada, argued that the central weakness of the
1841 Act was the abolition of elected local trustees.

The trustees were always chosen as the most intelligent men in each School
District. Among them, are found to be men of as good intelligence, abilities, and
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Education as are to be found in the Townships. They are better acquainted with
the wants of the respective schools to which they belong than the commissioners
can be supposed to be, and more interested in their well doing. They have also
the advantage of being better acquainted with all the common School Teachers,
as to character and education and consequently better able to Judge who are best
qualified among them. (Gidney & Lawr, 1978, p.162)

The School Act of 1843 re-established the tradition of locally elected trustees managing
the affairs of the local school district. In addition to their previously held duties,
trustees were now mandated to regulate the course of studies and the texts to be used,
subject to the approval of new local Superintendents. Ryerson, in opposition to this
development, argued that the Act contravened the principle of responsible government,
in particular by the restoration of trustees’ powers and the system of local
superintendency (Hodgins, 1911). Citizens suspicious of partisan politics and desirous
of protecting the local influence of civic trusteeship, mounted opposition to his position
that public education should be responsible to a central authority (Manzer, 1994).

(d) Centralization Acts of 1846 and 1850
The Act for the Better Establishment and Maintenance of Common Schools in
Upper Canada (1846) was instrumental in establishing a provincial education system in
Ontario (Fleming, 1993), instituting a central authority for education across the
province under the control of Ryerson, the Chief Superintendent for Common Schools.
Included in the Act were plans to develop a teachers’ training college and discretionary
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powers to collect, by voluntary subscription, monies necessary to finance the costs
associated with teacher salaries and schoolhouse expenses. The significance of this
piece of legislation for understanding school governance lies in the fact that it
centralized the ultimate policy and decision-making authority to govern the evolving
system of education in the government and created a provincial Board of Education.
Nevertheless, it also solidified the role of local trustees as powerful, public education
figures and legal entities with corporate powers:

XXV. And be it enacted, That the School Trustees in each School section, shall
be a Corporation, under the name of "The School Trustees o f Section
"number_________in the Township (Town or City) of__________ in
the_____________"District," —and shall have perpetual succession, and a
Common Seal, and may sue and be sued, and shall generally have the same
powers which any other body politic or corporate has with regard to the
purposes for which it is constituted; but they shall not at any time hold real
property.
Provincial Statutes of Canada, 9 Victoria, Chapter XX, s.25 (1846)

Although this Act legalized the status of school board trustees as legitimate decision
makers at the local education level, it set restrictive limitations on their powers,
positioning them as “creatures of provincial authority” who were “subject to the
constant scrutiny, and, if warranted, intervention” by provincial officers (Fleming,
1989, p.53). Moreover, although provisions had been made for trustees to fix a rate bill
for the purposes of supporting the local school, success in collecting these monies was
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unreliable across the province. Trustees had the option of petitioning the Municipal
Council to impose a tax but these petitions were most frequently denied.
Lack of power was not as problematic for trustees who lived in urban areas of
the province, as amendments to the 1846 Act show. The amendments authorized City
Councils and Town Police Boards to appoint a six-member school board to operate
within the boundaries of each incorporated city and town. Urban boards took
possession of and responsibility for all common school property and its upkeep. They
determined the number, sites and descriptions of schools to be established and
employed the teachers. Moreover, they appointed and prescribed the duties and
compensation for a superintendent of common schools for the area and appointed a
committee of management for each school (Hodgins, 1908, v. 7). Rural areas in the
province were allowed only half the number trustees and there were no provisions for
hiring an administrator, the superintendent being employed by County Councils. The
rural-urban divide continued to affect the scope of school board governance and the
ability of trustees to govern in rural versus urban locales. One must, as consequence,
exercise caution in generalizing about school governance in this period.

1850-1900 Centralized Policy and Local Administration
In 1850, the Ontario legislature passed legislation commonly considered the
foundation of Ontario’s education system. In response to repeated concerns regarding
the powerlessness of trustees, especially in regards to raising funds through
subscriptions or a municipal levy, the 1850 School Act re-positioned the role of trustee
boards as both powerful and honourable. According to Curtis (1988), the Act
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formalized the choice of trustees by plebiscite and solidified the principle of
representational democracy. Among other things, the Act set out provisions for the
elections of trustees by ratepayers, as well as the duties of trustees.
Extending the powers of school boards raised their stature and their autonomy.
School boards were authorized by law to determine the sums for their schools, and their
reliance on Municipal councils ceased. Trustees as “public actors” (Curtis, 1988, p.292)
enjoyed newfound support from government as long as their activities were consistent
with central educational objectives and they could account fully for their financial
decisions and actions. Legitimate school board decision-making authority, combined
with the principle of education as a public endeavour, paid for with public funds
through a combination of local taxes and grants from provincial government emerged,
as a structural feature of Ontario’s school system (Gidney, 1999). The power of school
boards to raise education dollars from local property taxes was clearly granted in 1850
and was an unambiguous signal of trustees’ power and legitimacy in Ontario.
While the status and legitimacy of school boards are solidly grounded in their
legal status as given in this law, the 1850 School Act was actually a turning point in the
struggle between centralization and localization of authority over education. The die
was cast, as it were, and the movement to establish and perpetuate centralization was set
in motion. A Council of Public Instruction was constituted as a central power to certify
teachers and set the list of approved textbooks. District superintendents were centrally
appointed and the power of local education authorities was reduced. This Act and
subsequent legislation served as successive stages towards a strong, centralized system
of education (Hodgins, 1911).
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The legislation’s aim of more definitively setting out the lines of division
between the local and the central, created a new situation that cannot be oversimplified
through a breakdown of externa (local) and interna (central). Adjusting to a new
approach to the dual locus of responsibility and division of responsibility for different
aspects of education was often accompanied by confusion rather than clarity, as is
apparent from correspondence in the last quarter of the nineteenth century among local
school boards, teachers, and the Department of Education. Issues were raised relating
to trustees’ accountability for the management and expenditures of provincial funds;
concerns regarding the repair and maintenance of school buildings; the right to tax and
procure property; and the authority to direct teachers as to their responsibilities. In
addition, were questions focused on the curriculum; the choice of texts; and concerns
related to the adequate coordination and supervision of schools. Inconsistent
communication between government and school boards regarding the roles,
relationships, and accountabilities of and between trustees and government, rather than
producing clarity, actually produced an opening for increased bureaucratic regulation.
An expository memo in Hodgins (1908, v. 21) sent by central education administrators
one the one hand instructed trustees, on their oversight and accountability
responsibilities and, on the other, advised them on their duties in relation to sweeping
the schoolhouse. This degree of regulation was more pronounced in the more numerous
smaller school districts. In urban areas, larger school boards were able to gain a
“degree of autonomy against the bureaucratization of provincial departments of
education” (Manzer, 1994, p. 87) due to their size, strong local leadership, and adequate
tax base.
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As the century drew to a close, there still lingered the suspicion that elected
trustees were not skilled enough to fulfill their responsibilities and that a decision as
important as school governance should not be left up to the electorate. A
recommendation was raised in the Ontario legislature that school trustees should be
appointed, as this would ensure that they possessed the requisite skills for local
governance, but it did not gain support (Hodgins, 1908, v. 21).
The movement toward centralization continued to be debated, but with no
serious challenges. As the size and the complexity of the education system grew,
existing acts were repealed and replaced with newer structures and regulations, resulting
in an ever-expanding educational system, which Prentice (1977) observed, seemed
increasingly to be run by and for the province. Local autonomy and leadership waned
as education department regulations gained more control over all aspects of education.
Manzer (1994) mapped this movement toward central educational governance as
“beginning with civic trusteeship exercised by a school board, turning to a chief
superintendent who combined policy-making and administrative authority and ending
with a ministerial responsibility under parliamentary government” (p.81). The cost to
local communities was that more of the governance role once exercised by school
boards was given over to the “efficiency and effectiveness of school boards as
administrative agents of provincial departments” (Manzer, p.95).

1900-1950 Turn o f the Century Harmony
The early twentieth century was a period of stability for Ontario’s school boards.
The focus of the Ministry of Education at that time was primarily on the betterment of
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schools, training teachers, development of schools for the visually and hearing
impaired, concern about the increasing the numbers of rural schools, and vocational
education in high schools. Nonetheless, school boards were under the watchful eyes of
the media and the legislature. Two contemporaneous reports from the Globe provide a
sense of the public scrutiny that school boards faced and concerns about their power and
accountability. The first report describes a debate by the Toronto School Board on the
purchase of playground equipment for schools in their district. While their commitment
to advocating for their local schools is evident, their lack of knowledge and preparation
for this particular agenda item portrays many of them, by today’s governance standards,
as fiducially inept.
.. .Another clause was inserted in the report to provide proper playground
equipment to McCaul School. None of the trustees knew just what this would
cost. Trustee Douglas said $14,000 to $20,000, Trustee Brown, $6,000 to
$8,000, and Trustee Hodgson, $11,000. There was only an appropriation of
$7,000 but the item was carried. After this liberality, Trustee Davis got $1,000
for George Street School and this emboldened Trustee Jones, who had got the
first clause through. He asked for a playground for Borden Street School, but
this was too much for the board. Trustee Lee protested against putting these
things through at the last moment and the board voted it down. (Had a Long
Talk and Added Forty Thousand to the Estimates, Globe, Feb. 2,1900, p.02)

The second story, written two years later, describes a motion passed by the Toronto
School Board depicting their view of their power and autonomy. It suggests not only
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the control and independence that school boards believed they legitimately possessed,
but also their conviction that such power was protected in provincial legislation.

.. .One matter of business that occupied the new school board was the proposed
action of the City Council to apply to the Provincial Legislature to have the
powers of the board curtailed in respect to expenditure. Briefly, the policy of the
board is that they desire no interference, that the present Act regulating the
affairs o f the board is perfectly satisfactory, [emphasis added] and a resolution
was passed appointing a committee to go before the legislature and oppose the
action of the city. (New School Board, Globe, Jan. 16,1902, p.16)

In 1926, Howard Ferguson, the then Minister of Education, acknowledged in his
Annual Report the contributions made by school board trustees to the overall
development of education in Ontario. He noted that the oversight of the schools, the
management of finances, the advocacy for better schools, improved courses and
engagement of well-qualified teachers were the result in large part of the “foresight and
ability of local authorities [trustees]... and the ratepayers who prompt them” (Ferguson,
1926, p.19). Several years later Minister of Education George S. Henry reiterated the
view of school board trustees as credible actors in the education system. Henry
endorsed the concept of “popular control” and the role that trustee boards played in
“systematically considering the problems that confront them” (Henry, 1933, p.2).
By the late 1940s Ontario had over 4000 elected school boards. According to
Gidney (1999), boards in large Ontario cities were responsible for all public elementary
and secondary schools within their boundaries, unlike smaller centres where school
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boards had authority for one or more elementary schools or secondary schools, but not
both. The larger urban boards of education employed teachers, principals, a director of
education, and other supervisory officers to administer a broader system of education.
Nonetheless, the most common form of local governance continued to be a board of
trustees for each rural school section, approximately six miles square. The great
majority of these boards employed one teacher for an ungraded single classroom, while
just over two per cent of the province’s school boards governed school districts
composed of twenty or more classrooms.
It was at this time that the Royal Commission on Education Report (1950),
which came to be known as the Hope Report was mandated to study the long-range
educational future of Ontario. Stamp (2005) notes that the Commission provided “a
forum for the competing philosophies of progressivism and traditionalism,” but the
report, which was released five years later, ultimately “reflected the social and
intellectual conservatism of its commissioners” (p.330). The conservatism may be seen
in the debate over the election versus appointment of school board trustees. In due
course, the Commission believed that the local control of education should remain in
the hands of ratepayers. This signalled a change in how trustees for most secondary
schools would come to office, as conventionally their board membership had come by
appointment. In making the recommendation, the Commission responded to a growing
demand from ratepayers “for elected boards to administer secondary education” (Royal
Commission on Education /Hope Report, 1950, p.275).
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1950s and Beyond
Ontario in the 1950s saw education costs rise sharply, brought on by both
unprecedented enrolments to the schools and the tendency for children to stay in school
longer. At the same time, the nature of educational decision-making that gave
prominence to department officials and trustees came into question due to its lack of
accountability and to rising education costs. As rural Canadians migrated to cities and
immigrants settled there, rural school systems grew smaller while urban school systems
became more multifaceted. To enable them to coordinate the complex curricular
changes being introduced by educational officials (Howell, 2005), as well as mounting
economic pressures, administrative reorganization was undertaken. In 1964, small rural
school sections and local trustee boards were amalgamated into township school boards.
This helped to offset the effect of rural geography by giving boards more schools in
their catchments and providing greater financial equity through a broadened tax base.
These amalgamations were viewed as both a way to improve the quality of education in
rural areas, as well as a way of bringing together many of the smaller disparate boards.

1960s Consolidations
In the late sixties, the government of the day embarked on a program
consolidating all remaining school boards in the province into 126 county and district
school systems, plus a few small boards, which existed for special purposes or served
isolated areas. These consolidations were not a response to demands from trustees, but
driven in part by taxpayer unrest over rising school costs. Additionally, smaller school
township boards could not raise enough funds or enrol enough students to provide the
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expanded programs and services required (Stamp, 1982). For smaller school boards
amalgamated with larger ones, trustees were forced to adopt larger scale methods of
educational administration and governance - methods that often went against their
accustomed practices of governance (Gidney, 1999). System-wide policies replaced the
diverse, local, and established practices of rural boards, routinizing procedures and
practices. Opponents of the consolidation described it as the “antithesis of localism”
and a “triumph of bureaucracy over democracy” (Stamp, p.237). Even the larger urban
municipalities, although more able to maintain their identity than their rural
counterparts, were altered by the addition of neighbouring suburban boards (Gidney,
1999). In some instances, where there had been separate boards for elementary and
secondary schools, new boards were assigned responsibility for both.
Resistance to the amalgamation, especially from rural school boards and their
electorates, was rooted in the belief that the new arrangements would make local voice
(and local decision-making) more difficult to preserve. Despite loud opposition, many
small, economically inefficient high schools were closed. These closures did little to
offset the cost of providing much demanded educational services to rural areas of the
province or the costs of “high salaried personnel required operating the larger, more
complex educational systems” (Stamp, 1982, p.238).
An integral part of these consolidations was a move away from the regulatory
role of the Department of Education, described by Manzer (1994) as policy
interdependence and egalitarian decision-making, a blend of participatory democracy at
the local level and rational management at the provincial level. Boards, which in their
recent history had been heavily regulated, were given a higher degree of independence,
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allowing individual boards to implement provincial policies in different ways and
essentially take over the supervisory functions that had been the prerogative of the
Ministry of Education. School boards hired their own administrators, including a
director of education, superintendents and whatever staff was necessary to support the
corporate centres. Board policies were written to take into account their new, larger
areas of responsibility, and processes were standardized across the many schools and
hundreds of teachers in their district. Leadership in program planning and education
improvement became the role of the board as a result of the decentralization of
curriculum control. Boards became responsible for designing and implementing their
own programs of study within broad provincial frameworks and were technically
accountable for the overall performance and ultimate achievements of their schools.
Essentially, aspects of interna and externa broadened for school boards, especially in
regard to greater control of curriculum and teacher contracts. In response to school
boards’ broadened governance responsibilities, Greenfield, House, Hickcox, and
Buchanan (1969) produced a manual for Ontario trustees, administrators and teachers,
describing the system changes and specifically attending to governance responsibilities
such as setting purposes and objectives, making decisions, setting policy, and the
evaluation of outcomes.
In effect, boards had been assigned more independent power than they had
previously or have had since. Even so, the seeming incongruence of having two
different levels of decision-making and the concept of policy interdependence tended to
complicate rather than illuminate the understanding of local governance. Limitations
on the authority of school boards continued. For example, boards were not totally free
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to hire their director of education but were and are limited to hiring candidates who
qualify under Provincial regulations and their choice required the approval of the
Minister. This approval requirement remains in force.
The new independence of school boards brought with it other serious problems.
The amalgamations led to grave financial concerns, fuelled by spiralling costs and
unrestricted spending. At first, boards tried to offset costs by adjusting education tax
rates, but political unrest surfaced throughout rural Ontario over tax increases. This led
to direct government intervention, and the enacting of legislation that placed sharp
restrictions “on the right of trustees to raise the money they considered necessary to
fund their schools” (Gidney, 1999, p.52). According to Stamp (1982) this ushered in a
period of “bitterness and acrimony between provincial and local authorities [school
boards],” where the government “led a vigorous and popular campaign to bring the
skyrocketing cost under control” (p.240).

1970s-1980s
Education costs continued to rise throughout the seventies, driven in part by
increased enrolments, and in the eighties by requirements for special education
programs and English classes for second language learners (ESL), but also by escalating
contract settlements. Although special education programs and ESL were mandated,
and originally offset by provincial grants, school boards maintained they were not
adequately funded to provide them, leaving them with a shortfall they compensated for
by increasing local education taxes (Gidney, 1999). The failure of the grant scheme to
keep pace with the overall total costs of education placed increasing strain on local
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property taxes, especially in property-poor rural boards, increasing the inequalities
between the poor (rural) and richer urban boards. Disproportionate taxation revenues
available to urban and rural boards fed the tension between school boards and
government.
The changing situation of school boards led to conflicting perceptions of their
power and authority, as illustrated in the following comments from a report of the
proceedings of a provincial conference on the politics of education that occurred during
this period.

.. .a ministry of education spokesman announced that local boards, ‘while they
affect postures of sovereignty.. .can never be sovereign’. A Toronto trustee
complained that ‘we do the dirty work while they make the decisions’. Lincoln
County education director Roger Allen called it ‘centralized control and de
centralized blame.’ (Stamp, 1982, p.241)

At the same time, another factor emerged that called into question the role and
value of school boards: concern over educational policy and achievement, not only in
Ontario, but also across Canada. In Ontario, the Ontario Study o f the Relevance of
Education and the Issue o f Dropouts (Radwanski, 1987) and British Columbia, A
Legacy fo r Learners: The Report o f the Royal Commission on Learning (Sullivan,
1988) raised questions about educational quality and attainment. Alarm about dropout
rates, widespread functional illiteracy, and poor comparative results in international
mathematics and science tests were interpreted as a failure of education. Critics
attributed the failure of enhancing the quality of student achievement, despite increased
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investment through provincial grants, “to be the result of muddled purposes, fragmented
curricula, and inadequate accountability” (Manzer, 1994, p.212). The Ontario
government responded by establishing a centralized curriculum and standards to meet
the competitive demands of the new economy, signalling a re-direction in the
governance of education by further centralizing control.

1990s and Beyond
The growth in education spending, labour conflicts between teachers and local
boards, and the demand for more specialized programs created challenges for trustees
and did little to maintain the public’s confidence. Eight teachers’ strikes Ontario in
1991-1992 fed public anger. Rising discontent over education spending, trustee
honoraria, teacher consultants, and other specialists was placed squarely on the
shoulders of the trustees. School boards, in ton, challenged government policies and
refused to implement specific education priorities, claiming that they could not afford to
do everything asked of them. For example, East York cut back on English as a Second
Language instruction and York Region vetoed a plan to introduce junior kindergarten
(Gidney, 1999). Public dissatisfaction along with the spate of teachers’ strikes led to
discussions in government about re-organizing school boards, lessening their number or
perhaps abolishing them altogether. A Toronto Star editorial, “Bloated Bureaucracy”
(Nov. 9,1992, p.A14) asked of the Metropolitan Toronto Public School Board, a
federated board composed of the Toronto school boards in each municipality, “Do we
need so many trustees and boards? Can we afford $95 million a year to run nine
separate administration centres with 14,300 non-teaching staff?” The question asked
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not whether boards govern, as much as cast doubt on the current practice of board
governance. It suggested diminished public confidence in the tradition of local
representation and placed responsibility for managing the escalating costs of a province
wide system of education with the legislature.
By the close of the century, sweeping reforms relating to the organization,
funding, and delivery of education were in place with a momentous impact on school
boards. Bill 104 (1997) reduced the number of Ontario school boards from 129 to 72;
renamed them district school boards; public and separate francophone school boards
were entrenched in legislation; trustee representation went from 1900 to 700 and a cap
of $5000 was placed on trustee honoraria.
The Education Improvement Commission (EIC) (1997) was given far-reaching
powers to oversee and implement the reform. These included power to order boards to
provide the EIC with information, records, or documents in their possession; to conduct
audits and prosecute anyone who obstructed them; to carry out its mandated functions
free from freedom of information legislation; and to act without liability for damages
caused by “good-faith” actions (Jefferson, 1998). Bill 160 (1997) introduced major
changes to how local boards governed. It repealed the School Boards and Teachers
Collective Negotiations Act (Bill 100)(1975) and placed bargaining under the auspices
of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (Bill 7)(1995), removed principals and vice
principals from the bargaining unit, and, perhaps most significantly, suspended school
boards’ powers to raise funds for their school districts through property taxes (Gidney,
1999). Bill 160 gave the Ministry of Education complete control of education
financing, with each school board receiving funding allocations directly from the
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province. It left most of the established duties and obligations of boards in place but the
suspension of school boards’ taxation powers, led many to conclude that their local
autonomy was “a dead letter” (Gidney, 1999, p. 187). Taxation is ordinarily associated
with the external aspects of education and in Ontario, these aspects devolved to local
boards. Thus, centralization was increased by the government’s removal of rights,
which previously had been deemed to properly belong to the local area of responsibility.
Time-honoured responsibilities such as hiring teachers, ensuring proper accommodation
for students, preparing and administering budgets, and managing the schools in their
jurisdictions remained with school boards, but all within the context of provincial
guidelines and limits, and with few restrictions on the power of the minister to control
all aspects of Ontario’s public education system (MacLellan, 2007). Thus, as education
centralized more over time, both the interna and externa came to be centrally controlled
to a greater extent by the Ministry, leaving local school boards with complex
responsibilities, but less actual governance power and authority. These responsibilities
include implementing new government strategies, for example, standardized testing and
student achievement programs, responsibilities that, according to Macauley (1988),
clearly situate school boards as one level of administration in a large provincial system.

The Past Ten Years: Disharmony and Dissent
School boards, the oldest form of publicly elected government in Ontario
(Ontario School Board Reduction Task Force (1996), have been merged, closed, and in
some instances placed under direct government supervision as a result of unprecedented
provincial interventions. The government justified several of these interventions as
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responses to alleged mismanagement by school boards of their governance
responsibilities.
In 2002, in response to governance decisions taken by trustees, the Ministry
temporarily appointed supervisors to replace school boards in Toronto, Hamilton, and
Ottawa. The Toronto District School Board, responsible for about one-seventh of
Ontario’s funded school board population and with a 2002 budget of 2 billion dollars
(Auditors, 2002), refused to submit a balanced budget to the Ministry of Education. A
review commissioned by the Ministry to look into the activities of the Toronto Board
found that inappropriate financial management in planning and decision-making had
caused the anticipated deficit. The auditors also alleged that in addition to out of
control costs, the Toronto board had ignored, in full or in part, province-wide standards
set by the Ministry. Similar scenarios played out in Hamilton and Ottawa where
supervisors were appointed by the Ministry to assume the leadership and control of the
board until budgets and other issues such as school closures and the loss of non-funded
programs were managed as per Ministry guidelines. In each instance where a
supervisor was appointed, trustee actions (or inactions) were construed as resistance to
the provincial takeover of taxation authority. Trustees countered, claiming that their
decisions reflected nothing more than their fiducial trust vis-à-vis their constituents
(Beer, 2002). These boards’ powers to govern were suspended until the Ministry was
satisfied that their budgetary and other responsibilities could be adequately met. The
following year, the Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board was placed under
financial supervision when they rejected the balanced budget recommended by an
appointed government supervisor. In 2008-2009, the Toronto Catholic District Board
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was placed under supervision by the Minister of Education for what she called “lavish
spending habits and failure to balance their budget” (Supervisor to Oversee Catholic
School Board, 2008).
In 2008, the Minister of Education set up a “governance review committee,”
with instructions to create job descriptions for board chairs and directors, and to develop
better training for trustees and a code of conduct for trustees. In response to the
announcement, Toronto District School Board chair John Campbell said that he was in
favour of anything that “more clearly defines the expectations and responsibilities of
trustees” (Code of Conduct, 2008, p.A18), confirming commonly reported confusion
and uncertainty about school board expectations. School Board Governance: A Focus
on Achievement (2009) was released after public consultations in 2009, along with
recommendations to amend the 1990 Education Act to describe more clearly trustee
roles and responsibilities and minimum standards for a proposed trustee code of
conduct. That not all school boards have dealt with role uncertainties and developed
their own codes suggests that perhaps they have not taken up the leadership and
initiative that one would expect of a governing body in discerning the expectations and
responsibilities of their office. The passage into law of the Student Achievement and
School Board Governance Act (Bill 177) caused public outcry and objections from
many Ontario school boards, who see it as one more attack on local democracy (Leitner,
2009).
Since their inception, Ontario school boards have experienced incremental
losses to their power and authority. While public school boards’ legitimacy, fiducial
and political nature, and orientation toward a public good have remained largely

163

uncontested over time, the same case cannot be made for governance power and
authority.

School Board Governance: Critical Times
Ontario school boards are not the only ones to have faced criticism, challenges,
and problems. Budgetary and administrative paradigm shifts reflect social and political
movements in education evidenced in government-school board interactions beyond the
borders of the province. To illustrate this, I turn briefly to incidences in Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick, as well as in the United States. In 2006 in Nova Scotia, the
Minister of Education removed the authority of the elected Halifax Regional School
Board under Section 68 of the Education Act. In doing so, the Minister noted that both
she and the public had lost confidence in the school board, that “board members have a
duty to the people who elect them; to the taxpayers, and most importantly to the
students they were elected to serve” (CBC News, Dec. 19,2006). The decision to
dismiss the Halifax board followed the board’s failure to comply with governance
performance standards set by the Minister. Factors contributing to the Minister’s
intervention included violations such as breach of trust, failure to attend meetings and
the inability of the board, reportedly paralyzed by infighting, to behave in a
“professional and competent manner” (CBC News, Dec. 19, 2006). In essence, the
Minister’s reasoning was that the board failed to serve its various publics.
In 2008, the Strait Regional School Board in Nova Scotia faced provincial
intervention because of mismanagement related to finances and human resource
matters. The Minister of Education appointed a retired university vice-president to
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oversee matters related to finance and human resources until the October elections,
noting that she had “formed the opinion that the board was not managing its duties
under the Education Act in a responsible manner" (CBC News, Feb. 28, 2008).
Problems with both the Halifax School Board and the Strait Regional School Board
resulted in the government’s positioning itself as an advocate for the people the school
boards are supposed to represent, and as the interpreter of the statutes under which
school boards operate.
In the Nova Scotia examples, the provincial government appealed to a board’s
obligations to their constituents, while the Ontario intervention was justified on the
basis of a board’s obligations to their funders and their responsibility to comply with
provincial legislation. What becomes clearly manifest in the examples from both
provinces is that government sees its role as the final arbitrator in matters of educational
governance.
Government’s view of its role concerning the local governance of education
becomes clearer in New Brunswick, where in 1997 school boards were abolished
altogether and replaced by District Education Councils (DECs) with less power and
authority than school boards in Ontario (New Brunswick Education Act, 1997). For
example, DECs do not participate in negotiations for teacher and other staff
(clerical/custodial/bus drivers/teacher assistants) contracts. The government and the
unions negotiate those contracts centrally. The purchase of school transportation and all
out-sourced contracts are negotiated through the Department of Supply & Services.
Additionally, the DECs make recommendations for capital expenditures about school
establishment and closure but the decisions are the Minister’s.
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In the United States, persistent reports of nepotism, corruption and
mismanagement, lack of accountability and poor leadership (Tyack & Hansot, 1982)
have seen governments often overriding the cherished principle of local democratic
control. Extraordinary means of oversight to address these concerns have been enacted,
such as installing court-appointed supervisors and creating control boards to oversee
school districts (Cibulka, 2001). In responding to school board governance concerns,
authority has been shifted ¡from elected school boards in Chicago (1995) and New York
City (1996) to mayoral control; in Hartford, CT from mayoral control to state control
(1997), and in Washington, DC, from elected boards to government-appointed boards
(1996) (Arasim, 1999). Just outside of Boston, the historical seat of local school board
governance, the school district of Chelsea was given over to Boston University (a
private university) in 1988, when the school board was accused of “everything from
nepotism to organized crime” (Elizabeth, 2003).
In 1990 the Kentucky Educational Reform Act (KERA) came into effect, with
provisions to safeguard against past school board governance practices (such as
nepotism and political interference), and included the appointment of a State
Commissioner of Education. Local superintendents’ powers were increased and the
Commissioner of Education was given veto power over any dismissal of a
superintendent by a school board. KERA also gave state authorized school-based
councils far reaching policy-making authority. Although strongly opposed by public
school boards who perceived KERA as reducing their local powers (Hoyt, 1999), these
interventions reflect broad government and public concern regarding the ability of
school boards to govern.
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American school districts vary substantially (that is, more than in Canada) in
size, enrolment, organization and legal powers, and status. In many states, school
district voters elect school board members; in a small number of states and some large
metropolitan areas, boards are appointed. Some school boards are fiscally independent
while others are fiscally dependent on local government funding (Howell, 2005).
Although significant differences that affect school governance across North America
make broad generalizations about school boards difficult, most school districts are
governed by elected boards that share many of the same contextual conditions and
circumstances as Canadian school boards, such as the requirement to govern their
school districts effectively and to represent their electorate.
Of significance to this inquiry into school board governance are mounting
expectations that schools meet international, national, or provincial standards, as well as
operate within budgetary limits that are at least partially determined by concerns over
province wide-taxation. Public scrutiny of school boards and increasing demands for
accountability have grown as school boards come under greater financial pressures and
the complexity of the demands they face increases. Governments have redeployed
economic controls and resources, encouraging the adoption of management and
governance practices from nonprofit and private-sectors (Alexander & Weiner, 1998) as
a way for boards to strengthen their governance capacities and meet their
accountabilities.
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Summary
The purpose of tracing the development of Ontario school boards and tracking
issues of school board governance even outside this jurisdiction was to identify some of
the historical and political factors that affect both conceptual and operative features
school board governance. Despite the, at times, seismic shifts in the political and social
landscape, certain features of school board governance appear more or less constant
throughout their history, features that earlier chapters have identified as being essential
to the concept of governance. Politically and socially, the tug-of-war between local
communities and central government over control of public education, the wrangling
over strategic aspects of interna and externa, and the accusations of mismanagement,
while integral to the story of school governance, may distract from the central question.
Regardless of what may be an asymmetrical sharing of responsibility, a skewed division
of education into interna and externa aspects, or even a suspicion that school boards
govern poorly, expectations suggest that they should be capable, governing bodies.
Thus, while it is both instructive and necessary to pay attention to the issues that surface
in this struggle, in themselves they do not answer the question.
Power, authority, legitimacy, fiduciality, governance as political, and
governance oriented toward a public good recur throughout the history of school boards
in Ontario and elsewhere, both as expectations and manifestations of good governance.
Sometimes it was claimed that local school boards inadequately fulfilled these features
of educational governance; at other times, central government was portrayed as lacking
the local knowledge needed for good school board governance. In either case, despite
divergent expectations of who should govern, there seems to have been agreement on
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what governance means and its role vis-à-vis the social good of education. While
different expectations for school board governance contribute to the lack of clarity
around the role and responsibilities of school boards, a question at least implicitly and
tacitly present in every debate over central or local control, or shared governance is, can
school boards govern?
There is little doubt that education in Ontario is a centralized project.
Nevertheless, school boards not only continue to exist, but there has been a
reinvestment in them as governing bodies, as evidenced in the recently released School
Board Review Report (2009). In this chapter, I have attempted to sketch the historical
and wider political context of school board governance in Ontario, to contextualize the
question can school boards govern? While there is abundant research on the evolution
of the education system itself, the evidence base for local governance of public
education is not well established. School boards began in small farming communities,
as well as in somewhat larger industrial centres, as an autonomous and representative
voice for overseeing schooling for a given locality. They evolved over the next two
hundred years of political, economic, and population growth into bodies responsible for
oversight of large, complex systems of education. This growth witnessed the
modification of school boards, sometimes in one direction, at times in the opposite
direction, in form, function, autonomy, and power.
The review covered more than a century of expansion and change, beginning
with the Grammar School and Common School Acts of the early 1800s and continuing
to the present. This approach traced the development of the education system in
Ontario precisely from the point of view of school board governance. Viewing school
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board governance over time is necessary for establishing both its dynamic elements and
the shifting contexts within which it occurs. From this it can be clearly seen that school
boards, in order to fulfill their function, need to oversee and direct the education
enterprise for which they are responsible, that is, they are, in design, governing bodies.
At the same time, the political give and take evidenced in the history of school boards in
Ontario has exposed several contested areas of governance. The limits and domains of
school boards’ power, extent of authority, legitimacy, and fiduciality have all been
disputed and challenged, as well as their political role and orientation toward a public
good. These areas of dispute and, at times, discontent, come back to issues that pertain
to essential features of governance, as identified in the analysis and discussion of
governance in earlier chapters. Thus, it is clear that these debates, while representing
different interests at different times and places, not only raise issues about school board
governance in practice, but also reinforce the belief and expectation that school boards
govern. Therefore, the degree to which these features are present or absent, latent or
actual, in law, or in practice, in the school boards of Ontario is of critical importance to
the focus of the next chapter Can School Boards Govern?
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CHAPTER FIVE
CAN SCHOOL BOARDS GOVERN?
The school board is the governing body of the district, the body that exercises
the district’s corporate powers and carries out its public responsibilities.
Richard Briffault (2005)
The question of whether school boards can govern is a question independent of
whether school boards do govern in practice. Through an analysis of theories of
governance in comparative politics, international relations, public administration and
board governance, I have identified six criteria or essential features of governance that
offer a framework for understanding the concept. These are power, authority,
legitimacy, and fiduciality, governance as political and governance as oriented toward a
public good. How these features are manifest in concrete iterations of governance
reveals variations in shape and form attributable to contingent features-the conditions,
circumstances, and constraints of governance that occur in particular instances. The
task of this chapter is to decide whether school boards satisfy the criteria for governance
based on this conceptual framework. I do this by taking up the essential features of
governance and giving them the weight of practicality-that is, I consider if school
boards realize the features of governance determined as essential to the concept. When
I began this inquiry, I was inclined to believe that school boards could not govern. My
thinking has changed, and in this chapter I will argue that school boards do have the
capacity to govern.
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Overview
This chapter explores the particular circumstances of school board governance
through the heuristic lens of essential and contingent features, established in previous
chapters. It is one thing for the nomenclature of school board governance to be
assigned by legislation, public expectation, and long-standing tradition but ultimately, if
governance in a school board setting lacks the identified essential features, school
boards cannot be considered governing bodies.
Previous chapters in this inquiry carried out a conceptual analysis of governance
that produced a framework for deciding whether school boards satisfy certain criteria or
essential features. The challenge in this chapter is to show that school boards realize
these features and to demonstrate their practical capacity to engage these features. I
suggest that much of the debate as to whether school boards can govern may be
attributed to performance issues, unreasonable expectations, and an abstracted or
skewed notion of school boards that does not consider their particular realities and the
contingent relations within which governance is realized in the concrete.
The chapter begins with a review of key points and themes that have surfaced
during this inquiry and includes a focus on school boards, including their legal roles and
expectations. It moves to a discussion of essential governance features in the context of
school boards, answering the question, can school boards govern?

What are School Boards?
Boards in general exist to oversee the direction and success of organizations.
They offer their knowledge, expertise, and oversight, and exercise their power for the
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purposes of a public good. They are ultimately responsible for the overall achievements
of an organization: as Low (2006, p.376) suggests “the locus of organizational control.”
Board governance, understood as the “fundamental structures and processes established
to order the relationship between an organization and its owners” (Tuohy, 2003, p.2), is
shaped by both internal and external influences. At its core are a number of features
essential to its understanding. They may occur to a greater or lesser extent but they are
present.
The provincial governance of education occurs through the legislature that, by
means of statutes,9 delegates certain decision-making powers to school boards, such as
responsibility for the effective use of resources. Enns (1963, p.l) aptly described this
system of educational governance as “partly centralized and partly decentralized,” with
centralized functions residing in Ministries or Departments of Education, and
decentralized functions delegated to local school boards. Ministries of Education are
responsible for broad, overarching policy directed toward the effective education of the
population and the efficient use of tax dollars. School boards are responsible for policy
at the local level and “have authority to make bylaws, resolutions, regulations, rules,
procedures, and policies” (Houston & Prentice, 1988, p.9). Generally, school boards act
in a legislative capacity when they establish policy; in an administrative capacity when
they carry on the business of the school board; and in a quasi-judicial capacity when
they hear an appeal or conduct a hearing related to student or staff status or placement
9 Key Statutes affecting the delivery o f education in Ontario include but are not limited to: Act to
Protect Anaphylactic Pupils, Education Act, Education Quality and Accountability Office Act, Ontario
Educational Communications Authority Act, Provincial Schools Negotiation Act, Teaching Profession
Act, Immunization o f School Pupils Act, Labour Relations Act, Municipal Elections Act, Municipal
Conflict o f Interest Act, Child and Family Services Act, Day Nurseries Act, Workers Compensation Act,
Ontario Human Rights Code, Occupational Health and Safety Act.
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(Dickinson & MacKay, 1989). The caveat that school board governance activities such
as policy-making must be consistent with local realities and provincial policy and can
occur only within fixed limits is recognized and long standing. Zuker (1988) captured
the two-tier governance reality well, noting that school boards “act as agents of the
province and within the limits of authority provided by the statutes, are the local
legislatures in educational matters” (p.6).

What Are School Boards Expected to Do?
Ontario school boards administer funding they receive from the province and
constituent municipalities to operate public elementary and secondary schools for over
two million fulltime students (Canadian Education Association, 2009). With these
funds school boards are mandated to provide appropriate education programs within
well-managed school districts. School boards act as overseers of local educational
systems comprised of numerous supporting structures and networks that contribute to
and facilitate the education process.
Much has changed since the first education legislation when local trustees
exercised substantial control over public schools. Although accorded considerably less
autonomy than their predecessors, school boards today are responsible for the oversight
of larger, more complex, multi-faceted organizations. Projected 2009-2010 budgets for
the five largest Ontario boards range from nearly 500 million to 2.5 billion dollars.10
Reforms such as provincial achievement standards, multi-sector collaborations, and
10
Proposed Toronto District School Board 2009-2010 budget set at 2.5 billion dollars; Peel
District School Board set at 1.26 billion dollars; Ottawa and Thames Valley District Boards both set at
just over 700 million dollars and Hamilton Wentworth District School Board 2009-2010 budget set at 484
million dollars.
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programs for vulnerable students contribute to the demands and intricacy of governing
local systems of education. School boards, within the broader system of education, are
responsible for directing their local system to these desired ends.
Expectations for school boards to govern include the requirement that they
appropriately manage publicly allocated resources for the education of children and
youth in their jurisdiction, represent their constituents, and direct and oversee the
management of their local school systems. Responsibility for collaborating with
different levels of government in the interests of both stakeholders and public policy
creates the highly political environment within which school boards work. Although
there has been disagreement about the degree of autonomy and control independently
exercised by local boards throughout their history, the Education Act (1990) makes
explicit the legal mandate for public school boards across Ontario to govern.
As with all boards, school boards are accountable to numerous constituents.
These individuals and groups have a stake in the actions and decisions of school boards,
a direct interest in the consequences of these actions, in the use of resources, and the
outcomes produced by school boards. These stakes are high-politically, economically,
and socially. Self-evident among stakeholders is the provincial legislature, but there are
many others. Local communities have a stake in how their elected trustees oversee the
school system and how they interpret local issues in their policy-making. Teachers and
other employee groups have a stake in employment contracts, standards, pensions,
benefits, and workplace issues. Parents and students expect a safe, clean, respectful
educational environment where learning and achievement are high. Municipalities,
local businesses, transportation lines, and many others look to their local school boards
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to make policy, guide management, provide fiducial oversight and stewardship, and
steer toward mission attainment. The actions and accountability expected of school
board trustees in response to the broad spectrum of stakeholder groups are clearly
governance activities.
Figure 5.1 reviews the earlier analysis of the relationship between essential and
contingent governance features illustrated in Figure 3.2 and adds details specifically
related to school board governance. In particular, it identifies many of the
contingencies that shape and influence school board governance in practice. Figure 5.1
provides a reference point for the following discussion about governance features in a
school board context.
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Figure 5.1 School board governance: essential and contingent features
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Warrantable Claims to Governance
The legal limits on school board governance may lead some observers to believe
that school boards have neither the latitude nor the capacity to engage the governance
features set out in previous chapters. This notion is echoed in Williams’ (2003)
observation that during Ontario’s recent reforms, the government imposed clear limits
on school boards’ authority and autonomy, and “effectively neutered school boards’
decision-making ability on matters affecting 75 per cent or more of their budget” (p.21).
Dobkin Hall (1990) describes the role of government policy in local school governance
as both “framing and constraining the process of governance” (p.l). The following
newspaper editorial excerpt illustrates this framing and constraining:

.. .the Education Ministry has taken over more and more decision-making power
on everything from class sizes to the amount of preparation time teachers should
have. Although local school boards receive hundreds of millions of dollars in
grants, and local trustees approve budgets, they have no control over a vast
majority of those dollars because Queen's Park tells them how the money must
be spent. (D’Amato, 2006)
Notwithstanding the perception that school board governance is so restricted that
perhaps school boards are deficient in one or more features required for governance, I
seek to show that in practice they can govern, that is, they can realize the essential
features that are necessary for governance, albeit within limits.
There is no advantage in attempting an exclusive analysis of each feature
claimed to comprise the concept of governance, nor to provide crisp distinctions
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between each feature because in practice they interrelate. Moreover, complexities
flourish in their application, making their boundaries fluid, which seems inevitable as
governance is practiced within the contingencies of differing conditions, circumstances,
and constraints. Nonetheless, where particular features can be conveniently isolated to
demonstrate their presence in school board governance, I do so below. This section
begins with a consideration of those essential features that to some extent stand on their
own. These claims of public good, fiduciality, and school board governance as
political, are situated within the context of the contingent features that shape and
influence how they are realized.

A Claim o f Public Good
Governance is a process whereby organizations and societies make important
decisions related to the public good. The focus of governance, whether in international
relations or public administration, directs itself toward economic, social, and
community enhancement, a common standard of public good. At the very least,
governance, as a social invention, seeks to ensure representative voice in issues related
to the public good, as mission or organizational mandate is pursued. Governance in
public administration treats the public good as the implementation of policy decisions
made on behalf of citizens by government. School boards, as one subsystem in the
broad system of public administration in the province, exist specifically to pursue goals
related to the public good. For school boards, the public good has been conventionally
related to education and representation.
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Education as a public good. Throughout the history of Ontario’s school
boards, education has figured centrally as a public good. From the tug-of-war between
localism and centrism for control of education during the mid-nineteenth century, to the
most recent amendments to the Education Act, a belief in education as a public good
has remained constant.
Legislation to amend the Education Act recently passed by the Ontario
legislature reasserts the public good of education and the role of school board
governance in achieving this end. Bill 177n construes education as the foundation of a
prosperous, caring, and cohesive society, and publicly financed and regulated education
as providing students with opportunities to realize their potential and develop into
highly skilled, knowledgeable, caring citizens who contribute to their society.
References in the Bill to school boards and their responsibilities in enhancing student
achievement and wellbeing illustrate this orientation toward a broad public good.
Questions about school boards’ orientation to public good emerge when
differences of opinion between school boards and local constituents or school boards
and provincial regulations and expectations arise. Issues such as school closures or
demands for specific educational programs have resulted in court challenges,1
12 with
arguments on both sides purporting to be acting on behalf of the public good.
Representation as public good. Since the great majority of Ontario school
boards are elected, it stands to reason that they are perceived as representative bodies.
11
Bill 177, An Act to Amend the Education Act with Respect to Student Achievement, School
Board Governance and Certain Other Matters passed its final reading in the legislature on Nov. 30, 2009.
12
See, for example, Fisher Park Residents Association Inc. et al. v. Ottawa Board o f Education
(1986); MacDonald et al. v. Lambton County Board o f Education (1992); Neiberg v. Simcoe County

District School Board (2004).
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According to Pitkin (1967), political representation is the activity of making citizens’
voices, opinions, and perspectives present in public policy-making processes. It occurs
when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on the behalf of others in the
political arena. Unlike delegates, who follow the expressed wishes of their constituents,
school board trustees are representatives expected to follow their own understanding of
the best action to pursue within the context of the overall good of the district. Elected to
substitute their judgment on behalf of their electorate (Christiano, 1996), trustees act
within certain limits, expected to consciously and intentionally participate together to
decide the best course of action.
A 2006 Ministry of Education document, Respect for Ontario Trustees,
describes trustees’ representative role thus:
Representation of the unique local needs of school boards to the
provincial government is a key component of the role of trustee. Trustees
are an important conduit of communication between school boards and
the provincial government and must be provided with the opportunity
and forum to convey information and be heard by the provincial
government, (p.l)
Pitkin (1967) offers two dimensions of representation that contribute to its
understanding in the context of school boards. These are authorization (does the
representative have legitimate standing?) and accountability (can the representative be
held accountable for his or her actions or inactions?). School board trustees obtain their
standing or authorization through the electoral process. They are accountable for their
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responsiveness to their constituents, who may punish them for failing to act in
accordance with their wishes by voting them out of office. Peters (1996) argues that
opposing expectations and conflicting demands may create policy gridlocks for school
boards if they are unable to aggregate dissimilar needs into common policy. If these
gridlocks result in unresponsiveness, constituent dissatisfaction may lead to calls for
change.
Because, as Pitkin (1967) points out, there are no standards for assessing how
well a political representative behaves, one can merely assess whether a representative
legitimately holds his or her position and whether a representative can be sanctioned.
Although voter turnout was just over 40 percent for the 2006 Ontario municipal
elections (AMCTO, 2007), school board trustees are considered representative in the
political sense.
Perceptions of representation and public good may differ, especially when
community and provincial influences and purposes collide. Managing multiple,
pluralistic expectations and sustaining the confidence of their various publics requires
school boards to maintain a careful balance between the desires of their electorate and
the dictates and interests of power. The consolidation of school districts in the late
1990s and the loss of direct taxation powers have limited the discretion of school boards
to negotiate and resolve local issues. Although school boards’ dependence is almost
complete and their ability to respond to local constituents tempered by the weight of
legal authority at the provincial level, school boards, as representatives, need not be
taciturn in issues that affect the local needs of their school districts. Indeed, the good
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working of any system of democratic government requires the checks and balances that
school boards may provide.
All too often, according to Kerr (1964), school boards legitimize the policies of
the school system to the community, rather than representing community concerns to
system and school administrators. Representation as public good may be better claimed
by representing these various communities to educational authorities as system policies
are formulated, reviewed, modified, and reaffirmed. In accord with the mores of
representative democracy, the public may act through their representatives to influence
school board decisions. For example, when constituents do not accept particular
education reforms, they expect trustees and boards to represent and advocate for their
interests, to navigate the discourse surrounding competing perspectives of public good
and give them consideration and debate. When this debate does not occur, the public
good suffers.

A Claim o f Fiduciality
We entrust school boards with billions of dollars of public monies,
responsibility for implementing provincial educational policy, student outcomes, and
representative voice, and we expect them to meet this trust with fiduciality. Fiduciality
includes aspects of governance oversight for budgets, audits, investment management,
monitoring, as well as educational programs and services. As fiduciaries, school boards
have the authority and duty to make financial decisions related to local district
expenditures for the purposes of ensuring a strong and competitive education system
and to do so with care and diligence.
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How school boards manage these revenues and resources is of immense
importance to their various publics including the provincial legislature and local
schools. Unfortunately, the extent to which school boards fulfill their fiduciary role is
often narrowly judged by their ability to stay within budgetary limits and performance
expectations imposed by government. Fiduciality has broader implications that include
a school board’s stewardship role to oversee the conduct of the school district, ensure
that an effective team is in place to carry out day-to-day operations, account for their
financial and other resources, and make certain that no issue falls between the cracks in
steering the school district toward specific educational goals.
School boards who compromise their fiducial duties may (or may not) have
always been around, but in recent years, increased public awareness has raised a myriad
of questions related to trustee behaviours, school board decisions, and provincial
interventions. Breach of public trust evidenced by abuse of trustee expense accounts
(CBC News, 2008, May 7), infighting sufficient to significantly derail board business
(CBC News, 2006, Dec. 19), conflict of interest allegations (The Record, 2009), and
findings of guilt relating to issues of finance, human resources and other governance
decisions (The Catholic Register, 2009), all compromise fiducial duties.
Fiduciality is compromised when trustees do not exercise their duty of care or
exercise it below the expected standard of care. Commonly expressed as the care an
ordinarily prudent person would use in a comparable position and under similar
circumstances, school board trustees have a duty to exercise reasonable care in all
decisions they make. A less reported breach of duty of care occurs when trustees do not
question any board activity or transaction that they find unclear or troubling. For
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example, for the most part, most trustees did not raise concerns about the transgressions
described in the preceding paragraph. In the specific cases noted, citizens and other
public officials raised the concerns, rather than individual trustees or the boards
themselves. Whether it was apathy, lack of knowledge, a packed agenda, ethical
muteness, or other factors, the duty of care incumbent on all trustees was not met.
Fiduciality also requires a standard of faithfulness. Faithfulness comes with the
expectation that trustees give undivided allegiance to their organization when making
decisions. The ever present dilemma for school boards in this respect flows from their
dual accountabilities and allegiances to their electorate (whose diminishing numbers at
the polls at the very least suggest indifference), and to the province, who funds and
centrally controls most aspects of the education system. For example, a board may
claim that refusing to balance their budget was a fiducial decision taken on behalf of
their electorate for the public good of the school district. At the same time, the province
may suggest that in refusing to balance their budget the school board did not meet its
fiducial duties. While the political capital may grow for a board that takes on the lion,
in Ontario’s education politics, the lion usually wins. Ultimately, operating on a best
interest principle includes the will to understand the competing demands of all
constituents, and the courage to make a decision that will serve the majority of the
public good.
Much of the governance literature attempts to sort and translate the duties of
fiduciary governance into a series of steps or lists (Carver, 1997; Gill; 2005; Plumtre &
Graham, 1999; Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002). While this may help to control the
increasingly complex environment within which school boards govern, more than plans
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and checklists are required to ensure the fiducial dimension of governance is satisfied.
Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) argue that execution and process matters, that formal,
analytical, and technical processes are important to fiduciality, but so too are insight,
intuition, strategic acumen, and wisdom. If these traits are not present on a school
board, then contingent features, those conditions, circumstances, and constraints that
affect and shape governance, may be one of the explanations. Elected, not recruited, the
board as a whole has little say in its makeup or skills. The high number of school
trustee acclamations-54 percent in 2003-(Ministry of Education, 2006) may foster
coalitions between long-standing school board trustees and impede the inability of
newcomers to influence board business. Board culture and practice may engender
dynamic, strategic approaches or foster staid, controlled, rigid practice. Whatever the
case, challenges to the status quo by new trustees, especially if few and inexperienced,
will not likely succeed. According to trustees themselves, specific school board
responsibilities are vague (Report of the Governance Review Committee, 2009) and
some trustees, despite the training provided for them, may not feel confident or
competent to meet the various expectations of their complex role. The fiducial aspect
of school board governance is an important component of school boards’ overall
governance practice, realized in their effective practices and relationships with
government, their local communities, and other major stakeholders.
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A Claim o f Governance as Political
The term politics is often associated with the activities and affairs of
government, but it is equally applicable to interactions of other governing bodies that
use their power and authority to formulate and direct policy.
Local school board governance, comprised of activities through which trustees
make, preserve, and amend the general rules of the system (Heywood, 2002), is a
political activity. Schools fulfill a political role (Dickinson & MacKay, 1989) and
trustees are politicians. As civic leaders, school boards are elected to represent interests
of various stakeholders through a municipal election process. They function as the local
governance system for their school district, and as a subsystem of the broader provincial
education project. Formal responsibility for establishing local policy and exerting direct
control over their jurisdictions resides in school boards across the province. The
struggle between school boards and the provincial legislature over who controls power
and resources has long fed the political culture within which school boards govern. So,
too, has the pressure from interest groups for their goals to become public policy as well
as the systemic politicization of such things as teacher power through their unions.
Allison, Allison, and McHenry (1995) highlight the political function of policy
making as opposed to the administrative function of policy decisions, arguing that
school board governance occurs within a political environment. School boards’
external linking role with major constituents as well as their necessary appreciation of
the systems and subsystems within which they orbit and which they may influence,
reflects the political nature of their governance.
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The public representation role of school boards, discussed earlier in the chapter
is based on a democratic political ideology, understood simply as rule by the people.
Such an orientation is evidenced in theories generated about school boards as
democratic in which the level and frequency of public participation in board decision
making, the congruence of policy outputs to public demands, and the freedom of the
public to participate by exercising their power at the polls are linked (Alsbury, 2003).
Different school districts may have different political traditions as well as a
multiplicity of cultures, reflecting a variety of social characteristics such as ethnicity,
income, history, and education. Ideally, school boards should be able to respond to
these dissimilarities, but as Ontario boards have become larger and their constituents
more diverse, school communities have greater difficulty agreeing on a shared set of
values, norms or a unifying vision. Moreover, the size of some Ontario school boards
and the geographic distance they cover may actually prevent constituents finding
expression on their local boards. Soliciting and balancing the participation and input of
all constituents in determining shared conceptions of the good become a matter of
importance to school boards as representatives of these constituents.

Claims o f Legitimacy, Power and Authority
Claims of legitimacy, power, and authority as features of governance are
reciprocally connected. Power, granted by law to school boards, is a capacity which
becomes manifest when authority, a form or instrument of power, is exercised.
Legitimacy is required to justify the wielding of power and gives authority. One can
have power but without legitimate justification to exercise the power, there is no
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authority. One can have authority, but only as an instrument of power. In the absence
of legitimacy, institutions such as school boards cannot realize their power or authority.
Because of the requirement of legitimacy in the proper exercise of power and authority,
I treat it first.
Legitimacy. School boards realize legitimacy through the normal democratic
process of elections and the statutes and legal precedents that set out and recognize their
role. Legitimacy has to do with rights: whether a government (or school board) has the
right to govern, and whether someone has the right to speak on behalf of those they are
representing. In part, legitimacy may be claimed through the legal process by which
school board trustees come to office. Whereas many appointed boards in the publicsector gain their legitimacy in part through an order-in-council, school boards gain
theirs through the electoral process.13 Additionally, the employment of correct
governance procedures in enacting policy brings legitimacy to boards.
School boards’ legitimacy, what Edwards and Zadek (2002, p. 211) describe as
“the right to be and do something in society...a sense that an organization is lawful,
admissible, and justified in its chosen course of action,” can be classified into two types.
The first is institutional or formal legitimacy, grounded in regulatory bases such as
provincial statutes, as well as local organizational requirements. Institutional legitimacy
is a long-term attribute gained over years of activity with many stakeholders. In
addition, school boards may derive institutional legitimacy from their history, tradition,

13

Municipal councils are elected bodies that govern in the public-sector, but are not constituted as
boards o f directors. The 2003 Municipalities Act acknowledges municipalities as responsible and
accountable governments, with broadly defined purposes, natural person powers (authority and flexibility
to manage their organizational and administrative affairs) and spheres o f jurisdiction (Municipal Act eGuide, 2003).
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and recognition. Normative legitimacy is embodied in the values and moral obligations
of educational governance. It is not enough to for school boards to simply conform, but
to ensure that in doing so, their actions are just and ethical. The policies and procedures
that boards follow as they make governance decisions, write policy, and set direction
must be informed by the values developed within the school district, to ensure actions
that are just and ethical. School boards may gain legitimacy in the eyes of their
stakeholders through their support of regulatory standards and constituent expectations.
It can be lost when either their electorate or the province come to view board decisions
as unjustifiable or inappropriate in terms of social and institutional norms and legal
requirements. As recent history has shown, when Ontario school boards lose their
legitimacy, they risk loss of power and authority, which may be then ceded to provincial
supervisors. The Ontario government has intervened several times over the last decade,
asserting that school boards were mismanaging their governance responsibilities. In
2002 the Toronto, Hamilton, and Ottawa District School Boards were temporarily
replaced by Ministry appointed supervisors as a result of governance decisions taken by
trustees. The Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board was put under financial
supervision in 2007 when they rejected the balanced budget recommended by an
appointed government mediator, and the Toronto Catholic District School Board is
currently under supervision by Ministry of Education appointees. Such interventions
are not limited to Ontario as was seen in the previous chapter. Indeed, challenges to
public school board structures and powers have become more commonplace in Canada
and the United States (Carver 2000; Edwards 2000; Howell, 2005; McAdams &
Urbanski 1999).
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Power and authority. Because one cannot have authority without power, and
power without authority would prevent boards from governing, these features are
coupled for this discussion. Boards exercise authority, control and direction over an
organization (Muttart Foundation, 1997); exercise power and hold final authority and
legal responsibility for the outcomes of the organization (Houle, 1997); practice
financial discipline, provide informed oversight, mission fidelity and primacy of
organizational interests (Chait, Ryan & Taylor, 2005).
To review, school board governance consists of the powers, duties, and
decision-making capability established through legislation and government direction.
School boards are responsible for governing their local school districts, subsystems in a
larger provincial education system, and for ensuring that government’s fiscal and policy
directions are met. Although the specified power and authority exercised by local
school boards and the limits placed on them have been contested throughout their
history, school boards can realize the power and authority to govern, as boards are
expected to govern.
As discussed in Chapter Three, power is the ability to get things done — to
realize one’s own will or to achieve the collective will of some group over others.
School boards are elected bodies, endowed with certain rule making and decision
making powers intended to further education in their local communities. School boards
are corporations. As such, they are legal persons and can enter into contracts, sue, and
be sued. As corporate entities, school boards carry on, despite the electoral outcomes
of individual trustees. School boards do not have the power to change provincial
education policy, direction, or funding agreements. They do have the power to secure
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information to govern effectively, to supervise, to decide, to direct the operational use
of power, and to be accountable for its use. References to operational power relate to
the power of the board to direct the CEO, and may include such activities as setting
parameters for senior management, and directing remedial action when indicated (Joint
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2001) as well as ensuring that all activities of the
local school system are guided by a clear strategic framework (Eadie, 1993).
School boards have the kind of power that administrators and staffs do not have
-the legal power to oversee everything in their jurisdiction. Although the dynamics of
power enacted may vary greatly across boards and chief executives, school district chief
executives require board approval for certain major activities, such as specified human
resource decisions and expenditures.
Clearly, a school board’s power is not absolute. It is assigned by legislation,
regulation, and precedent and enacted within defined limits and conditions. Despite, or
perhaps because of these formal legal limits, the power of school boards may be
misconstrued. Macauley (1988), an administrative law expert, argues that powers
conferred by legislation “include not only such powers that are expressly granted, but
also all those powers which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
mandate which that legislation imposes” (p.29), suggesting that precision in
determining what power such a body holds is difficult to achieve. A historical lack of
clarity regarding school boards’ power continues to preoccupy school boards, as is
apparent in recommendations from the Report of the Governance Review Committee
(Ontario, 2009) to the legislature. The Committee, based on public consultation with
trustees, CEOs, other stakeholders and the public, articulated the need for what Hickcox
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(1974) called for thirty-five years earlier, the need for “a sharper delineation of the
function of trustees... and a clear statement of the power of local boards” (p. 35).
This ambiguity feeds different perceptions of school board power among
stakeholders. These include perceptions that school boards have little or no power, are
merely traditional holdovers of an earlier time, victims to provincial policy direction or
ambitious chief executives usurping whatever power they had. Coupled with these
perceptions is the portrayal of school boards as comprised of unengaged, non
participating trustees, overwhelmed by the complexity of the system, prone to defer to
their chief executive and the Ministry of Education rather than exercising what power
they might have.
Contrary to the perception of school boards as powerless, there is also a public
perception that school boards have the power to intervene and resolve certain problems
and, especially at times when local concerns become front-burner issues, to exercise
that power. A 1997 Ontario-wide labour action by teachers, described by the province
as an illegal strike and by the unions as a political protest (Bedard & Lawton, 1998),
illustrates a case where public expectations about boards’ power to influence outcomes
were misplaced. School boards had neither the resources nor the political power to
sway the proposed legislation, even though the implicit threat of the legislation for
boards was significant loss of existing power. Public school boards’ lack of power to
resolve such issues have been perceived as inaction and lack of will, highlighting a
misapprehension about what boards are legally empowered to do and the limits of that
power. Confounding the issue is the dependency of trustees on their constituents for re
election and the tension between enacting provincial mandates and representing their
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constituents, which may at times be incongruent. Thus, although school boards can
realize their power to govern, contingent features inherent in the structure and practice
of school board governance place restraints on their ability to govern as autonomously
as boards in other sectors.
Authority is the right to exercise power and requires the recognition and
acceptance of an individual, group, or institution. It implies voluntary compliance and
deference by those over whom authority is exercised. Weber’s rational-legal authority
type characterizes the authority held by school boards. As corporate bodies, school
boards’ authority is bounded by rules, understood within structures, aimed at the
achievement of some purpose and legitimized by the democratic electoral process and
the Education Act. School board authority also derives from Ministry of Education
policy and regulations, board policy and regulations, and decisions of courts in litigation
(Canadian School Board Association, 2008). In addition, authority in institutional
settings such as school boards permeates the formal hierarchy itself, where both the
rulers and the ruled recognize the distinction between authority’s exercise and
authority’s receipt (Arendt, 1993). Authority is rarely granted unconditionally, and it
can be undermined if those in authority habitually make unreasonable demands or show
they are not qualified or able to fulfill their responsibilities.
Statutes, regulations, and legal precedent confer school board authority. Within
limits fundamental to this authority, school boards do have a lawful right to make
governance decisions related to many aspects of local education programs and services,
including decisions related to teaching and supervisory staff, facilities management,
financial management, and risk management associated with strategic directions and
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system operations. Charged with oversight of their school district, school boards have
the authority to set their agenda, request and receive information, create policy, hear
appeals, and make decisions.
For governance to be effective, school boards must exercise their formal
authority and delegate to those with functional authority, especially their Chief
Executive Officer (CEO). According to Mortimer and McConnell (1978), “formal
authority is based on legitimacy...and position, whereas functional authority is based on
competence and person” (p. 19). The exercise of both formal and functional authority is
evident in the paradoxical relationship between a school board (whose formal authority
comes through relevant Acts) and their Chief Education and Executive Officer, who is
expected to command skills, competence, and knowledge that school board trustees
may not possess. As the employer, school boards exercise their authority in hiring,
supervising, and dismissing the CEO. Yet they also rely heavily on the CEO for
professional knowledge, information, and execution of board policies. Although some
school board governance literature describes the desirable relationship between school
boards and CEOs as a partnership, such implicit equity is frequently not realized, and
the relationship may be more patently understood as one of mutual dependence
(Allison, Allison & McHenry, 1995). Such exchange relationships blur the board’s
formal authority with administrators’ functional authority. To illustrate, boards depend
on the CEO to provide appropriate, relevant, adequate, and timely information, yet it
will often be left to the CEO to decide what information is appropriate, relevant,
adequate, and timely. How the CEO reports the activities of the school district to the
board cannot logically contain all relevant information, but only that information a CEO
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(or her staff) judges should be communicated, and/or that the board or a superordinate
authority has directed to be shared. Ideological beliefs may cloud whether board and
CEO roles should be fluid or clearly defined, or whether policy-making and policy
implementation roles are distinct and separable (Blumer, 1999). According to the
American Association of School Administrators (1992), the traditional view of role
separation is not widely practiced. In a human endeavour such as board governance,
context, personalities, personal and professional interests and interpersonal skills may
all be factors that affect the board/CEO relationship. Regardless, Peterson and Short
(2001) argue for role clarity as necessary for the development of positive relationships
between school board and CEO.
Eisenhardt’s (1989) principal-agent theory can be useful in explaining the muchdiscussed concern of school board/CEO relationships within the context of power and
authority. Agent opportunism, demonstrated by CEOs intent on maximizing personal
power, position, status, or organizational operations can provide a partial explanation of
the exchange relationship. On the other hand, if the board is not using its authority in
ways that lead to effective governance, a CEO’s intentions may be directed at ensuring
that the operation of the school district is not compromised. There are times, it may be
argued, when it is more expedient for any number of reasons to bypass the board
altogether. However, it becomes a prickly issue when a board allows to this happen,
since both accountability and compliance are compromised (Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Yet, school boards cannot work effectively in isolation from the chief executive.
The part time nature of their governance role requires reliance on their senior
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administrator for information, ideas, and recommended actions. It has been argued that
school boards give their power and authority away by exchanging it for the currency
they need to govern, for example, information (Greene, 1992; Resnick & Seamon,
1999). Chief executives may utilize powerful stances vis-à-vis their boards, which may
situate them in a superior position. The potential exists for some governance power and
authority to rest with the CEO, dominating the school board and influencing their
agenda and policies, risking the fiducial accountabilities that school boards have to their
various constituents. Institutional and procedural norms or deeply embedded structures,
not seen but nonetheless present (Parsons & Fidler, 2005), may accept these exchange
relationships as the cost of governing.
A second illustration underscores the challenges school boards face in realizing
their power and authority in practice. It is a governance responsibility to set and control
the board agenda, determining which items are acceptable or unacceptable for
discussion, ensuring that the agenda does not bog down with unnecessary reports, and
prioritizing items in order of action and importance. In principle the power to set the
agenda and the authority to delegate the function belong in the governance realm, yet as
Awender (1985) argues, in practice it is often the school district CEO who determines
and prioritizes the agenda.
Even though there is nothing that conceptually inhibits the practice of legitimate
school board power and authority, contingencies such as the part-time nature of the
governance role, board limits set out in legislation, as well as inherited institutional
norms and structures suggest practical reasons why de facto governance may at times be
compromised.
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Can School Boards Govern?
Earlier chapters established that governance is about both structures and
processes, as well as a social practice. Statutes primarily determine and regulate the
governance structures of school boards. The control and exercise of governance
processes reside within the sphere of board control. Together, the structures and
processes understood as governance oblige school board trustees to exercise authority,
direction, and control to discharge certain legal and fiducial obligations that ensure
educational and organizational purposes. Governance, as Chait, Holland, and Taylor
(1996); Gill, (2005); and Rosell, (1992) argued, is about overseeing and guiding the
processes by which an organization is steered. In Ontario, we entrust school boards
with oversight responsibilities and require that they make decisions necessary for the
effective operations of the seventy-two school districts in the province.
An analysis of essential governance features shows that each of the identified
features is integral to understanding school boards as they are constituted by law.
While the features may be realized differently in school boards than in boards in other
sectors, or take on iterations that set them apart from boards of other publicly funded
organizations and agencies, they are nonetheless present. School boards, put simply,
have what they need to be genuine and effective governing bodies. School boards that
adequately appreciate their governance capacities and are willing to exercise the full
extent of their legislated powers, can not only govern, but are positioned to provide
clear leadership in education through imaginative and creative oversight and decision
making.
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The Legislature has vested in school boards the power and authority to govern
and successive governments have made it clear through very public interventions that
the province will not stand by when, in its view, school boards misgovern or fall short
of their legislated and discretionary obligations. The public expects boards to govern
and demands the kind of accountability normally associated with the practice of
governance. Employee groups and parents approach school boards to negotiate or
resolve issues that pertain properly to governance. The unique situation of school
boards and the diversity and plurality of their stakeholders places trustees at the centre
of public debates and scrutiny of how education is managed in Ontario. I have
attempted to capture the unique character of school board governance that flows from
the circumstances, limitations, and constraints that are inseparable from the actual
practice of governing particular school districts. Conceptually, I refer to such
particularities as contingent features of governance. In actuality, they shape and inform
the practice of governing, such that no iteration of governance ever meets the distilled
criteria of essential governance features as they might be conceived in the abstract.

I f They Can Govern...
If school boards can govern, what then keeps some of them from fully
governing? If they adhere to the prescribed structures and processes, is it perhaps the
social practice dimension of governance that suffers from inattention?
In an American study of the attitudes and beliefs of school trustees about their
governance roles, Delagardelle (2006) found that the rhetoric of school governance
outstripped the practice and demonstrated contradictions between what school trustees
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espoused and reported. For example, school board members expressed a fear of being
overly influenced by the superintendent (CEO) and viewed as rubberstamp boards, yet
in practice they indicated they relied most heavily on the superintendent and other
professionals when making governance decisions. Moreover, trustees consistently
expressed a need to know more about their governance role, but did not take advantage
of opportunities for training and interactions with other boards. Finally, although they
voiced their reason for serving as trustee as a desire to make a difference, most admitted
that in practice they felt unable to make a difference because they lacked educational
expertise. Is it lack of confidence, lack of will, of genuine understanding of their
governance roles, or something more that prevents school boards from taking up their
governance responsibilities and leading their local district? Alternatively, is it perhaps
what Selingo (2007) believes, that “people join boards thinking they are prepared and
then they see the magnitude of the responsibility that an overseer has” (p.3). Many
board members rely on personal expertise and experience and tend to govern in ways
that reflect their professional qualifications and individual skills (Miller, 2002; Widmer,
1993). Although these assets are often vital to effective governance, the board must be
attentive to the fact that many experienced and successful individuals are newcomers to
governance work.
As discussed in Chapter One, research on governance effectiveness is promising
but inconclusive and board development activities do not conclusively lead to effective
governance. Governance codes, standards, and regulations have been imposed or
adopted across board governance sectors but such attempts to regulate governance
activities have not resolved ineffective governance issues, giving credence to Zandstra’s

200

(2002) observation that “adding laws to the legal code does not necessarily solve the
problem of crime” (p. 17). Yet the effective governance of schools matters. How
boards understand and enact their governance roles can make the difference between
dysfunctional and highly effective leadership teams.

The Burden o f Office
Paquet (1999) proposed a dimension of governance related to obligations for
ethical and accountable governance, the burden o f office. He argued that holding public
office is a privilege that carries with it this burden. Tangibly, burden of office may be
construed to include trustees’ expenditure of time, labour, and capital in properly
fulfilling their responsibilities to their constituents. Paquet broadens the meaning to
include a shared set of socially based expectations, including expectations for
governance accountability and ethical behaviour. Accountability is answerability. It
defines who can call for account and who owes a duty of explanation (Day & Klein,
1987), conveys the sense of being answerable for actions and inactions, and specifies an
individual or body to whom one is answerable. Ethics refers to standards of right and
wrong, prescribing what people ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations,
benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues. It entails ongoing reflection on personal
moral beliefs and conduct and a commitment by trustees to live up to standards that are
reasonable and decent (MacIntyre, 1984; Velasquez, Andre, Shanks, & Meyer, 1987).
Boards are obligated to guard organizational integrity and the public trust.
Trustees are expected to act as moral agents of their institutions (Houle, 1997). Boards,
while ensuring their mandate to increase profits, provide services, or oversee systems,
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must do so in ways that respect the spirit of the law and the moral expectations of the
community (Carver, 1997; Chait, Holland & Taylor, 2005; Comforth, 2001; Herman &
Renz, 2000). The language of boards embodies ethical concepts such as legitimacy,
fiduciality, honesty, public good and integrity. Expectations for ethical behaviour from
boards underlie much of the board literature, made explicit in codes of conduct and
ethical standards. Gregg (2001) describes these expectations as follows:

Directors must be able to identify the key issues facing the corporation. They
must be able to ask the questions necessary to safeguard the owners’ interest and
obtain, evaluate, and act on the answers. Their responsibilities are to ensure that
the corporation remains loyal to its corporate purpose, to exercise prudential
judgment, and to demonstrate moral courage in carrying out these functions.
(p.6)

These expectations require not only knowledge and skills from trustees, but also
the motivation and will to fulfill the requirements of governance. Boards are
answerable to all stakeholders for their decisions, including those who lack the power
to enforce compliance. Meeting ethical and accountability expectations for governance
requires more than minimum compliance. Indeed, simply satisfying legal requirements
to give the appearance of legitimacy may constitute neglect. Corporate and nonprofit
governance reports reflect a consensus that where governance works well, it re
enforces ethical behaviours; where it fails, it permits unethical practices (Cadbury
Report, 1992; PAGVS, 1999; Robinson, 2001).
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The dilemmas faced by most governing board members emerge from the
complex and uncertain circumstances of governance, where decisions may be required
from among several right answers or the lesser of undesirable courses of action. Paquet
(1999) believes that the only way to reach agreement on difficult governance decisions
is to set sufficient time for deliberation, engagement, and full involvement of all board
members in activities that develop and utilize good meeting structures, review and
improve board performance, and attend to the interactions and processes between board
members. These activities require a commitment to conversation, listening to all sides,
and appreciating that reasonable outcomes develop through discussions that compare
and contrast, exchange and negotiate alternate possibilities. Paquet’s perspective
corresponds with Chait, Ryan and Taylor’s (2005) notion of the importance of insight,
intuition, strategic acumen, and wisdom in ensuring fiducial governance obligations are
met. While these qualities do not coincide with the objectives of ethical standards and
codes, they are ethical qualities which motivate and enable such ethical behaviours.
The public places its trust in board members to ensure the best interests of all
shareholders and constituents and generally attributes organizational failure to the
decisions and behaviours of the chief executive, the board, or both. One of the most
public governance failures in recent times was Enron. A review committee charged
with uncovering the role the board played in the scandal noted the following. The
expertise of the board was not in question. Board members included CEOs, bank
executives, capital management leaders, several lawyers, the dean of a law school, a
university president, and a Harvard professor of government. Board members knew the
law, knew accounting, knew how to read a financial report, and what questions to ask

203

(Zandstra, 2002). Of the review findings, two are significant. The first was that the
board could “not be faulted for the various instances in which it was apparently denied
important information” (Powers, Troubh, & Winokur, 2001, p.23). Yet, the review
committee charged that Enron’s board did not meet their burden of office, failing to do
what they had agreed to do. In fact, the committee found that Enron’s board

can and should be faulted for failing to demand more information, and for
failing to probe and understand the information that did come to i t ... those
abuses could and should have been prevented or detected at an earlier time had
the Board been more aggressive and vigilant. (Powers, et al., p.23-24)

Strategic business decisions alone did not fell Enron. Failure by the board to act
on their governance obligations to their various publics and to attend closely to their
accountability requirements was a significant contributing factor. Moreover, it was not
one or two board members responsible for the demise of the corporation but the board
collectively, as the powers to decide are vested in the board as a whole and not in
individual directors. To meet the burden of office, it is not enough to realize the
essential governance features, but to engage these features ethically and accountably.
Trustees are obligated to act with integrity in and out of the public eye. Factors
such as imprudent prudential judgment or inadequate planning lead to organizational
problems that generally can be resolved. Governance failures are most often the result
of trustees who do not take their governance responsibilities to their full moral
implications, who do not meet burden of office. The burden of office thus suggests that
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boards not only have ethical standards to meet, they must meet them ethically.
Governance is an inherently moral endeavour. Trustees need to treat the activity of
governance itself as a responsibility, a burden of office from which they may not excuse
themselves.

Summary
All school board trustees have access to print materials and board development
activities geared toward equipping them with the knowledge required to govern their
school districts (Canadian School Board Association 2006, 2008; Ontario Public School
Board Association/Ontario Ministry of Education, 2003). It is likely that some boards
do govern effectively and of these, in ironic consequence, we hear little. Regardless,
the print and television media have reported numerous examples of school boards who
have not met governance expectations as demonstrated in court challenges regarding
school board decisions, legal proceedings against trustees accused of governance
misdeeds, and interventions by the Ministry of Education directly related to governance
issues. Yet, as Ostrower and Stone (2006) point out, governance education does not
necessarily lead to effective governance.
Over time, momentous change has altered nearly every aspect of public
education in Ontario. Yet, the essential features of governance, those features that
comprise its nature and substance, although altered, are not absent. Trustees must
apprise themselves of these features of governance, specify them in terms of the
mandate, mission, and legal framework of school board governance, and draw upon and
enact these features in bold and confident action that leads, directs and guides local
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school systems. Perhaps an overriding sense of disempowerment or the ambiguity that
surrounds school board’s roles prevents trustees from realizing the governance role
expected of them. Regardless of the reasons for inactivity, misplaced activity,
governance misdeeds, and in some cases outright incompetence, governing requires that
a person or a group take charge and steer the ship, using processes and capacity to make
and implement policy (Pierre & Peters, 2000). Moreover, governance is not simply a
concern of those who exercise this responsibility; it is of vital interest to the enterprise
or persons being governed and the various publics to whom it is to be a benefit.
The term governance brings together both the active and the substantive usage
of “to govern” and “the one (or body) who governs.” If school boards do not govern,
the error is theirs. Within the limits and the possibilities of their unique form of
governance they can clearly steer and direct their system of schools in a way that is
fully governance, although not absolute governance.
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CHAPTER SIX
A REASONED CONVERSATION
A good board is a victory, not a gift.
Cyril Houle (1997)
One must require from each one the duty that each one can perform.
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1943)

This chapter seeks to provide a summary of the inquiry, present the major
conclusions, and suggest a number of implications. The first major section of the
chapter is devoted to reviewing the problem, providing an overview of the
methodological approach adopted and summarizing the subsequent development of the
study. The implications that follow suggest considerations for boards in general and
school boards in particular focused on essential and contingent governance features and
governance as a social practice.

Overview of Study
The aim of this inquiry was to analyze the concept of governance as it is
understood in different governance literatures seeking a conceptual understanding of the
term, with the intent of answering the central research question can school boards
govern? A central task was to analyze the various conceptions of governance manifest
in current literature. Although there are any number of claims about the meaning of
governance in general, and board governance in particular, they are necessarily context
laden and subject to internal and external influences and elements (contingencies).

207

Hence, this inquiry focused on core theories of governance and board governance
largely implicit in the bodies of literature that surround and inform the practice.
Much of the literature related to board governance is prescriptive, focusing on
what boards should do, and how they should do it. If boards are to govern well,
understanding the concept of governance is at least as important as attention to activities
designed for governance effectiveness. Both are ultimately important to governance
outcomes, yet as the research has shown, practical aspects of governance such as board
structures, decision-making, and planning receive the majority of attention, with less
consideration given to the meaning of the concept itself. Yet, many boards, including
school boards, claim that their governance roles and responsibilities are unclear to them.
The term governance is ubiquitous and problematic, as previous chapters have
shown-ubiquitous because it is omnipresent in everyday usage, problematic because of
its protean character. My professional and personal governance experiences confirm
what the governance literature suggests-that boards often assume a shared meaning of
governance that leaves the collective practice of governance subject to individual,
unarticulated values and beliefs. Of problematic and ubiquitous meanings, Austin is
credited by Wamock (1999) with the following observation.

First, words are our tools and as a minimum, we should use clean tools; we
should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves
against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their
own little comer) facts of things; we need therefore to prise them off the world,
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to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies
and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. (Wamock, p.5)

Methodology and Development
The intent of this inquiry was to engage in a conceptual analysis for the purpose
of better understanding the concept of governance, as Wamock (1995) advised, to know
what we mean and what we do not mean by governance; to identify those features
essential to the concept itself; and to apply this conceptual frame to understanding
school board governance in Ontario. Toulmin (2001) observed that conceptual analysis
is worthwhile when the concept is complex, as is the case with governance. He argued
for the importance of explicating conceptual constructs, especially in actual practice
situations, because of its value in understanding the practice.
Chapters One, Two, and Three comprised the analytic phase of the study,
seeking to conceptualize and formulate the meaning of the term governance. A review
of conceptual models and understandings of governance in comparative politics,
international relations, public administration, and board governance literatures was
undertaken. The literatures reviewed spoke freely and frequently of governance,
describing how it should be practiced and what the practice entailed. Rarely did they
offer more than a paragraph or two explicating the meaning of governance itself.
A first look showed little unity or compatibility across the literatures concerning
the meaning of governance. The board governance literature in particular offered
diverse theories related to the activities of governance, assigning different values,
requirements, and expectations, as well as conflicting ranks to order their importance.
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A deeper analysis aimed at breaking down bodies of knowledge and multifaceted
perspectives into comprehensive, relational ideas about governance, showed common
elements I described as essential features. These features captured the complex,
dynamic interactions, structures, and processes that comprise governance, operant in
many venues, with different goals, constituents and stakeholders. No single feature is
adequate to say what governance is, but taken together they frame the essence of
governance.
Yet, as much as governance is a concept, it is also a human activity. As such,
the necessary or essential features could not remain in the abstract. In practice they are
embodied in forms and acts of governance in context, under particular conditions, and
within the limits and possibilities in a given place and time. Variations in governance,
specific to particular contexts that shape and influence its practice, I explained as
contingent features, recognizing the complex nature of governance and the
environments within which governance activities take place. Governance emerged not
only a structure, and a process, but also a social practice, not fixed and inert, but
influenced by settings, variables, culture, and contexts, and requirements for moral or
ethical practice. This understanding allowed me to account for the differences and
variations in the treatment of the term. By accommodating both essential and
contingent features of governance, the analysis attended to broad variations of context
found in an array of literatures and fields.
The literature review led to a conceptual model of governance, comprised of
both essential and contingent features. No attempt was made to identify a single
understanding of governance, as what governance ought to be and do is not derived
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exclusively from a definition of governance or a list of its essential features. Rather
essential and contingent features were treated as continuous, reminding us that every
theoretical conceptualization includes descriptive-explanatory elements, reflective of
the social, political, economic, and other contexts in which governance occurs.
Practically, the continuity between essential features (those recurrent, constants that
comprise the concept) and contingent features (those aspects that contribute to and
influence governance as a social practice) permitted a multi-perspective understanding
made possible by including aspects of governance that would otherwise be excluded as
being non-essential.
Chapters Four and Five clarified and challenged the emerging conceptual
framework, using the newly articulated concept of governance, understood through the
lens of essential and contingent features, to make sense of the question of school board
governance. Judgments as to the relevance of the conceptual framework were sought
through historical, political, and practice lenses. Existing conceptions of governance
were challenged by considering the conceptual frame of essential and contingent
features in relation to the actual practice of school board governance, taking into
account the numerous contingencies that influence and control how school board
governance is enacted. I concluded that structurally and procedurally, school boards can
govern.
Although the analysis identified essential and contingent features of governance,
it also recognized that board governance is not practiced in the abstract. Ultimately,
how both essential and contingent features are realized and influence governance
requires boards to commit to ethical practice. Paquet (1999) spoke of obligations for
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ethical and accountable governance, the burden of office. Burden of office enriched the
conceptual understanding of governance attained in the earlier chapters and served to
illustrate MacIntyre’s (1984) beliefs regarding the role of ethical or moral behaviour in
social practice situations.

Conclusions
At least five main conclusions emerged from this study. First, the meaning of
governance in the board governance literature is assumed, rarely explicated and the
practice of governance is more written about than the concept itself. Although political
science literatures explored different perspectives and approaches to the concept, with
few exceptions board governance literatures generally subscribed to a straightforward,
corporate model of governance. Second, the concept of governance is comprised of six
essential features without which its understanding is incomplete. These features are
power, authority, legitimacy, fiduciality, governance as political and oriented toward a
public good. These showed themselves to be common elements across the various
bodies of literature. Third, the concept of governance cannot be fully understood
without attention to contingent features, those features of governance specific to
context, time, place, and a variety of influences. Fourth, governance is a social practice.
As such, the activities of board members in the act of governing contribute to the
outcomes of governing activities, both positive and negative. Fifth, school boards can
govern. They can realize the essential features of governance. Contingencies that
particularize their governance context may deter them from fully realizing the essential
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features, but do not solely account for the problems and criticisms that school boards
continue to face.

Limitations
Certain limitations in the execution of this inquiry are acknowledged.
a) The first arises from the plurality of diverse literatures that focused on
different aspects of governance and expressed somewhat divergent
expectations for its practice. Board governance literature, a relatively
new tradition, chiefly addresses normative and structural aspects of
board governance, not the meaning of governance itself. In the absence
of board governance research taking up the critical question of board
governance, the analysis offered here can serve only as provisional
account.
b) Secondly, because conceptual analysis led me to focus my attention on a
variety of literatures, I did not mine the lived understanding of school
board governance that contributes to its practice through trustees past
and present, nor those of other interested agents. In order to deepen and
articulate the values and virtues of governance necessary for excellence
within the social practice, empirical, interpretive research is needed to
learn what trustees actually do, how they act, and what they think.
c) A related limitation was the need to rely on school board governance
literature often written from the perspective of educational
administration. Generally, this literature includes unarticulated
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assumptions of what school board governance is and does, assumptions
not exposed to critical analysis. The value of this inquiry is limited until
more scholars explore school board governance from a board governance
perspective, that is, until there is more conversation occurring about
governance qua governance.
d) Every empirical study requires a conceptual framework. I have
contributed to the construction of such a framework, but it needs to be
exposed and tested against the experience of trustees, funders and all
those who have an interest in governance.

Synthesis
Implicit in much of the board governance literature reviewed in this inquiry is
the argument that board governance is more than structures and processes; it is a social
practice, influenced largely by board members themselves. Governance as a social
practice serves as a unifying and explanatory notion that unites the findings of this
inquiry. In exploring Aristotle’s notion of virtues, MacIntyre (1984) stressed the
relationship of attitudes, dispositions, and behaviours to the attainment of excellence in
human activity. In the sense conveyed by the term social practice, governance is not
simply a static, structural function, but a dynamic activity, a verb, as it were, rather than
a noun: the social practice of governing.
Much of the literature reviewed in this project dealt with the outcomes of
governance. From an organizational standpoint, governance was depicted as the
uppermost level of a corporate pyramid, indicating where the “buck stops” and the
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reporting direction within the organization. Its focus was on achieving the goals for
which an institution, organization, corporation, or agency was established, for example,
profits, production of goods, provision of services, or coordination of systems.
MacIntyre (1984) would describe this approach as focused on external goods, which in
some cases are pursued at the cost of fully developing the inherent qualities or internal
goods of governance. MacIntyre argues that excellence in governance itself (an internal
good) leads to the attainment of external goods through ethical means. For example, a
corporate board, whose external goods include maximizing profits, may choose to do so
by depleting an employment pension plan. Yet, in doing so, the good of governance,
internal to the practice, is lost. Although profits are an external good in a corporate
governance context, they were not achieved through an internal good, specific to the act
of governance.
The internal good of governance, excellence in governing, is of two kinds. The
first involves the practitioners’ (trustees) “participation in the attempts to sustain
progress and to respond creatively to problems” (MacIntyre, 1984, p.190), arising out of
and producing the second good of governance, the care and sustainment of human
communities toward social progress. Moreover, “[i]t is characteristic of [internal
goods] that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the
practice” (MacIntyre, p.190). When a governing board excels in the way it governs, all
boards can share in the benefit, because the understanding of what it means to govern
attains a higher plateau, and a higher standard is set for all who take part in governance
activities.
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Thus, if governance is accepted as a social practice that is carried on by
individuals who have come together to perform the activity of governing, of overseeing,
directing, and guiding a corporate human endeavour to its desirable ends, then the
essential features of governance are best construed as verbs, rather than nouns. We
should speak of acting authoritatively, rather than of authority; of exercising power,
rather than of power; of working toward the social good; and so on. Moreover, the first
task of a governing board is to recognize their corporate identity and learn how to work
together as a board, as a group. Good governance is not simply a matter of individuals
doing their best, but of cooperative action: “its goods can only be achieved by
subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners”
(MacIntyre, 1984, p.191).
Governance as a social practice also transcends the so-called normative
literature that reiterates the need for technical skills and effective procedures. While
these can play a crucial role in effective governance, they derive their meaning and
value from the notion of governance itself. Nor can the good of governance be
identified with the good of the institution being governed. The good internal to
education is intrinsically related to, but distinct from, the good of governing an
education system. School board governance cannot ignore the importance of skills and
procedures, cannot operate without reference to the goods of education, or ignore the
requirement for funding or the need for being re-elected (both of which would be
considered external goods by MacIntyre).
With emphasis on education as a basic human right and the duty of governments
to provide universal public access to education, school boards must find ways to
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maintain their integrity as governing bodies, while defining themselves as operating
within a social context that has emerged as substantially different from that of the 19th
or 20th century. How boards see themselves, how they understand the social practice of
governance, and the ways in which they appropriate and adapt the activities through
which power, authority, and so on are embodied and made real, is integral to a realistic
and credible conception of governance.
As Stout (2001) notes, internal goods “can only be achieved by participating in
the activity well” (p.267) and true practitioners establish their excellence and expertise
as governors by how they govern. Therefore, the question can school boards govern?
should not be answered simply by demonstrating that school boards, by statute and in
public view, are in possession of all the features of governance that are integral to and
necessary for the concept of governance.

Implications
Since governance is not an empty category, it must be asked whether trustees are
prepared to take on the office of governance, are aware of, and prepared to work at the
goods internal to the practice of governance, and to develop the abilities needed to
attain them. Among these are the ability of school boards to critically assess their own
practice and the role of social criticism, as shown by Stout (2001). At several points in
this project, I have noted the presence of social criticism, as voiced in the media, in
parental voices, and especially by lawmakers and government ministries. This study,
however, cannot be concluded without some discussion of the need for school boards to
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engage in self-criticism. Stout lists four characteristics of constructive criticism. It must
be
a) radical enough to account for the misgivings that reasonable people
might have about how the board governs; b) generous enough to account
for when governance is well practiced; c) non-utopian, in order to sustain
reasonable hope and d) cooperative, in order to foster positive action
among board members and between boards, their agencies, and their
stakeholders. (Stout, 2001, p.277)

Without presuming to develop a comprehensive rubric for self-criticism by school
boards, the following suggestions are offered.
a) School board trustees must ask themselves radical questions, such as whether
their agenda is driven by the external demands of the funder. School boards
find themselves in an inextricable relationship with their primary source of
funding. If consciousness of this relationship makes them lose sight of their
ability to make independent judgments and to accept the responsibility for the
decisions they must make, then questions and misgivings will inevitably arise
about their capacity to govern.
b) The political language of student success, raising test scores, or funding
formulas cannot be allowed to colonize the language of the social activity of
governing. School boards must find ways to highlight and appreciate their
achievements in bringing together the demands of the marketplace, the political
world, and the needs of schools and educators through prudent, courageous, and
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just governing actions. These achievements set a standard for governance and
demonstrate the value of the local in education governance. They establish
school boards as governing bodies in their own right, with their own autonomy,
rather than as weak partners caught between the jaws of central authority and
popular opinion.
c) School boards must review their rhetoric on a regular basis. In implementing
untested educational initiatives coming from government or enforcing
unpopular local policies, school boards need to be aware of the discourse they
employ. Echoing unfounded political promises that come with new bureaucratic
programs or promising greater satisfaction, for example, to disgruntled parents
whose local school is being closed, leaves constituents feeling excluded and
raises doubts regarding a board’s willingness to act in its own name.
d) School boards must see themselves in a tradition of school board governance
and accept the reality of their role and status as partners in a province-wide
process of local school governance. Billion dollar budgets, complex
environments, and vast school districts create governance responsibilities far
different from those faced by trustees in earlier times. Yet much of school
boards’ enabling legislation and many of the expectations held by and for them
remains rooted in outdated assumptions. School boards must not only
participate and initiate dialogue that clarifies and shapes their current practice,
but also foster a positive tradition among board members and between boards,
their agencies, and their stakeholders.
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e) Boards should be expected to set standards for themselves (some observers see
the opposite as having taken place in the recent Ontario school board
legislation, Bill 177). This implies that they not concentrate on the tasks of
governance to the exclusion of the practice of governance. Trustees who do not
take the time to engage in the practical learning of what governance is and
requires risk weakening their own role, at best, and of misgoverning, at worst.

There are, indeed, countless other specific things that school boards could do to
engage in the kind of self-criticism that leads to the practice of governing well. This
brings us to the critical question, not can school boards govern ,?, but can school boards
arrive at a credible and operative understanding of governance, that is enabling and
facilitating of excellence in this most necessary human activity? This study has been an
attempt to foster movement toward such a realization.

Concluding Remarks
Interest in board governance has grown, as is reflected in the enormity and
complexity of the literature that was the material and means for analyzing the concept
of governance. A heightened awareness of governance spurred by board scandals,
legislative and regulatory changes aimed at governance reforms, as well as media
attention to a myriad of governance issues has brought the practice of governance and
the language surrounding it to the mainstream.
This inquiry provides a point of reference for understanding and discussing
school boards as governing bodies. The notion and nature of the essential and
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contingent governance features emerging from the inquiry afford a language for school
boards (and other governing boards) to assess their practice and to engage in reasoned
conversation about roles, responsibilities, and ethical issues. In this and related ways,
the inquiry can serve as a step toward creating a commons for the discussion of board
governance.
When I began the inquiry, I was unsure whether Ontario school boards could
govern, that is, whether there might be inherent features or conditions that limited what
school boards could actually do and aspire to do in the realm of governance. My
curiosity was informed by the claims of boards and interested observers that provincial
statutes and regulations constrained school board power and authority to such an extent
that governance was no longer possible. Conceptual analyses of governance and school
board governance has shown this reasoning to be invalid. School boards can indeed
realize the essential features of governance, in spite of the various contingencies that
shape and influence their practice.
School boards that fulfill only their minimum statutory role or ones that work to
unduly influence operational management are not realizing the fullness of their
governance capacity. Perhaps this is because their focus is on how much power and
authority they have or have lost, or they adhere to a particular, reinforcing approach to
governance, embedded in the systems and processes of the institution and inherited
tradition. Such perspectives isolate and distance school boards from the publics they
are elected to represent and keep them from cultivating and developing those attitudes,
dispositions, relationships, and practices that foster the internal good of effective
governance.
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Governing is not a status, but a practice. As I have sought to demonstrate,
school boards do not lack the institutional capacity to govern and need not lack the
resources. Yet, they need an understanding of what it means to govern, the will to
govern, and a commitment to nurturing requisite competencies. Without this, boards
are akin to a ship at sea which has lost its rudder. The helmsmen can engage various
steering-like (the literal meaning of governance) gestures, but without the stabilizing
and directional underpinning that a rudder provides, the ship is out of control.
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